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INTERPRETING INDIAN COUNTRY IN STATE OF
ALASKA v. NATIVE VILLAGE OF VENETIE
Kristen A. Carpenter*
I. INTRODUCTION
I think that the [Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act] will never fully to the
extent advocate and stand individually for the real Native part of us. I think that
ANCSA is not totally Native. It is written in the Western-adopted ways, and that
it has that business nature where the land is collateral, just like a car or anything.
Anyone, in one way or another, gambles with it, and Western laws apply to it. We
have a limited say on it. ANCSA -- if it has to be there -- it should be for the
good, to help us but not take away our way of life.
This is the Native personal part of us. Talking about land is about our everyday,
individual part of us. Our ancestors survived because of the land. A large portion
of our diet still comes from the land. What if, sometime in the future, the food is
still on the land, but the land is taken away and in the hands of others who wouldn't
permit us to go out and hunt for the game, etc. With no money to pay to hunt, if
that was the only way. I think, in this modern day and age, you have to pay for
everything. What would we do?'
A large body of statutory law of the United States affects American Indians and
Alaska Natives 2 in many aspects of their tribal and individual lives.3 Statutes come
to life under various conditions. In some instances, tribes influence the enactment of
statutes affecting them, but often the legislative process is deaf to Indian input.
* Judicial Clerk, Judge John C. Porfilio, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, J.D., cum laude, 1998,
Harvard Law School; A.B., cure laude, 1994, Dartmouth College
1. Virginia Commack, Ambler, Alaska, in THOMAS BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA
NATivE REvImV CONWISSION 92 (1985) [hereinafter "BERGER"].
2. Like many Indian law articles, this one uses the terms "Indian" .native" and "indigenous" somewhat
interchangeably. "Alaska Natives" include Tlingit, Eyak, Haida, Tsimshian and Athabaskan Indians, Aleuts, Inupiats,
and Yupiks. These cultural and linguistic groups are represented in 220 federally recognized Alaska Native tribes. See
generally, DAVID CASE, ALASKA NATVES AND AMRICAN LAws 333 (1997) [hereinafter" CASa"].
3. See Rennard Strickland and Glora Valencia-Weber, Observations on the Evolution of Indian Law in the Law
Schools, 26 N.M. REV. 153, 167 (1996) [Federal law affects] over 550 federally recognized tribes and 200 plus in
the process of qualifying for such a nation-to-nation relationship. Through [Title 25 of the U.S. Code and Code of
Federal Regulations], individual Indians also have a unique relationship with the federal government, which reaches
into everyday life to affect occupations, family relations, land title, probate and other matters in ways that no other
citizens experience.)
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Congress sometimes makes its intent clear, but other times drafts vague or incomplete
statutes. Fortunately for the courts, agencies, public, and Congress itself, certain
canons guide interpretation of statutory law. According to federal Indian law's
canons of construction: (1) laws enacted for the benefit of Indians are construed
liberally in favor of the Indians; 4 (2) drafting language is interpreted as the Indians
would have understood it;5 and (3) ambiguities cannot diminish existing Indian rights
because Congress must do so explicitly.6 These canons have developed over
hundreds of years of legal interactions between Indians and Euro-Americans and can
offer clarity, stability, and harmony in an otherwise confusing maze of federal Indian
law.
A doctrine of statutory interpretation presently challenges certain applications
of the Indian canons. Announced by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,7 the doctrine requires that courts defer to
administrative agency interpretations of ambiguous language in statutes they are
authorized to administer. Federal administrative agencies must often interpret
statutes affecting Indians. In instances where agencies have construed vague
statutory language against Indian interests, not as Indians would have understood it,
or as abrogating reserved rights, Chevron deference and the Indian canons dictate
opposite results for a reviewing court. This conflict muddles Indian law jurispru-
dence, produces uncertainty among affected individuals and communities, and
weakens the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes.
The federal courts of appeal have split on the question of whether Chevron
deference trumps the Indian canons. The Supreme Court has avoided opportunities,
including the recent case of State ofAlaska v. Native Village of Venetie to resolve the
issue. In Venetie the Court considered whether land owned in fee simple by Alaska
Native tribes,9 pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA),0
constituted "Indian Country."" If the tribal lands were Indian Country, the tribe
would retain its authority to tax non-Indians doing business there. ANCSA itself did
not describe whether such lands were Indian Country; the tribe urged the Court to
4. See Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
5. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1970).
6. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
7. 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984)
8. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
9. The Native Village of Venetie, a federally recognized Indian tribe, owns the lands at issue in Venetie, but
generally, Alaska Native corporations own land pursuant to ANCSA. SeeMartha H-irshfield, Note, TheAlaska Native
Claims SettlementAct: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALELJ. 1331 (1992) for a discussion of
ANCSA's creationAfstate chartered village and regional corporations, comprised of Alaska Native village members,
to receive federal benefits.
10. 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (West 1994).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994) (defining Indian Country as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.). Id.
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interpret this silence as leaving tribal jurisdiction intact while the State argued the
opposite. Although the United States did not appear in the litigation, the State cited
a Department of the Interior Solicitor's Opinion expressing the view ANCSA had
abrogated Indian Country. Thus the case involved both an ambiguous statute
affecting Indians and an agency interpretation contrary to Indian interests and thereby
presented the question of whether the Indian canons trump Chevron deference. The
Supreme Court, however, did not answer, or even discuss, this question when it held
the ANCSA had generally extinguished Indian Country in Alaska, including in the
Native Village of Venetie.12
Examining the problem under three jurisprudential frameworks, I argue the
Court should have rejected the Solicitor's Opinion on Indian Country's existence in
Alaska, if it had reached the issue.13 First, as a matter of administrative law, the
Solicitor's Opinion was an unauthorized, unpublished and informal agency
interpretation. The Opinion, therefore, lacked the weight of law and could and was
not binding on the courts: it had no claim to Chevron deference. Second, as a matter
of federal Indian law, because the ANCSA is a statute enacted for the benefit of
Indians and contains ambiguous language, courts must interpret it with the aid of the
Indian canons. Under the Indian canons, Congressional silence could not have
extinguished Indian Country, and the Solicitor's belief to the contrary was incorrect.
Third, as a matter of indigenous Indian law, 4 indigenous peoples must be meaning
fully involved in lawmaking affecting them. Because the Solicitor's Opinion deeply
affected Alaska Natives but failed to incorporate Alaska Native interpretations of
Indian Country under ANCSA, it violated indigenous Indian law, and should not have
informed the Court's decision.
Justice Thomas' thirteen-page opinion in Venetie did not mention the
Solicitor's Opinion. The Court thereby avoided the administrative law, federal Indian
law, and indigenous Indian law analyses under which the Indian canons would have
trumped the Solicitor's Opinion. This article undertakes the these analyses because
each suggests important problems in interpreting the ANCSA and other statutes
enacted for the benefit of Indians. Although the decision to write about what was not
in a Supreme Court decision may seem peculiar, in Venetie, like in many Indian law
cases, the untold story is the one most revealing.
12. See Venetie 522 U.S. 520.
13. Thisarticledeliberatelytakesanarrowfocuson Venetie; Ihighlightthe Solicitos OpinionbecausetheSupreme
Court totally ignored it and because it raises the Chevron deference- Indian canons conflict. Other articles, published
before and after the Supreme Court's decision, have considered the case more broadly. See generally, Dean B. Suagee,
Cruel Irony in the Quest of an Alaska Native Tribe For Self-Determination, 13-WTR Nat. Resources & Env't 495
(1999); Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of Indian Country, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 283 (1997); Donald Craig
Mitchell, (Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie): Statutory Construction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts,
14 ALASKA L. REv. 353 (1997); Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Indian Country and Inherent Tribal Authority: Will They
Survive ANCSA, 14 ALASKA L. REv. 443 (1997).
14. "Indigenous Indian law" is a term I have created for the purpose of this paper. As described in Section V,
indigenous Indian law is an alternative approach to the legal problems of American Indians and Alaska Natives. Instead
of relying exclusively, or heavily, on non-Indian sources and institutions, indigenous Indian law looks to traditional
tribal custom to encounter-era relations between Indians and non-Indians and to international law to identifi indigenous
legal theories and practices.
1999]
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I. VENETIE15
Nearly 800 miles north of Alaska's capital -- above the Arctic Circle at the foot
of the Brooks range in a land as wild as any area in America -- is the homeland of the
Venetie Tribe of Neets'aii Gwich'in Indians. The Venetie people have governed,
hunted and fished their land since time immemorial according to ancient tribal
customs and traditions, in a society where children still speak Gwich'in as a first
language and life still largely follows the migratory rhythms of caribou and salmon. 16
Presently, the Venetie lands are owned in communal fee simple by the Native Village
of Venetie, a federally recognized Athabascan Indian tribe including 350 enrolled
members in 99 households who reside primarily in the villages of Venetie and Arctic
Village. 7 Traditionally, Neets'aii Gwich'in people lived, hunted and fished, raised
their children, governed themselves, and moved seasonally in "vast aboriginal
lands."'" One tribal member and resident of Arctic Village explained:
According to legends, our story's location is at the source of the Porcupine River--
at least that is where our legendary hero CH'ITEEHAAKWAII presumably starts.
Our people, the NEETS'AII and NEETS'IGW]TCH'IN, being a nomadic tribe,
were not always restricted to this valley. Some elders believe our kinship extends
throughout interior Alaska, that some of our relatives are still living in Bettles,
Stevens Village, and other places in Alaska and Canada.19
Russian, English, Spanish and American explorers explored and occupied
various regions of Native Alaska between the 1750's and 1900's. Pursuant to the
Treaty of Purchase of 1867, the U.S. purchased Alaska from Russia and began to
administer it as a territory. "In 1938, the Neets'aii petitioned the Secretary of the
Interior to set aside a portion of their vast aboriginal lands in Alaska as a reservation
to protect their exclusive use and occupancy of the land."20 Under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA), the Neets'aii Gwich'in ratified a constitution in
1940, and in 1943 the Secretary designated 1.8 million acres of land as the Venetie
Reservation.2" Alaskajoined theUnited States under the Alaska Statehood Act 1958.
Many Alaska Native groups had unresolved land claims stretching into the
1960's when oil companies sought to exploit oil reserves in Alaska. In 1966
Secretary of the Department of the Interior Stewart Udall froze land transactions so
that Alaska Native title could be settled before he issued a permit for the Trans-
15. The name of the village is pronounced "vee-neh-tie." Since 1998 "the Venefie case" has been cited often, but
both courts and litigants seem to have trouble referencing it orally.
16. Respondentfs Brief, Alaska v. Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), [hereinafter "Resp. Br."].
17. See Id. at 3.
18. Id.
19. LincolnTrittA Glimpse oftheAboriginal Society, in RAvENTELUs SToRis, JOSEPH BRUCHAC, ED., 214
(1991) (capitalization in original).
20. Resp. Br., supra note 16 at 3.
21. See id.
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Alaska Pipeline.' Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) of 1971' to settle the land claims of Alaska Natives and pave the way for
the oil industry.24
ANCSA created state-chartered regional and village corporations, including
the village corporations of Venetie and Arctic Village, comprised of the Neets'aii
Gwich'in occupants of the Venetie Reservation. ANCSA' permitted conveyance of
44 million acres of land to the Native corporations, along with a cash settlement just
under $1 billion, "in exchange for the purported extinguishment" of Native land
claims in Alaska.2 6 The statute revoked the reservations of Alaska Natives,27 but gave
village corporations the option of taking fee title to their former reservation lands in
lieu of sharing in the monetary, land, regional corporation, and other provisions and
obligations of the Act.' In 1974, the Neets'aii Gwich'in took advantage of this
option.29 The United States conveyed to the Venetie and Arctic Village corporations,
as tenants in common, fee simple title to the reservation lands. In 1979 tribal
members, acting through the two village corporations, reconveyed their reservation
lands to the Native Village of Venetie, IRA, and then the two village corporations
dissolved."0
Although ANSCA was a statute focused on Alaska native lands, it did not
reference "Indian Country, 3 1 the statutory term of art for Indian lands where federal
22. See Guy Martin, The Politics of Passage, The Native Land Claims, Alaska Department of Education, 4
(1975), http://www.ankn.uaf.edu/passage.html [hereinafter "Martin"]
23. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994).
24. See Martin, supra note 22 at 4.
25. This is not an article on the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which has a complex structure and legacy.
See generally, Hirschfield, 101 YALE L. J. 1331, The Alaska Native Claims SettlementAct: Tribal Sovereignty and
the Corporate Form (1992); Patricia Thompson, Comment, Recognizing Sovereignty inAlaska Native VillagesAfter
the Passage of ANCSA, 68 WASH. L. REV. 373 (1993); Shannon D. Work, Comment, The Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act: An Illusion in the Questfor Native Self-Determination, 66 OR. L. REV. 195 (1987). It is important
to state, however, that people in Alaska have mixed feelings on the ANCSA. Many would describeANCSA as the most
generous and fair native claim settlement act in the history of the United States. See, e.g, COHENS HANDBOOK OF
FEDERALINDIAN LAW 197 (1982 ed.) [hereinafter "COHEN"] (" [ANCSA was] a major victory forAlaska Natives who
had been seeking a settlement of their aboriginal land claims for many years."). Others argue ANCSA was passed
without attention to many Native needs and real circumstances, imposed a corporate system that did not protect Native
resources, was predestined to fail economically, and sought to dismantle Native institutions and cultures. See generally,
THOMAS R. BERGER, VILAGE JOuPNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION (1985)
(providing critical analysis and first hand testimony from Alaska Native villagers). For one example of contemporary
economic consequences oftheANCSA, see David Whitney, ANCHORAGE DAmY NEWs, SenateApproves Calista Land
Deal, October 9, 1998 (The U.S. Senate approved a "financial lifesaver" exchange of 218,585 acres inside the Yukon
Delta National Wildlife Refuge owned by Calista, the Native corporation for Southwestern Yupik Eskimos, for $39.4
million in recapitalization. The land-for-dollars-deal was prompted by the corporation's "financial losses, stemming
from a spate of bad investments with its $80 million from the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act [which] have
prevented any payments of stock dividends for the last 13 years.").
26. See CASE, supra note 2 at 17.
27. See 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994).
28. See 43 U.S.C § 1618(b) (1994).
29. See State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520.
30. See Id.; see also, Resp. Br., supra note 16 at 5 ("The Venetie Tribe was one of only six Alaska tribes to select
the option afforded by § 1618(b) to retain its former Reservation, and it is the only tribe which used its village
corporations solely as a vehicle to retain communal fee title to the Reservation in the tribal government.") Id. (italics
added).
31. ANCSA lacked language on the broad category of "Indian Country." It did reference two of the subsets of
Indian Country - leaving in place "allotments," see 43 U.S.C. § 1617 (1994), and revoking "reservations," see 43
U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994) -but took no action with respect to "dependent Indian communities." Thus, ANCSA can be
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and tribal, rather than state, jurisdiction exists. The Indian Country statute, 18
U.S.C. §1151, was first enacted to define the scope of federal jurisdiction over major
crimes between Indians occurring on Indian lands. 2 It provides that Indian Country
includes reservations, allotments, and dependent Indian communitites, Because the
Indian Country statute is now used to deliniate Indian lands for both civil and
criminal purposes, 33 "[t]he designation of an area as Indian country has become
extremely important to Native Americans."34
[Designation of Indian Country] recognizes [Native] rights to control their own
lives and affairs within that area. In Indian country, Natives enjoy inherent
sovereignty, i.e., the right to self-government and self-determination. Specifically,
in Indian country, a tribal government has the following powers: to enact and
impose taxes; to adopt and enforce its own internal tribal laws; to adjudicate civil
and criminal disputes and minor criminal offenses that occur on tribal lands; to
issue marriage licenses; to buy and sell real property; to regulate land use; to
provide essential and non-essential governmental services; and to regulate affairs
of non-Natives on tribal land. Also in Indian country, Native Alaskan tribal
governments enjoy the same sovereign immunity possessed by federal and state
governments. They can be sued only if they consent or if they engage in acts
beyond the scope of their authority.3
most precisely described as being silent on the dependent Indian community category of Indian Country. However, this
article follows the parties and courts' lead by describing the issues as whether, generally, ANCSA abrogated Indian
Country inAlaska and whether, specifically, the Native Village of Venetie was a "dependent Indian community." Thus,
ANCSA can be mostprecisely describedas being silent on the dependent Indian community category of Indian Country.
However, I have followed the parties and courts' lead by describing the issues as whether, generally, ANCSA abrogated
Indian Country in Alaska and whether, specifically, the Native Village of Venetie was a "dependent Indi an community."
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151; 1153 (1994). In 1885, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act, codified as amended,
18 U.S.C. 1153, in response to Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556,571-72 (1883). In Crow Dog, the Court held the
Dakota Territorial court was without jurisdiction to impose a death sentence on Crow Dog, who had murdered Spotted
Tail on tribal lands. Instead, the tribe's traditional restitutionary sentence would stand. "The Court's sanction of'red
man's revenge' [in CrowDog] caused popular outrage among Americans and prompted the passage of the Major Crimes
Act" to extend federal jurisdiction over murder and other crimes committed by one Indian against another in Indian
Country. Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Politcal Status of
Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV 507,527 (1987).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994); see also, Scott A. Taylor, State Property Taxation of Tribal Fee Lands Located
Within Reservation Boundaries: Reconsidering County ofYakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation and Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Cass Country, 23 AM. IND.L. REv. 55,71-72 (1998):
"Federal courts have recently started using § 1151 to define Indian country when deciding the reach of state taxing
power over Indian lands. The Supreme Court's first explicit use of §1151 to limit state taxing power was in
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114,123 (1993)... Why the Supreme Court has decided
to use the section 1151 definition of Indian Country in state tax cases is unclear... The purpose of section 1151 is
to establish the iurisdiction of federal courts overmaiorcrimes thatNativeAmericans commitwithin Indian country
... [S]ection 1151 reflects the federal policy that Congress, in the absence of state criminal jurisdiction, has taken
the power to prosecute major crimes from tribes and taken over the responsibility itself.... Indian country, as defined
in section 1151 could very well be too broad or narrow in establishing the limits of state taxing power." Id.
(emphasis added) (citation added).
34. See Marilyn J. NWard Ford, Indian Country and Inherent Tribal Authority: Will They Survive ANCSA?, 14
ALASKA L. REv. 443,451 (1997).
35. Id. Beyond its jurisdictional meaning, "Indian Country" is "a place that marks the endurance of Indian
communities against the onslaught of marauding European societies; it is also a place that holds the promise of
fulfillment. As Lakota people say, "Hecel lena Oyate nipikte" (That these people may live)." FRANK POMMERSHEIM,
INTERPRETING INDIAN COUNTRY
Beyond its jurisdictional meaning, Indian Country is "a place that marks the
endurance of Indian communities against the onslaught of marauding European
societies; it is also a place that holds the promise of fulfillment.
36
Alaska natives and others believed ANSCA's settlement of land claims left
intact Alaska native jurisdiction over the lands they retained. 37 Prior to ANCSA,
Alaska Native tribes had exercised civil regulatory jurisdiction over their lands and,
in Federal Indian law, Indian rights are reserved unless Congress explicitly terminates
them 38 Congress had made no statement abrogating Indian Country in ANSCA.
Further, ANSCA had been enacted during the "self-determination without termina-
tion" policy-era, during which the federal government recognized the importance of
tribal government and other institutions, without abating federal responsibilities to
tribes or rescinding tribal rights under federal law.39 But others believed Congress
sought to treat Alaska Natives differently from Indians in the lower 48 states who did
retainjurisdiction over their lands;40 and thus in ANSCA, Congress abrogated Indian
Country by implication, if not by express language. Congress' 1987 Amendments to
ANCSA were explicit in not making law on the Indian Country issue. Section 17 of
the Amendments Act provides:
(a) No provision of this Act (the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act amend-
ments of 1987)... shall be construed to validate or invalidate or in any way
affect... any assertion that Indian country (as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151 or any
other authority) exists or does not exist within the boundaries of the State of
Alaska."41
In these amendments, Congress revealed both its own uncertainty on just what, if
anything, ANSCA had done to Indian Country and the fact that competing
BRAiD OF FEATHERS, 11-36 (1995) [hereinafter "PONMMERSHEIM"] (describing Lakota reservations particularly and the
meaning of reservation as place more generally).
36. FRANKPOmiMERHEI,BRAIDOFFEATHERS, 11-36 (1995) [hereinafter "POMMERSHEIM"] (describing Lakota
reservations particularly and the meaning of reservation as place more generally. Observing, "As Lakota people say,
"Hece lena Oyate nipikte" (That these people may live)").
37. See CASE, supra note 2, at 458.
38. Alaska Natives also retained and exercised civil adjudicatory jurisdiction to the extent possible under Public
Law 280. P.L. 280, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1984), conferred on the courts ofseveral states, including Alaska,
jurisdiction over civil matters in Indian Country, but did not abolish tribal court jurisdiction over the same matters,
creating a framework of concurrent jurisdiction. See generally, Suzanne Di Pietro, Tribal Court Jurisdiction and
Public Law 280: What Role for Tribal Courts in Alaska, 10 ALASKA L. REv. 335 (1993) (discussing the contours of
civil and criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280.
39. In the 1960's, the executive and legislative branches denounced earlier federal policy of "terminating" the
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes. "The new policy advocated "self-determination without
termination" for Indian tribes, and was most clearly articulated in President Nixon's 1970 Special Message to Congress
on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564-76 calling upon the federal government to "explicitly affirm the integrity and right
to continued existence of all Indian tribes and Alaska Native governments." Id. at 567.
40. See generally Mitchell, supra note 13, at 377-78.
41. Pub. L. No. 100-241, § 17(a), 101 Stat. 1814, Feb. 3, 1988.
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interpretations were brewing in Alaska.42 In 1993, the Solicitor of the Department
of Interior attempted to ascertain what ANCSA meant for tribal status and Indian
Country in Alaska. Summing up his research and legal analysis, the Solicitor
released, "Governmental Jurisdiction of Alaska Native Villages Over Land and Non-
Members," the Solicitor's Opinion was released on January 11, 1993, in the closing
days of the Bush Administration. After detailing the federal perspective on Alaska
Native history and law, the opinion finally, "rejected the notion that there are no tribes
in Alaska" and concluded "Native Corporation lands do not qualify as Indian
Country."43 The second conclusion is relevant to the Venetie case.44
The Solicitor acknowledged that the question of Indian Country was
politically sensitive, and stated, "in our effort, we have consulted with Governor and
Attorney Generat of Alaska; numerous Native leaders in Alaska and the contiguous
states, as well as their counsel; the Alaska congressional delegation and other
congressional leaders; and the members of the Joint-Federal State Commission on
Policies and Programs Affecting Alaska Natives... We have received numerous
comments, including several detailed briefs."'45 Further, "this opinion has been one
of the most difficult to prepare during my tenure at the Department of the Interior. ,,46
Despite the important and difficult nature of the issues therein, the Solicitor's Opinion
was neither published, nor subjected to public scrutiny, and has been under
reconsideration since the Clinton administration assumed power.47 Nonetheless, it
was a very significant voice in the debate over what ANSCA meant for Indian
Country.
With the question of Indian Country still looming, the State of Alaska entered
into a joint venture with a private contractor to construct a public school in Venetie
in 1986. After the contractor and the State refused the Tribe's demand for
approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting business on tribal land, the Tribe
brought a collection action in tribal court. The state then sought an injunction in
federal district court, arguing Venetie lacked authority to tax nonmembers of the tribe
because Venetie's ANSCA lands were not Indian Country. The district court
evaluated Indian Country with respect to four factors:
(1) the nature of the area; (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants to one
another, to Indian tribes, and the federal government; (3) the extent to which the
inhabitants and Indian tribes of the area are under the superintendence of the
federal government; and (4) the extent to which the area was set aside for the use
42. Unlikemost otheradministrativedecisions,this Solicitor's Opinionis unavailable to anyone doing legal research
in the bounded volumes of Solicitor's Opinions or in electronic databases such as Westlaw and Lexis. A hard copy exists
for public use at the National Indian Law Library, Boulder, Colorado.
43. Vol. 2, Op. Sol. Gen. at 132.
44. This article does not focus on the contents of the Solicitor's Opinion. Instead, it discusses what was left out of
the Solicitor's Opinion - Alaska Native perspectives on Indian Country and how the omission conflicts with
administrative law, federal Indian law, and indigenous Indian law. For an analysis of what is in the Solicitor's Opinion,
see Mitchell supra note 13, 14 ALASKA L. REv. at 405-07.
45. Vol. 3, Op. Sol. Gen. at 3.
46. Id. at 131.
47. Vol. 2, Op. Sol. Gen. at 132.
[Vol. 35:73
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and occupancy of Indians as such.4'
Finding the "lands of the Neets'aii Gwich'in had not been set aside for Alaska Natives,
as such, under the superintendence of the federal government,"'49 the district court
concluded, "the lands of the Neets'aii Gwich'in are not Indian Country; and, therefore,
the Tribal Government does not have the power to impose a tax among non-members
of the tribe. "50
The Ninth Circuit disagreed.51 Addressing three issues on appeal -- (1) the
appropriate test for determining Indian Country; (2) whether ANCSA extinguished
Indian Country; (3) whether Venetie occupies Indian Country,52 the court began by
explaining that the canons of federal Indian law derive from the federal government's
trust responsibility to Indians.53 The canons require that "statutes affecting Indians
are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the
Indians."'54 Further, Congress must clearly and plainly state its intent to abrogate
Indian rights. 5 ANCSA is a statute enacted for the benefit of Indians; therefore, the
canons apply in interpreting its meaning and "congressional intent to extinguish
Indian Country must be reflected by 'clear and plain' language."56 Because ANCSA
lacked such language, the Ninth Circuit applied the Indian canons, and found no
abrogation of Indian Country in ANCSA.57 The existence of the informal, nonpublic
Solicitor's Opinion did not lead the court to abandon this result.
Then the Ninth Circuit applied a six-factor test, previously used by the Ninth
and several other circuits, to determine whether the Venetie lands constituted a
dependent Indian community under the Indian Country statute.58 Considering
48. State of Alaska, ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 1995 WL
462232, at *10 (D.Alaska August 2, 1995) (not reported in F.Supp.).
49. aIk at *20.
50. lId
51. See State of Alaska exrel. Yukon Flats School District v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 101
F.3d 1286, 1302 (9th Cir. 1996).
52. See id. at 1290.
53. See id. at 1294 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Petition) 1, 17, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831).
54. Id. (citing Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
55. See id.
56. State of Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't 101 F.3d 1286,
1295 (citing U.S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339,353 (1941)).
57. See id. at 1302.
58. The court acknowledged the First, Eight, and Tenth Circuits applied a slightly different test, substituting the
factor of whether the United States retains title to the land for the Ninth's Circuits inquiry into degree of federal
ownership and control. Seeid. at 1292-93 (quoting Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531,
1545 (10th Cir. 1995)). Pittsburg considered: (1)Whether the United States has retained title to the lands which it
permits the Indians to occupy and authority to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this territory; (2) the
nature of the area in question; (3) the relationship of the inhabitants to Indian tribes ana to the federal government; (4)
the established practice of government agencies toward the area; (5) whether there is an element of cohesiveness
manifested either by economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by that
locality; and (6) whether such lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian
peoples. 52 F.3d at 1545; see also United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1981) (adopting a four-
factor test considering: (1) whether the United States has retained title and authority over the land; (2) the nature of the
area, the relationship of the inhabitants to the tribe and to the federal government, and the practices of governmental
agencies toward the area; (3) whether there is cohesive community based on common pursuits, common interests or
needs of the inhabitants; and (4) whether that land has been set apart for the use of Indian peoples), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 823 (1982); Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 89 F.3d 908, 917-22 (1 st Cir.
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(1) the nature of the area, (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants to
Indian tribes and the federal government; (3) the established practice of govern-
ment agencies toward that area; (4) the degree of federal ownership and control
over the area; (5) the degree of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the
extent to which the area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of
dependent Indian peoples, the court concluded the Venetie lands were a dependent
Indian community and the Native Village of Venetie retained the authority to levy
the tax. 59
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "approximately 1.8 million acres
of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple by the Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1601" did not constitute "Indian Country."6,° Acknowledging the three statutory
categories of Indian country: reservations, dependent Indian communities, and
allotments under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994), Justice Thomas noted ANCSA was to be
accomplished:
[W]ithout litigation, with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting
their rights and property, without establishing any permanent racially defined
institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, [and] without creating a reservation
system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship.6"
Congress "revoked 'the various reserves set aside.., for Native use' by legislative
or executive action," with one exception, "and completely extinguished all aboriginal
claims to Alaska land."62
Thus, the lands transferred to Alaska Native corporations were clearly not
"reservations," and no "allotments" were at issue in the case.63 The remaining
possibility under the Indian Country statute was that the lands were "dependent Indian
communities."' The Courtrecognized that, "since 18 U.S.C. § 1151 was enacted in
1948, they had not had an occasion to interpret the term 'dependent Indian communi-
ties."'65 To derive a test for "dependent Indian communities," the Court looked at
previous cases,66 in which it had previously held "Indian lands that were not
reservations could be Indian Country and that the Federal Government could
1996) (same); cf. United State v. Cook, 992 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991) (applying
a three-factor test that considers: (1) the nature of the area; (2) the relationship of the inhabitants to the tribe and the
federal government; and (3) the established practices of governmental agencies toward the area).
59. See State ofAlask exrel. Yukon Flats School District v.VenetieTribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286 at 1292 (9th Cir.
1996).
60. Venetie, 118 S.Ct. at 955-57.
61. Id. at 951(quoting43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1994)).
62. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. §§1603, 1618(b) (1994)).
63. l at 953.
64.
65.
66. Id. at 953-955 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442
(1914), and United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
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therefore exercise jurisdiction over them."'67 The Pueblos involved in the Court's
earlier cases possessed their land in fee simple,6" like the Native Village of Venetie.
But Justice Thomas noted that "in each of those cases... we relied upon a finding
of both a federal set-aside and federal superintendence in concluding that the Indian
lands in question constituted Indian country and that it was permissible for the
Federal Government to exercise jurisdiction over them."69
The Court concluded that when Congress enacted ANSCA it intended (1)
neither to set aside Venetie's lands for the use of Indians as Indian lands, (2) nor to
create federal supervision of these lands.7" As a result, Venetie was not a dependent
Indian community. This holding was consistent with the Solicitor's Opinion that
ANCSA had abrogated Indian Country. Although the Opinion had received much
attention in the briefs and at oral argument,71 the Venetie decision did not mention it.
II. ADMINISTRATIE LAW
Land is very important to our tribe and no quick decisions are ever made about it.
Last summer the Tribal Government interviewed contractors who wanted to get hired
to improve some of our culvert system in Arctic Village. Because their presence and
activity would affect the tribal members and the land, we made sure that they
protected the environment and observed tribal rules respecting the ban on drug and
alcohol use. They were also not allowed to hunt game. They were encouraged to
follow our tribal member employment preference.72
Many important decisions about Indian tribes, their lands, and resources are
made by federal administrative agencies. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, first created
in 1832 and soon transferred to the Department of the Interior, carries out the
majority of federal responsibilities to Indians.73 The Departments of Health and
Human Services, Education, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Commerce,
and Justice also administer federal programs for Indians.74 While Congress sets
standards for agencies to follow, it delegates to the agencies a great deal of discretion
over program administration.75 As a result, agencies have significant latitude
implementing, and interpreting, laws affecting Indians.76 Judicial review acts as
67. Id. at 953.
68. See also, Taylor, supra note 33, at 75.
69. Id. at 953.
70. See id. at 955-56, expressing the test in terms of what Congress intended "to set aside" or "create," Justice
Thomas did not explain how he changed the federal Indian law inquiry from "what rights did Indians retain?" to "what
rights did Congress confer?" Id.
71. State's Petition for Certiorari, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tibal Gov't (U.S. 1997) 1997 WL523883,
at 22 [hereinafter Pet. Br.] (The State also criticized the Ninth Circuit for declining to accord any deference and
ignoring the Solicitor's Opinion altogether.).
72. See Testimony of Gideon James, Respondent's Brief, Appendix I at 68aa - 69aa.
73. See Cohen, supra note 25, at 673.
74. See id. at 674.
75. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREACRACY (1990) [hereinafter "EDLEY"]
76. See generally Cohen, supra note 25, at 673-77 (describing administrative duties to Indians).
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check on agency discretion.77
"The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 et seq ("APA"
establishes a strong presumption in favor of reviewability of agency action. 78
Professor Edley has surmised that "existing 'law' (agency rules, the agency's organic
statute, the APA, the Constitution, common law) constrains administrative decisions
and how deferential the court should be when settled 'law' is absolutely determinative
- which is almost never."79 In "rare circumstances," a statute "is drawn so that a
court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's
exercise of discretion."80 Review is also precluded where Congress has so indicated
in the agency enabling statute.81 Otherwise courts can review agency actions, paying
careful attention to the proper standard of review.
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ;82
the Supreme Court decision set the standard for judicial review of statutory
interpretation undertaken by administrative agencies. The case required the Court to
consider the proper interpretation of the term "source" under the Clear Air Act
Amendments of 1977.83 Finding that the language and legislative history of the
statute did not conclusively provide a definition, the Court held that the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) legislative ruling defining the term was a pure policy
decision.84 Because Congress had delegated to the EPA the power to make pure
policy decisions, the EPA's definition was affirmed."
Under Chevron, a reviewing court must first determine "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. 86 "If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as weli as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."87 If the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the court must evaluate whether the
agency's construction has rendered a "permissible construction of the statute."88 The
77. See id. at 678 (providing examples of eases reviewing of administrative actions pertaining to Indians); see also
EDLEY, supra note 75, at 96-130 (describing scope ofjudicial review in administrative law).
78. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Babbit, 87 F.3d 1338, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
79. EDLEY, supra note 75, at 107.
80. Navajo, 87 F.3d at 1343 (citing Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 189-93 (1993).
81. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1) (1994).
82. 467 U.S. 837.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 864-865.
86. Id. at 842.
87. Id. at 842-843; see also U.S. v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751,757 (1997) ("We do not start from the premise that
th[e] [statutory] language is imprecise. Instead we assume that in drafting this legislation, Congress said what it
meant... Inasmuch as we find the statute at issue here unambiguous, we need not decide whether the Commission is
owed deference under Chevron"); Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 519 U.S. 465, 470 (1997)
("Absent any indication that doing so would frustrate Congress's [sic] clear intention or yield patent absurdity, our
obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it."); Robinson v. Shell Oil Company, 519 U.S. 337 (1997) ("Our
first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning
with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and
'the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.'). See also, Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical
Reasoning and the Dynamic Nature of FederalIndian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (1990) ("In the realm of
Indian law.. .clear Congressional intent controls, no matter how harsh the result.").
88. Chevron Inc. v. National Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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court does not "simply impose its own construction on the statute."'8 9
Courts defer to agency constructions in cases where the statute is silent or
ambiguous because "the power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy
and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress."90
Where Congress has explicitly left a gap to fill, it has expressly delegated to the
agency the authority to make regulations that clarify the provision. When made under
express delegation, "legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to statute."'" In instances where
Congress has given the agency an implicit delegation of authority, the court "may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.,
92
Several factors support deference to agency interpretations:
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations has
been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or
reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full
understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to
agency regulations.93
For these reasons, if an agency interpretation indicates a reasonable accommodation
of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's discretion by statute,
courts should not overturn the interpretation unless it is contrary to Congressional
intent.94
A. Chevron Deference
Some reject the idea that every type of agency interpretation merits full and
automatic Chevron deference. Chevron deference may only apply where the agency
has received an explicit delegation of authority to resolve policy issues and has used
a formal rulemaking format to announce the interpretation. Scholars generally reject
the notion that Congress' vague or ambiguous statutory drafting in itself confers full
89. Id.
90. Id. at 843 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199,231 (1974)).
91. Id. at 844.
92. Id.; See also Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Company, 119 F.3d 816, 831 (10th Cir. 1997)
(discussing scope of Department of the Interior's "express" delegation ofauthority over public lands, this and subsequent
cites to "Southern Ute" refer to section of opinion neither disturbed nor revisited in en banc opinion, 151 F.3d 1251
(1998).
93. Chevron Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council. 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
94. Id TheSupremeCourthasfurtherexplainedthat a reviewing court may " hold unlawful and set aside' agency
action that is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' Thomas Jefferson
University v. Shalala, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
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authority to make policy decisions meriting Chevron deference,9' and courts, too,
have required an agency seeking Chevron deference to "show that it has been
delegated authority to address the question., 96 Administrative law scholar Robert A.
Anthony argues courts to accord Chevron deference to informal agency interpreta-
tions including interpretive rules, policy statements, manuals, guidelines, staff
instructions, opinion letters, and litigating positions.97 Kenneth Davis and Richard
Pierce agree that Chevron applies only to adjudications and legislative rulings,
although the Supreme Court has sometimes applied it to less formal formats.98 The
rational for refusing deference is "Congress has not delegated to any agency the
power to make policy decisions that bind courts and citizens through formats like
letters, manuals guidelines, and briefs."99  Certainly reasonable interpretations
appearing in formal adjudications or legislative rulings do bind the courts. But if the
agency lacks an express delegation of authority or has used an informal decision
making format, its interpretation does not merit full Chevron deference."°
After determining that an agency interpretation does not merit Chevron
deference, l"' a reviewing court instead applies "Skidmore consideration:Itl"
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [agency] ....
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a
95. See Breyer, supra note 89 at 376-379
96. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("a precondition to deference under Chevron is a
congressional delegation of administrative authority")
97. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts, 7 YALE J. ON.
REG. 1, 60 (1990). It is hard to conceive that an interpretation put forward in argument, without previously having
been laid down in a form bearing the force of law, could bind the court to which it is presented. An agency may not
simply declaim, "this is our interpretation -under Chevron you must accept it," and prevail. It would exceed the bounds
of fair play to allow an institutionally self-interested advocacy position, which may properly carry bias, to control the
judicial outcome. Id.
98. See also Auer v. Robins, 518 U.S. 452,462 (1997) (an amicus brief containing the Secretary's position is not
rendered unworthy of deference because it is neither a position adopted in litigation nor a "post hoc rationalization
advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack.") (citing Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hosp.,488 U.S. 204,212 (1988)); cf., Bowven, 488 U.S. at 212 (1988) "We have never applied the principle of those
cases [Chevron etc.] to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, oradministrative
practice. To the contrary, we have declined to give deference to an agency's counsel's interpretation of a statute where
the agency itself has articulated no position on the question, on the ground that Congress has delegated to the
administrative official and not to appellatecounsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.
Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely
inappropriate:' Id.
99. See DAVIS & PmRCE, supra note 90 at § 3.5 ("Statements of agency lawyers in briefs and oral arguments are
particularly unreliable evidence of an agency's position, given the powerful incentive for lawyers to take any position
that is likely to further their clients' interests in a case and the uneven level ofsupervision of agency lawyers.") (citations
omitted).
100. See also, Anthony, 7 YALEJ. ON REG. at 45 (Another issue within the delegation of authority rubric is whether
an express delegation "must be a delegation specific to the portion of the statute at issue.").
101. See also, DAVIs AND PiER E § 3.6 (citations omitted) ("If an agency to which Congress has delegated the power
to make a binding policy through an appropriate procedure - rulemaking or adjudication - attempts instead to make
policy through a less formal vehicle Congress has not authorized - a brief, staff letter or manual - a reviewing court
should not give the agency's pronouncement binding effect under Chevron step 2. Neither, however, should the court
reverse the agency's pronouncement. The court should treat such a pronouncement the same way it treats general
statements of policy. The policy may bind agency staff and provide helpful guidance to citizens potentially affected
by the agency's policy views, but it has no binding effect on courts or citizens.").
102. Skidmore v. Swift & Co 323 U.S. 124 (1944).
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body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade. 3
The courts have often applied the Skidmore in cases where the interpretation lacks
power to control.' °4 In an opinion examining the interplay between Chevron and
Skidmore, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Company, the Tenth
Circuit held Congress did not intend to exclude CBM, a gaseous substance contained
in coal, when it enacted statutory reservations of certain coals.' To reach that
decision, the court evaluated whether deference was owed to an informally issued
Solicitor's Opinion wherein the Department of the Interior interpreted the 1909 and
1910 Coal Acts as not reserving CBM. This Solicitor's Opinion conflicted with the
canon that land grants are construed in favor of reserved rights to the government,
with nothing passing in the absence of clear language.'0 6 In setting out the relevant
canon, looking for plain meaning and specific general congressional intent, the court
discovered no evidence of congressional intent clear enough to overcome the
interpretation dictated by the canon. 7
Although the district court deferred to the Solicitor's Opinion under Chevron,
the Tenth Circuit panel did not agree that Chevron deference was automatic. Chief
Judge Seymour explained, "When Congress has not addressed 'the precise question
at issue,' an agency requesting Chevron deference to its statutory interpretation must
show that it has been delegated authority to address the question. "108 Further "to
satisfy Chevron, the delegation of authority to form binding policy must include not
only discretion to formulate interpretations but also discretion to utilize the particular
format selected." ' 9  The court stated that only agency policies formulated in
legislative rulings or adjudications merit Chevron deference.1 0 Because agencies can
only make law through those two formats, the court concluded "Chevron does not
103. Id. at 140.
104. See, e.g., Metropolitan Stevedore Company v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, (1997); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519
U.S. 337 (1997).
105. 119 F.3d 816 (1997), rev'd en banc, 151 F.3d 1251 (1998), cert granted,_ S.Ct. _ (1999). The en banc
court held, in accordance with the panel opinion, that the Coal Land Acts of 1909 and 1910 were ambiguous, and under
the longstanding principle thatproperty grants are construed favorably to the sovereign, reservation of coal to theUnited
States in those acts must be construed to include CBM. The en banc court did not reconsider the question of deference
to the 1981 Solicitor's opinion and did not disturn the panel's disposition on that issues. Therefore, this article cite to
the panel opinion on that issue.
106. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 821 (10th Cir. 1997).
107. See id. at 821-29; see also EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989). "We believe that
unequivocal Supreme Court precedent dictates that in cases where ambiguity exists (such as that posed by the ADEAs
silence with respect to Indians), and there is no clear indication of congressional intent to abrogate Indian sovereignty
rights (as manifested e.g, by the legislative history, or the existence of a comprehensive statutory plan), the court is to
apply the special canons of construction to the benefits of Indian interests... We conclude, that, in this case, the bases
for inferring congressional intent were not so clear as to overcome the burden which the EEOC was required to carry"
[to show Age Discrimination in Employment Act applied to Indian tribes.] (internal quotations and citations omitted).
108. Southern Ute, 119F.3dat831.
109. Id. at 832.
110. Id. at832-43.
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mandate that we give deference to the [Department of the Interior] Solicitor's
Opinion."'. The court instead considered the Solicitor's Opinion under Skidmore,
and found that it lacked the power to persuade."' Although subsequently overruled
on other grounds, Southern Ute is a model for evaluating an agency interpretation
that is informally promulgated under a questionable delegation of authority, and is
particularly applicable to cases like Venetie where an interpretive canon and other
statutory tools dictate a result contrary to the agency interpretation.
B. Chevron Deference for the Solicitor's Opinion in Venetie?
In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the State argued the
Solicitor's Opinion merited "considerable deference" because it came from "the
federal agency charged with implementing ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. § 1624 - and, indeed,
with overseeing all Indian affairs, 25 U.S.C. § 2."" ' However, these statutes do not
authorize the Department of the Interior to make binding law on Indian Country
through the issuance of an informal Solicitor's Opinion.
The cited portion of ANCSA, 43 U.S.C. § 1624, does confer.upon the Secretary
certain interpretive authority. The exact and complete language, conspicuously
absent from the State's petition, is: "The Secretary is authorized to issue and publish
in the Federal Register, pursuant to subchapter I of chapter 5 of Title 5, such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this chapter."' 14
Subchapter II of chapter 5 of Title 5 is the Administrative Procedure Act which
provides for rule making subject to a notice and comment period, of which
publication in the Federal Register is a crucial part. 11
5
In short, through the ANCSA, Congress authorized the Secretary to
promulgate regulations though the formal APA process. If the Secretary had followed
the ANCSA and APA, affected tribes and individuals would have had an opportunity
to read the proposed findings on Indian Country in the Federal Register and
participate in the Notice and Comment procedure. "6 ANCSA did not delegate to the
111. Id. at 833.
112. See id. at834-36.
113. Pet. Br., supra note 71 at 22. The State did not cite to Chevron, but rather toAndrus v. Idaho, 445 U.S. at 729
and Accord National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407,417 (1992) for the proposition
that "considerable deference" to the Solicitor's Opinion is merited. Andrus pre-dates Chevron, but pertains specifically
to deference accorded to the Department of the Interior. National R.R. cites Chevron at the page referenced by the
State. This article treats these cases in detail below.
114. 43 U.S.C. § 1625 (1994) (emphasis supplied).
115. 5U.S.C.§551 (1994).
116. Publication in the Federal Register allows individuals, groups, industries, and others to read a proposed
rulemaking and the Notice and Comment period allows them to submit letters, reports, and other statements to the
agency for consideration. See Arnold Rochvarg, Adequacy of Notice of Rulemaking Under the Federal
Administrative ProcedureAct-- When Shoulda SecondRound ofNotice and Comment be Provided, 31 A.U.L. REV.
1, 2-3: "Rulemaking is viewed as more responsive than adjudication to the needs of a democratic system because it
opens the administrative process to a broad spectrum of interests, including those of regulated industry and consumers
... The ... APA requires an agency to publish a notice of proposed the rulemaking including 'either the terms or
substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.' Interested parties are then given
the opportunity to comment before the agency adopts the final rule. The agency must publish the final rule and give
a 'concise general statement of its basis and purpose' in the Federal Register."
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Secretary authority to make law by issuing informal agency opinions in circumven-
tion of the procedural safeguards of the APA.1 7 Because the Secretary did not subject
his Solicitor's Opinion to the APA rulemaking procedure, it remains an opinion
nonbinding on the public or the courts.
The 1987 Amendments to ANCSA further clarified that Congress did not
delegate to the Secretary authority to make law on the Indian Country issue. In
particular, Section 17 of the Amendments Act provides: "(a) No provision of this Act
(Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act amendments of 1987)... shall be construed
to validate or invalidate or in any way affect... any assertion that Indian country (as
defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151 or any other authority) exists or does not exist within the
boundaries of the State of Alaska."'1 8 As the District Court noted;
"The published history on the amendments of 1987 further underscore [sic] the
intent of Congress that, "this is an issue which should be left to the courts in
interpreting applicable law and that these amendments should play no substantive
or procedural role in such court decisions." 119
Beyond 43 U.S.C. §1624, the State relied on Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v.
United States,2' for the proposition that a Secretary Memorandum interpreting
ANCSA was entitled "considerable deference" because it was "reasonable.'
121
Aleknagik held the Secretary of the Interior had correctly determined that a federal
townsite segregated, but not yet subdivided and distributed, was within the "valid
existing rights exception" of the ANCSA.12 2 In deciding to accord considerable
deference to the unpublished Secretary's memorandum discussing the process for land
to come within the existing rights exception, the court found that the publication
requirements of the APA, ANCSA, and Freedom of Information Act did not apply
because the interpretation in question was not "substantive."'"
117. The Solicitor seemed aware of the problems he was creating in failing to subject the Opinion to notice and
comment. The Solicitor's Opinion pertains to thousands of Native and non-Native people who were denied the
opportunity to criticize or influence the content through the formal means provided by the APA. Handpicking, at the
Solicitor's own discretion, certain individuals with whom to confer on this issue is not the same as exposing the
Proposed Opinion to the Federal Register process for nationwide public comment. See Anthony supra note 97 at 57-58,
n. 275: "[R]outine acceptance for interpretations expressed in these [informal] formats would, in abdication ofjudicial
duties under Marbury, endow them with the force of law where Congress did not intend them to have such force... And
since these formats are exempt from APA public participation requirements, an especially odious frustration is visited
upon the affected private parties: they are bound by a proposition that they had no opportunity to help shape and will
have no meaningful opportunity to challenge when it is applied to them...." [Further] "[algencies may yield to
temptation and seek to shield their regulations from the scrutiny occasioned by notice-and-comment procedures,
choosing instead to cast would-be regulations as interpretative rules." (quoting Community Nutrition Instr. v. Young,
818 F.2d 943,953 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
118. Pub. L. No. 100-241, § 17(a), Feb. 3, 1988, 101 Stat. 1814.
119. Alaska ex rel. v. Native Village Venetie Tribal Gov't, 1995 WL 462232, at *20 n.33 (D. Alaska 1995)
(emphasis supplied) (citing S. Rep. No.201,100thCong., 1st Sess. 23 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3269,
3274.
120. 806 F.2d 924,926(9th Cir. 1986)
121. See Resp. Br.,supra note 16 at8.
122. Aleknagik, 806 F.2d at 926.
123. Id. at 927 (citing5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a) (1) (D) (1994), 553; Alcaraz v. Block,746 F.2d593, 612 (9th Cir. 1984);
Powdery v. Schweiker, 704 F.2d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1983)).
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The question of whether a rule is "substantive" raises the distinction between
legislative and interpretive rules -another administrative law factor weighing against
deference to the Solicitor's opinion in Venetie. The APA requires:
Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for
the guidance of the public... substantive rules of general applicability adopted as
authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general
applicability formulated and adopted by the agency."
Substantive rules "'effect a change in existing law or policy. These are rules which
create law [and are] usually implementary to an existing law.' 125  In Shalala v.
Guernsey Memorial Hospital,1 2 the Court explained "interpretive rules" do not effect
a change in the law and are not inconsistent with an agency's prior existing
regulations.127 Therefore, they do not require APA rulemaking. However, such
interpretive rules which are not subject to notice and comment "do not have the force
and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process."''2
In Venetie, the substantive/interpretive distinction should only have hurt the State's
case for deference. Whereas the conclusion in Aleknagik was that the Secretary's
interpretation of "existing rights" exception for distribution of public lands was not
"substantive" under Alcaraz and Powderly,129 the Opinion in Venetie was a
substantive interpretation, effecting substantial change in Alaska Nativejurisdiction,
and requiring publication in the Federal Register. Finally, although courts are bound
to give substantial deference to agency interpretations of an agency's own regulations,
in this case the Secretary was not interpreting any regulations it promulgated
pursuant to ANCSA. The very point of this argument is that the Secretary has failed
to issue regulations under § 1624 of ANCSA.
The Native Village of Venetie did not challenge the general authority of the
Secretary to make interpretive rulings or policy statements. An agency charged with
124. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1) (D) (1994).
125. Alcaraz, 746 F.2d at 613; (citing to Powderly, 704 F.2d at 1098).
126. 514 U.S. 87,99, 102 (1995).
127. Courts acknowledge that the difference between a legislative and interpretive rule is sometimes unclear. See
Zhangv. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 745 (2d Cir. 1995). A "legislative rule" is characterized as irreconcilable with a prior
rule, or representing a nonobvious and unanticipated reading of a previous regulation, effecting a change in existing law
or policy. See National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227,235-37 (D.C. Cir.
1992); see also, Miami Nation of Indians, Inc. v. Babbit, 887 F.Supp. 1158,1164 (N. D. Indiana 1995) ("Legislative
rules have effects completely independent of the statute [and] create law, usually implementary to an existing law.").
By contrast, interpretiverules clarify statutory terms and remind parties of their duties. See National Family Planning,
979 F.2d at 235. A rule is interpretive where it seeks to clarify an exiting rule but does not change existing law, policy,
or practice. See Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Of Wayne Township v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 949 (1993). Some courts have held that an agency action having a substantial impact on the public
is legislative, regardless of whether the agency itself characterizes the rule as interpretive or legislative. See Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C.Cir. 1974), rev'd on othergrounds, 426 U.S.
26 (1976). Others take the agency label into account. See Miami Nation ofIndians, 887 F.Supp. 1158. Under most
of these formulations, the Solicitor's Opinion in Venetie appears to be an attempted legislative, rather than interpretive,
rule.
128. Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 87,99 (1995)
129. Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. United States, 806 F.2d 924,927 (9th Cir. 1986).
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implementing a statute may do so by issuing interpretations of that statute.130 The
Secretary can, of course, issue a Solicitor's Opinion without adhering to APA
procedure; he just cannot expect it to bind courts because it does not carry the weight
of law.131
The State also cited to 25 U.S.C. § 2 in support of its position that the
Solicitor's Opinion merited considerable deference. Section 2 provides:
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of
the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have
the management of all Indian affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian
relations.
132
The State apparently sought for the Court to infer that any action pertaining to
Indians, undertaken by any individual charged by the Secretary of the Interior, is
insulated from judicial review because it merits considerable deference. The
delegation under section 2 does appear broader than that under ANCSA. However,
case law demonstrates that the courts have not unilaterally bowed to the will of the
Secretary as a result of section 2's grant of authority, but rather have been willing to
review the scope of that authority.
In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,'33 the Supreme Court held, in part,
the Secretary of the Interior was not authorized to issue regulations permitting Indian
communities to use fish traps in Alaska waters in violation of Alaska state law.
134
The Court explained that "sole authority conferred by [25 U.S.C. § 2] is that to
implement specific laws, and by [25 U.S.C. § 9] is that over relations between the
United States and Indians -- not a general power to make rules governing Indian
conduct."'35 Kake does not stand for the proposition that Secretarial actions pursuant
to Sections 2 and 9 are unreviewable.'36 In Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette
Islands Reserve v. Egan, a lengthy search by the Court for Secretarial authority to
promulgate certain rules did not even consider 2 U.S.C. § 2 or § 9.137 Further, in
Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby,13' an erroneous order of the Secretary of
the Interior was canceled when, without statutory authority, the Secretary struck the
130. See Guernsey Men. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87 (1995) (Secretary of Health guidelinei s a prototypical example of an
interpretive rule issued by an agency to advise the public of its construction of the statutes and rules it administers).
131. See id.
132. 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
133. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 65.
136. 369 U.S. 45, 58 (1962) (An 1891 federal statute setting apart Annette Islands in southeastern Alaska as a
reservation for Metlakatla Indians under rules and regulations prescribed by Secretary of the Interior would have
authorized Secretary to promulgate regulations according the Metlakatla Community the right to erect and operate
salmon traps in the waters surrounding the Annette Islands, and the regulations would have trumped Alaska Ati-Fish
Trap Conservation Law. Because the Secretary promulgated the regulations under the White Act and the Alaska
Statehood Act, neither of which authorized his action, the Court remanded the case to give the Secretary an opportunity
to determine what, if any, authority he might choose to exercise.).
137. Metlakatla, 369 U.S. at 58.
138. 211 U.S. 249 (1908).
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name of an enrollee from the rolls of an Indian nation. The Supreme Court explained:
In our view, this case resolves itself into a question of the power of the Secretary
of the Interior in the premises, as conferred by the acts of Congress. We
appreciate fully the purpose of Congress in numerous acts of legislation to confer
authority upon the Secretary of the Interior to administer upon Indian lands, and
previous decisions of this court have shown its refusal to sanction a judgement
interfering with the Secretary where he acts within the powers conferred by law.
But... there is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary
power and if the Secretary has exceeded the authority conferred upon him by law,
then there is power in the courts to restore the status of the parties aggrieved by
such unwarranted action.'39
Under this reasoning, courts are be expected to take restorative action if the
Secretarial action exceeded the agency's authority or was an arbitrary exercise of
power, as in the Solicitor's Opinion in Venetie.
The question of limits on the Secretary's authority under 25 U.S.C. § 2 is not
well-settled, or even addressed in the case law. The Secretary claims authority to
take all sorts of actions affecting Indians, and few courts or scholars have critiqued
this practice in any context. 40 Sparseprecedent, however, should not have rendered
the Secretary's action beyond judicial review in Venetie. Even Section 2, which has
been characterized as "essentially a grant of managerial authority,' 14' does not clearly
confer authority to make binding law through informal interpretations. Further, 25
U.S.C. § 9, often cited along with Section 2 and notably absent from the State's
Petition, delegates authority to the Executive Branch to prescribe regulations to carry
into effect any statute pertaining to Indians. It resembles the ANCSA provision
allowing the Secretary to implement ANCSA through regulations. As stated
numerous times, the Secretary did not issue any regulations on the Indian Country
question. Venetie did not argue the Secretary lacked broad managerial authority
under § 2, or broad rulemaking authority under § 9. Rather, the particular Secretarial
action in question did not use any of the procedures necessary to make binding law.
ANCSA itself required that the Secretary use the formal rule making format,
expressly limiting the Secretary's interpretive power to the publication of regulations
139. Idat 262.
140. Cf., William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: Authority, Judicial
Interposition, and CFR § 83,17 AM. INDIAN L. RFv. 37,51-52 (1992) (Evaluating the extent of Secretarial authority
to federally acknowledge tribes under 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9: "rh[e] nebulous basis for and exercise of authority by the
Secretary to acknowledge Indians tribes was reflected in [several letters and memoranda between Congress, the
Department of the Interior, and the Secretary]... Most of these memoranda and building-block attempts at establishing
the Secretary's authority to acknowledgeIndian tribes by exhuming obscure legal precedents skirted the principle reason
for such authority - perhaps because the reason was too obvious .... The simple fact is that the Secretary has this
authority because he has always exercised it, irrespective of proper delegation from Congress .... This administrative
exercise of power is not a case of the Secretary expropriating or usurping the plenary power of Congress .... Rather the
issue is a matter of the Secretary's historically exercising such authority where a vacuum of'responsibility existed over
decades, resulting in a gradual and unchallenged accretion of this authority.)" (emphasis supplied).
141. Quinn, supra note 140, at48.
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in the Federal Register subject to the APA. Congress' amendments to ANCSA then
explicitly left the legal question of the existence of Indian Country to the judiciary.
No other statute conferred on the Department of the Interior authority to make law
on Indian Country by means of informal rule making. Federal courts may "hold
unlawful and set aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions found to be without
observance of procedure required by law.' ' 142 Further, if the Secretary was
attempting to make "substantive!' changes in the law by eradicating Indian Country
in Alaska without adhering to APA procedures, such action is null and void as a
matter of law. 143 If the Secretary did not seek to make substantive changes in the law
and only expressed a policy or opinion, than his opinion is merely an interpretive rule
and not binding on court."4 Under these circumstances, the Solicitor's Opinion did
not merit Chevron deference. 45
C. Skidmore Consideration
Because Chevron deference was not appropriate, the Supreme Court should
have considered the Solicitor's Opinion under Skidmore. The Skidmore analysis
would have revealed several factors diminishing the Opinion's power to persuade. 146
First, the Solicitor's Opinion completely ignored the federal Indian law canons
requiring that statutes passed for the benefit of Indians be liberally construed in the
Indians favor and that divestiture of Indian rights must be plainly stated by Congress.
" Second, the Solicitor's Opinion conflicted with long-standing interpretations of the
Department of the Interior. 148 Third, its conclusions were arbitrary, and overlooked
the critical fact that ANCSA was a land claims statute, not a jurisdictional statute.149
Lacking the power to persuade even under Skidmore, the Solicitor's Opinion in
Venetie should not have influenced the Court. 5 ° Because the Supreme
142. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1994); see also Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732,743 (2d Cir. 1995).
143. See Prows v. United States Department of Justice, 704 F.Supp. 272,278 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 938 F.2d 273
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
144. See Guernsey Memorial Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 101-102 (9th Cir. 1986).
145. See Resp. Br. supra note 16 at 29 n. 25.
146. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 834 (10th Cir. 1997).
147. The Venetie opinion did nothing to correct these errors. In fact, Justice Thomas came close to announcing an
exact opposite to the canon that Indian rights are reserved unless Congress explicitly states otherwise when he wrote:
"The federal set-aside requirement also reflects the fact that because Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs,
see U.S. Const. Art. I. § 8, cl. 3, some explicit action by Congress (or the Executive, acting under delegated authority)
must be taken to create or recognize Indian Country." Venetie, 118 S.Ct. at 954 n.6. Under this (new) theory, Indians
seem to have no rights unless Congress creates them.
148. See, e.g., theStatus ofAlaska Natives, 53 I.D. 593,605 (1932); Status of Alaska Natives-TideLands, I Op.
So. 104, 105 (1924); Custom Marriage -Validity -Alaska, 1 Op. Sol. 329, 220 (1932); Liquor Traffic- Alaska, 1
Op. Sol. 749, 750 (1937); Fishing Rights ofAlaskan Indians, I Op. Sol. 1096, 1097 (1942); Alaskan Natives Subject
to Territorial School Tax, 11 Op. Sol. 1196, 1197 (1943); Organization of School Districts on Indian Reservations In
Alaska, II Op. Sol. 1755, 1756 (1956); See also Petition of McCord, 151 F. Supp. 132 (D.C. Alaska 1957)
149. See NATIONAL INDIAN POUCY CENTER ANALYsIs at 19 (the Opinion concludes that ANCSA terminated all
tribal territorial jurisdiction, "despite having twice concluded that ANCSA is not terminationist legislation.")
150. Although Justice Thomas' thirteen page opinion in Venetie made no mention of the Solicitor's Opinion, it was
discussed at length at oral arguments before the Supreme Court. Justices O'Connor and Scalia appeared to dismiss the
Solicitor's Opinion precisely because it had not been formally published. However, because the United States did not
appear on either side of the case, the Solicitor's Opinion was the government's only statement available to the Court on
the issue and this fact did not escape notice of the Court. The relevant section of the oral arguments is excerpted here.
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Court did not comment on the Opinion but issued a holding expressing the same
conclusions of the Opinion, we are left to wonder to what extent the Court afforded
the Native Village of Venetie the usual standards and protections of administrative
law. 151
D. The Basic Administrative Law Lessons of Venetie
Before moving on to the special protections afforded tribes by Federal Indian
See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Oral Arguments, State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie,
1997 WL 762053, at * 23-26 (December 10, 1997):
QUESTION (Ginsburg): Do we have a - any statement in this case of the current views of the United States?
ROBERTS [Counsel for the State): Well, not - I think the current view of the United States is in the 1993 opinion (by
the Interior Department solicitor general), which has not been withdrawn. It is as final as any of these opinions get. It's
been under review for almost five years now but hasn't been withdrawn. It represents the last statement of-
QUESTION (O'Connor): Well, it's never been issued, either. I mean, it just was put in limbo.
ROBERTS: It was signed by the acting secretary. It hasn't been published.
QUESTION (O'Connor): No, it hasn't.
ROBERTS: It hasn't been published, but it is the final statement of the agency charged with the responsibility for
implementing ANCSA, charged with responsibility for Indian affairs in general, and charged with responsibility for.
QUESTION (O'Connor): Yes but I don't see how you can give any weight to that, when the Department of Interior and
the BIA has never let it be published, and it'sjust sitting there. I mean, it makes interesting reading. You can understand
it's logic, but I don't know that were entitled to...
ROBERTS: Well, I think it's entitled to significant weight for a variety of reasons. It hasn't been included in the
published volumes of solicitor opinions, but its been signed by the Acting... scretary.. . It's also consistent with prior
Department' of the Interior interpretations both, for example, when Venetie brought the lands back and said, take it in
trust, Interior said "no we can't." Later, it had an oil and gas lease it wanted to have approved, and Interior said,
basically, "we're not in the business of approving things now. You're on your own."
That was the departure from prior Indian policy that ANCSA represented. In the lower 48, the history had been, in
settling Native land claims in conflict with white settlers, setting the Natives apart on reservations, which also had the
effect of setting them apart from the state government. Alaska provided an opportunity for a fresh start, and Congress
seized it in ANCSA. It said, "we are not going to set this land aside for your use under our superintendence. It's to settle
these claims, these serious claims, this is your land, and you can do with it as you see fit. "ANCSA set the Natives free
to manage their own property without the federal government looking over their shoulder, subject, like all property
owners in Alaska are, to State law, but not subject to any Federal superintendence, and that's what makes the settlement
lands incapable of constituting Indian country, because Indian country ...
QUESTION (Ginsburg): Mr. Roberts, this is the first time that I participated in a case involving tribal lands where we
haven't heard from the from the United States, and I thought that that was extraordinary, but maybe they sometimes
appear and at sometimes don't.
ROBERTS: Well, obviously it would be speculation, but we do have a thorough exposition of the Department of the
Interior's views, which hasn't been withdrawn, and I do note that in the three other cases so far this term where the
Solicitor General has appeared, it has been on the side of the Indians. The fact that he hasn't appeared in this case
suggests to me that he didn't think that that position could be taken. I'd like to reserve the remainder of my time for
rebuttal.
ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor. Respondents' position confuses the question of tribal status and the question of
Indian country. They are two separate questions.
The Department of Interior made that clear in 1993 when it published for the first time the list of federally recognized
tribes in Alaska. It said inclusion on the list does not resolve the scope of powers of any particular tribe over land and
non-members, and it footnoted the solicitor opinion that we have referenced in our briefs. Nothing about the state's
position calls into question Venetie's status as a tribe.
QUESTION (Scalia): How could it footnote that if it wasn't published? That's not very useful, is it?
ROBERTS: It's not technically been published in the collected volumes, but it's not a secret. It's been made public.
QUESTION (Scalia): I see, sort of been smuggled out.
(Laughter.)
151. If, in fact, the Solicitor's Opinion was subjected to a less stringent administrative law analysis than is usually
employed by the Supreme Court, it would not be the first time Indians received unequal protection under the laws of
the United States. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 27 (1991).
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law and Indigenous Indian law, it may be helpful to recap the administrative law
lessons of Venetie. Courts reviewing an agency interpretation of a statute affecting
Indians will aks whether Congress spoke clearly in the statute. If so, Congressional
intent prevails under Chevron Step One. If Congress has not spoken clearly, and an
agency has interpreted the statute, but when Congress enacts vague or ambiguous
statutes affecting Indians, agencies often issue interpretations and courts review them.
Like any agency action, these interpretations can be reversed if they are unlawful.
152
If the authorizing statute required the agency action to be formal and on the record,
it "must be supported by substantial evidence," and in "rare circumstances, a
reviewing court can consider some or all factual issues de novo."'53
The APA generally requires publication of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register and public notice and comment period. Further, a court must look to any
additional procedural requirements imposed by the specific enabling statute.
Adherence to these procedures gives the resulting interpretation a chance of reflecting
political accountability, gained though public participation, and expertise, gained
through informational exchange. Therefore, evidence the agency followed the
procedural requirements of the APA and other statutes weighs in favor of
deference. 54 Non-adherence suggests no Chevron deference and theresulting agency
interpretation merits only Skidmore consideration. Like corporations, industries, and
non-Indian citizens, tribes and individual Indians should be confident courts will
review statutory interpretation undertaken by agencies within this administrative law
framework. In the next sections I will discuss how, beyond administrative law, the
special history and ongoing relationship between tribes and the federal government
urge additional protections when agencies interpret statutes affecting Indian.
IV. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
What we started out to try to do, was we would rather have had just our territory
up there.... [Tjhe state wasn't even hardly a presence in rural Alaska.... Well,
what we wanted to do was to try to work our way into the 20th century with
control of our own territory. We primarily wanted the land. We didn't want to
disturb any inherent rights to govern or powers that the communities may have had
and the tribes may have had.... But we didn't have the power to clarify things and
so, if you doit have the power to get what you want in negotiation, then you keep
it fuzzy. Maybe you win it in court. And that's where we're at'"'
152. See EDLEY, supra note 75, at 107.
153. Id.
154. See generally id.
155. Indian Country Forum, http:llwww.and.comlfeatures/indiancountry/ ICFtanscript.html at 6 (emphasis
supplied) (On October 23, 1997, the Anchorage Daily News and local KTUU-Channel 2 produced a two-hour forum
on Indian country and tribal-rights broadcast statewide television and radio. The program was moderated by Professor
Charles Ogletree, Jr. of Harvard Law School, and included tribal leaders, state politicians, attorneys and others. Mr.
Hensley statement and others cited below are taken from this source.) [hereinafter "Indian Country Forum"].
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If the Supreme Court had reached the issue, administrative law, alone, should have
led the Court to reject the Solicitor's Opinion that ANCSA extinguished Indian
Country in Alaska. In addition, because ANCSA was enacted for the benefit of
Indians, it should have been considered within the parameters of federal Indian law.
The canons of federal Indian law generally require liberal statutory interpretation 5 '
in the Indians' favor and prohibit courts from reading Congressional silence as
abrogating of tribal rights. In this case, it was undisputed ANCSA was silent on the
Indian Country question, but the Solicitor had nonetheless issued his Opinion
ANCSA extinguished Indian Country and the State urged judicial deference to that
interpretation. The circuit courts are split on whether the Indian canons trump
Chevron deference to agency interpretations, but the federal Indian law, in particular
its trust doctrine, requires courts to interpret statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians
consistent with the Indian canons even when Chevron would suggest an opposite
result. 1
57
A. The Federal Indian Law Trust Relationship
Although federal Indian law is replete with casual references to the "trust doctrine,"
the doctrine is elusive and confusing. Its first judicial expression came in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia (1832) where the tribe filed an original action in the Supreme
Court to enjoin enforcement of state laws on lands guaranteed to the tribe by
treaties. 5 ' Chief Justice Marshall decided the Court lacked original jurisdiction
because the tribe was neither a state nor a foreign government.'59 Rather it was a
"distinct political society," whose status "may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations... in a state of pupilage" and "their relation
156. Although my three topics of discussion - administrative law, federal Indian law, and indigenous Indian law -
all cross paths with statutory interpretation, examination of the general methods and goals of statutory interpretation
is well beyond the scope of this article. However, it is worth noting Professor Frickey's description: "statutory
interpretation is a specialized endeavor with the concept of 'faithful interpretation at its heart," and that "such
interpretation attempts simultaneously to reach contextual and functional yet predictable and nonsubjective
conclusions." Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WAsrH.U. L. Q. 1085, 1090 (1995). Under this
formulation, I understand that statutory interpretation looks for a meaning that is consistent with the text and is also
practical and workable. Those involved in drafting legislation might shed light on the text (thus explaining why courts
often turn to legislative history) and those affected by the legislation might reveal what is practical and workable (thus
explaining why courts look to the status quo or contemporary affairs). The question of "to whom legal interpreters
should turn for assistance in examining the laws normativity," id. at 1094, is important, and will merit additional study
with attention to which tribal members, leaders, and others are best situated or authorized to provide tribal versions of
statutory interpretation.
157. Certain statutes incorporate the Indian canons as substantive provisions. The Indian Self-Determination Act
explicitly states that "each provision of the Indian Self-Determination Act shall be liberally construed for the benefit
of the contractor." 25 U.S.C. §450()(a)(2)(1994). The Secretary's own implementing regulations adopt the same
Indian canon. 25 C.F.R.§§ 900.3(a)(5), 900.3(b) (11). "If the Act can reasonably be construed as the Tribes would
have it construed, it must be construed that way." Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1461; see also Jill
De la Hunt, Note: The Canons of indian Treaty and Statutory Construction: A Proposal for Codification, 17 U.
ltcu. J.L.REF. 681, 686 n. 26 (1984) (Advocating codification of the Indian canons to reaffirm their centrality in
federal-Indian relations and to "require their application as a matter of substantive law.")
158. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).
159. See id. at 16, 19-20.
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to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.""16
In United States v. Kagama (1886), the Supreme Court relied on the
guardianship theory as a basis for Congressional "plenary" power over Indians. 161
The case required the Court to decide the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act
which conferred federal jurisdiction over crimes between Indians occurring in Indian
Country. 62 Although there was no explicit constitutional justification for the Major
Crimes Act, the Court believed either the states or federal government must have
authority over Indian tribes. Relying on the doctrine of "discovery," ensuing Indian
"wardship," and traditional "wisdom," the Court chose the federal government:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent
on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food... From their very
their weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
federal government with them... there arises the duty of protection, and with it
the power... The power of the general government over these remnants of a race
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their
protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist
in that government.., because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes.163
The Indian wards, deemed incapable of carrying out criminal justice in their
lands and among members, were thus subjected to Congressional supervision over
certain internal criminal affairs. And into the mid-Twentieth Century, the concept of
Indians as weak, defenseless, and/or savage wards continued to influence Supreme
Court decisions. 64
Notwithstanding these origins, Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law
described in 1982 that the federal trust responsibility has "evolved judicially' '165
Although in the past, it was used to justify Congressional power over Indians, in post-
Kagama era it "establish[es] and protect rights of Indian tribes and individuals.' 166
In particular: (1) Congressional statutes affecting Indians must be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligations to Indians, (2) courts should apply the
Indian canons in interpreting treaties, statutes and other lawmaldng affecting Indians,
160. Id. at 17.
161. 188 U.S. 375 (1886).
162. In 1885, Congressenacted the MajorCrimes Act, codified asamended, 18 U.S.C. 1 153, inresponsetoExparte
CrowDog, 109 U.S. 556,571-72 (1883) wherein the Supreme Court upheld a traditional tribal restitutionary sentence
in a case where one Indian murdered another in Indian Country. "The Court's sanction of'red man's revenge' [in Crow
Dog] caused popular outrage among Americans and prompted the passage of the Major Crimes Act." Rachel San
Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Politcal Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. REv 507,527 (1987).
163. Kagama, 188 U.S. at383-84.
164. In Tee-Hit-Ton v. U.S, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), for example, the Supreme Court described origins of the
relationship between "savage" Indians and their "conquerors... Every schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of the
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by
treaty in return forblankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conqueror's will that deprived them of their land.'
Id.
165. COHEN at 220.
166. Id.
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and (3) the conduct of executive agencies must meet strict fiduciary standards
enforceable by the judiciary.167
Beyond Cohen, federal Indian law provides a full spectrum of trust
relationship articulations. Advancing a "social contract" theory of trusteeship, Janice
Aiken explains:
[Treaties between the United States and the various Indian tribes, like constitu-
tions, are the formalization of an implied contract by which the Indians accepted
the authority of the federal government, giving up their right to defend themselves
from intrusions on their sovereignty in return for the United States Govermnent's
promise to protect their sovereignty.... When ... [tribal] acquiescence [to federal
authority] is taken together with the United States' promise to protect the tribe
against incursions on tribal territory, the treaty becomes a formalization of a social
contract. The implied contract, as the basis of the legitimacy of the government
authority over the tribe, exists whether or not it is formalized in a treaty. This
means that ... the government's obligation to protect the tribal right to self-
government exists even in the absence of a treaty with a tribe.' 68
Under this social contract version of the trust relationship. The tribal right to self-
government is analagous to constitutional rights of individual citizens: "it is the
contractual limitation on the legitimate power of the government of the United States
over the Indians. The United States Government has, therefore, an obligation to
protect the tribal rights of self-government to the same degree as constitutional
rights."'169 Because the tribe's ability to effectively govern itself depends on
maintaining a land base and economic security, "the government also has a trust
responsibility with regard to any tribal property it undertakes to hold in trust or
manage on behalf of the tribe."'70  Finally, the federal "trust obligations under the
implied contract paradigm differ from the trust obligations in the context of the
'guardian-ward' paradigm. Unlike obligations based in treaties, they cannot be
unilaterally abrogated because they are part of an ongoing contract.0
71
Perhaps more focused on the pragmatic, Frank Pommersheim insists the federal
government must uphold its fiduciary duties to protect tribal property and treaty
promises to provide teachers, doctors, food and supplies. 172  Pommersheim
recognizes, however, the trust relationship:
167. See COHEN supra note 25, at 220-228; see also, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); cf, Reid Peyton
Chambers, JudicialEnforcement ofthe Federal TrustResponsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213,1227 (1975)
("[Wihile courts recognize that Congress has a trust responsibility, they uniformly regard it as essentially a moral
obligation, without justiciable standards for its enforcement.")
168. Janice Aiken, The Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law:A Look at its Developmentand at How itsAnalysis
Under Social Contract Theory Might Expand its Scope, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 115, 14748 (1997).
169. Id. at 147.
170. Id. at 149.
171. Id. at 152,
172. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 35, at 44.
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is a classical colonizing doctrine that seeks, advertently or inadvertently, to
enshrine a relationship of superiority and inferiority [and] needs to be
reconceptualized both theoretically and operationally in order to establish more
clearly the relationship between the federal trustee and beneficiary as a relation-
ship between equals.
173
Resisting any reconceptualization, others merely put a contemporary spin on
Kagama: "the trust doctrine defines the powers and responsibilities that accrue to
Congress and the executive branch as a result of the wardship relation."174 This
formulation implies the federal government has responsibilities to tribes only as long
as they are in a state of wardship; the government continues this relationship to the
extent that it wants to protect "vulnerable" Indians from "exploitation by individual,
state, and executive intrusions"175
B. The Indian Canons
As Cohen stated, one of the federal government's trust responsibilities is to apply the
Indian canons in interpreting vague or ambiguous laws enacted for the benefit of
Indians.176 The Indian canons emerged to aid in interpreting the treaties signed
between Indian tribes and European nations, and later, the United States government.
The United States Constitution provides "all Treaties made... shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land," '177 reflecting their importance as "political compacts"'78 between
Indian tribes and the United States. In particular:
Treaties were signed as an alternative to a war of attrition that would prove even
more devastating to Native American nations than the cession of most of their land
bases. Provisions in the 371 treaties negotiated with Indian bands and nations
varied widely,'79 but most of them contained similar elements: a guarantee that
both sides would keep the peace, a marking of boundaries between Indian and non-
Indian land, a statement that the signatory nations were placing themselves under
the "protection" of the United States, and a definition of Indian fishing and hunting
173. Id. at 45.
174. Peter S. Heinecke, Comment, Chevron and the Canon Favoring Indians, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1015, 1030
(1993) [hereinafter "Heinecke"].
175. Id. at 1042.
176. SeeCOHENsupranote25, at220-28; butsee, PhiipP.Frickey, Scholarship, Pedagogy, andFederallndian
Law, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1199, 1209 (1989) (book review) (criticizing COHEN's handbook for "mak[ing] the
sympathetic canons of construction one of the cornerstones of federal Indian law ... [as] exaggerat[ing] them beyond
their practical significance.")
177. U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2.
178. see BRUCEELLujoTJOHANSEN, ED., THEENCYCLOPEDIAoFNATIVEAMERIcANLEGALTRADTION 331 (1998)
[hereinafter "JOHANSEN"] (citing RUSSELL BARSH AND JAMES HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIwES AND
POLrrICAL LIBERTY 270-71 (1980) [hereinafter "BARSH AND HENDERSON"].
179. See id. at 331 (The United States entered into over 800 treaties with Indian nations between 1789 and 1871,
butonly 300 were ratified by the Senate. Congress ended formal treaty making with tribes in 1871, but the Executive
Branch continued to sign treaties or "agreements" with tribes through 1914.).
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rights (often applied to ceded land).80
The treaties were often concluded in unequal conditions where Indians tried to
negotiate terms under duress, in a foreign language, and across cultural barriers.'"I
And although the Supreme Court has characterized treaties as "essentially a contract
between two sovereign nations," after 1800 "the treaty process was allowed to
deteriorate from a sacred pledge of faith between nations to a series of quasi-
fraudulent real estate transactions."
8 2
Recognizing the circumstances of treaty drafting and signing, Justice McLean
opined in 1832, "[t]he language used in treaties with the Indians should never be
construed to their prejudice, ... How the words of the treaty were understood by this
unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of
construction.' 8 3 More recently, the Supreme Court has stated in construing an
ambiguous statute, it must be guided by that "eminently sound and vital canon,"'84
that "statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes ... are to be liberally
construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians."" 5 In general,
to facilitate the trust or (wardship) relationship "courts presume that Congress' intent
toward [Indians] is benevolent and have developed canons of construction that treaties
and other federal action should when possible be read as protecting Indian rights and
in a manner favorable to Indians.'
86
Reviewing the case law, commentators have described the Indian canons in
several ways. 87 For example Judge Canby discusses "rules of sympathetic
construction such that treaties are to be construed as they were understood by the
tribal representatives who participated in their negotiation. ,188 Getches and
Wilkinson explain that the canons require: "(1) very liberal construction to determine
whether Indian rights exist and (2) very strict construction to determine whether
Indian rights are to be abridged or abrogated."'89 According to Wilkinson and
Volkman there are three primary rules: "ambiguous expressions must be resolved in
favor of the Indian parties concerned; Indian treaties must be interpreted as the
Indians themselves would have interpreted them; and Indian treaties must be liberally
180. Id. at 330-31 ("Many treaties also regulated travel by non-Indians on Indian land, as well as containing
provisions to punish non-Indians who committed crimes on Indian land and Indians who committed offenses against
non-Indians.")
181. See id. at332-33.
182. Id. at 331-32 (quoting ViNEDELORrAJR.,BEHND THETRAILOFBROKEN TREA.S: AN INDIAN DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE I 10 (1985)).
183. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,582 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring).
184. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbrest, 425 U.S. 649,655 n.7, (1976).
185. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89, (1918); see also, Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,
(1912).
186. COHEN, supra note 25, at 221; butsee Frickey, 107 HARv. L. REV. at 425 (disagreeing with the principle that
the canons were "designed to protect disadvantaged minorities," and contending, "the Indian law canon is essentially
structural and institutional and was not established to promote equality or to combat political powerlessness.")
187. Ronald Steiner, THE INTERPRETATION OFTREATIEs ANDTHE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY
at 25 (1993).
188. WLUAM C.CANBY JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 90(1988).
189. DAVID H. GETCHES&CHARLEsF. WILKNSON,CAsES AND MATERIAIS ONFEDERALINDIANLAW217 (1986).
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construed in favor of the Indians."'9 ' Deloria and Lytle elaborate four rules as being
particularly important:
(1) Ambiguities in treaties are to be constructed in favor of the Indian claimants
(2) Indian treaties are to be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them
(3) Indian treaties are to be liberally construed in favor of the Indians and (4)
Treaties reserve to Indians all rights that have not been granted away (reserved
rights doctrine).191
Aiken states because Indians would likely not have entered the social contract
with the intent to divest themselves of self-government, the Indian canons "adopting
the Indians' understanding of the obligation undertaken by the United States in its
early treaties with the Indians" must prevail. 192 Drawing on these articulations, this
article presumes three canons: (1) Indian treaties, statutes, settlements, and
regulations are construed liberally in favor of the Indians; (2) drafting language is
interpreted as the Indians would have understood understand it; (3) ambiguous or
vague language cannot diminish existing Indian rights.
The Supreme Court generally applies the Indian canons in cases of statutory
ambiguity. In County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Nation, Justice Scalia wrote "when we are faced with... two possible constructions,
our choice between them must be dictated by a principle deeply rooted in this Court's
Indian jurisprudence: '[s]tatutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the Indians,
with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit." ' 193 In Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, the Court held the Termination Act of 1954, terminating all
federal supervision of the tribe and extending State law to the tribe and its members
"did not mention hunting and fishing rights."' 94 The Court, therefore, declined "to
construe the Termination Act as a backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and
fishing rights of [those] Indians. While the power to abrogate those rights exists, the
'intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress." 95
The Court has even privileged the Indian canons over other canons of statutory
interpretation. In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, for example, the Court
explained, "in the State's view, sound principles of statutory construction lead to the
conclusion that its taxing authority under the 1924 Act remains intact. The State fails
to appreciate, however, that the standard principles of statutory construction do not
have their usual force in cases involving Indian law. 19
6
In recent history, however, the Supreme Court has deviated several times
from its long-standing precedents applying the Indian canons. In Hagen v. Utah, the
190. Charles F. Wilkinson andJohnM. Volkman, JudicialReview ofIndian TreatyAbrogation: 'As LongAs Water
Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth - How Long a Time is That? 63 CAL. LAv REv. 601,608-19 (1975).
191. ViNEDELoRiA,JR.&CLFFoRDM.LYTLE,A MRICANINDINs,AMERiCANJUSTICE, 48 (1983); cf. Dela Hunt,
supra note 154, at 689 (postulating that reserved rights doctrine is not a canon; rather it "complements the canons of
construction as a guide to the interpretation of ambiguities that could result in the loss of sovereign tribal rights.).
192. Aiken, supra note 168, at 149.
193. 502 U.S. 251 (1992)(quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 754,7 (1985).
194. 391 U.S. 404, 408-412 (1968).
195. Id. at 412-13 (citations omitted).
196. 471 U.S. 759,766(1985).
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Court held that Congress had diminished the Ute Reservation in 1905 despite the
absence of explicit statutory language or evidence of clear Congressional intent to
diminish.197 In Oliphant v. SuquamishIndian Tribe, the Courtheld, "While Congress
never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we
now make express our implicit conclusion of nearly a century ago that Congress
consistently believed this to be the necessary result of its repeated legislative
actions."198
Commentators have been quick to criticize these and other cases where the
Court has failed to apply the Indian canons. Lauren Natasha Soil has written:
As a result of its Hagen decision, the Court has wreaked both jurisprudential and
practical havoc on the all-important Indian legal issue ofjurisdiction. Not onlyhas
the Court diluted its traditional strict standard of statutory construction, but it has
also generated unimaginable jurisdictional chaos in Utah that will hamper and
frustrate the efforts of the federal, state, and tribal governments charged with local
responsibility to exercise valid criminal and civil jurisdiction.'99
David E. Wilkins has explained that in Oliphant, Justice Rehnquist enunciated "a
formulation of a novel and logically insupportable principle of federal Indian law --
implicit divestiture [of reserved rights]."2' 00 Failing to require an explicit congressio-
nal statement, "the Supreme Court judicially usurped an inherent tribal power [to
impose criminal penalties on non-Indians] that had existed since time immemorial or,
certainly, since the whites settled in Indian country. "'20' In both cases, the Court's
willingness to overlook the Indian canons muddled centuries of legal precedent and
created contemporary problems for the maintenance of law and order in Indian
Country. Where the Court has not given a satisfactory explanation for its deviation
from its precedent on the Indian canons, it is difficult to accept the troubling
jurisprudential and practical results. 2 The Supreme Court's failure to apply the
Indian canons in certain cases may be best described as anomalistic, if not simply
wrong.
20 3
197. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
198. 435 U.S. 191,204 (1978).
199. Lauren Natasha Soil, The Only Good Indian Reservation is a DiminishedReservation? The NewandDiluted
Canons of Construction in Indian Law, 41 FED. B. NEWS &J. 544,544 (1994)(italics added).
200. DAVID E. WRKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF
JUSTICE 208 (1997) [hereinafter "WILKINS"].
201. Id.
202. See Soil, supra note 199, at 544 (Hagen seems to be based on "the disturbing attention" the Court paid "to the
modem-day racial-political makeup of the reservation to discern the expectations of [the 1905] Congress.")
203. See WILKINS supra note 200, at 86 (The Supreme Courts inconsistent approach to the Indian canons reveals
the "Court is not wedded to constitutional, treaty, or legal principles so much as it is to ad hoc decision-making based
on issues, players, and political circumstances."); see also id. at 342 n.141 (Supreme Court inconsistency manifests in
older cases, too. The Court applied the Indian canons in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (6 Pet.) (1832), The
KansasIndians, 5 WALL 737 (1866); Wau-Pe-Man-Qua v. Aldrich, 28 Fed. 489 (1886); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S.
I (1899); UnitedStatesv. Winans, 198 U.S.371 (1905) andSeufert Brothers Company v. U.S.,249 U.S. 194 (1919),
but did not apply the Indian canons in Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1886) and the Cherokee Tobacco Case,
I I Wall. 616 (1872)); Heinecke, supra note 174, at 1031 (surveying evolution of the Indian canons in the Supreme
Court to the present day).
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C. Circuit Split on the Indian Canons - Chevron Deference Issue
A split has been created among several federal circuit courts of appeal, with
the D.C. and Tenth Circuits consistently applying the Indian canons over Chevron
deference, and the Ninth Circuit sometimes going the other way. The D.C. Circuit
has expressly upheld application of the Indian canons, even in cases where Chevron
would otherwise apply. Explaining how statutory ambiguity may be limited by
"traditional presumptions" about the parties or topics at issue, Judge Sentelle recently
wrote in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. States Department of Transportation:
In Native American law ... statutes must be 'construed liberally in favor of the
Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.' As a result of this
presumption, we have rejected agency interpretations of statutes that may have
been reasonable in other contexts because the agency interpretation would not
favor the Indians. Other time-honored canons of construction may similarly
constrain the possible number of reasonable ways to read an ambiguity in a statute,
though the application of the canon alone may not suffice to make the intent of the
statute sufficiently clear for the court to pronounce what Congress intended.'
In Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, the 10th Circuit explained:
When faced with an ambiguous federal statute, we typically defer to the
administering agency's interpretation as long as it is based on a permissible
construction of the statute at issue [citing Chevron]. In cases involving Native
Americans, however, we have taken a different approach to statutory interpreta-
tion, holding that "normal rules of construction do not apply when Indian treaty
rights, or even non-treaty matters involving Indians, are at issue." Instead we have
held that federal statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of Native Ameri-
cans, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.
205
Declining to defer to the Department of the Interior's interpretation of the Indian Self-
Determination Act, the court explained its rationale for adopting a special approach:
[T]he policy of self-determination, which is the driving purpose behind the Act, is
derived from the same source as the canon of construction favoring Native
Americans. We believe it would be entirely inconsistent with the purpose of the
Act, as well as with the federal policy of Native American self-determination in
general, to allow the canon favoring Native Americans to be trumped in this case.
204. 93 F.3d 890, 893 (citing Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439, 1444-45 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759,766 (1985), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1010 (1989).
205. 112 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir. 1997) (citationsomitted); seealso, Sohappyv. Hodel,911 F.2d 1313 (9thCir.
1990) (special principles govern the interpretation of Indian treaties).
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We therefore conclude, for purposes of this case, that the canon of construction
favoring Native Americans controls over the more general rule of deference to
agency interpretations of ambitious statutes.206
From these cases emerges the reasoning that the trust relationship gives rise to the
Indian canons which in turn perform equitable and normative functions important in
fulfillment of the federal government's ongoing responsibilities to Indian tribes.
In Venetie, the Ninth Circuit avoided the Chevron deference-Indian canons
issue. In other cases, such as Haynes v. United States, the Ninth Circuit has allowed
Chevron deference to trump the Indian canons. 7 In Haynes, the court held that the
Secretary of the Interior had discretion to convey to an Alaska Native less than the
maximum one hundred sixty acres provided for by ANCSA where the land was
located in a national wildlife preserve.0 8 Considering the opposite results urged by
Chevron and the Indian canons, Judge Trott observed, "while this court has
recognized this canon of construction [requiring interpretation of ambiguous statutes
in favors of the Indians], it has also declined to apply it in light of competing
deference given to an agency charged with the statute's administration."29
In Williams v. Babbit, the Ninth Circuit reversed an Interior Board of Indian
Affairs (IBIA) decision prohibiting non-Native entry into the reindeer industry under
the Reindeer Industry Act.2 0 In this case the agency interpretation and the Indian
canons urged the same pro-Alaska Native interpretation. However, in weighing the
agency/Indian canons interpretation against an equal protection claim, Judge Kozinski
noted, "It is a close question whether -- even giving the agency the full measure of
deference to which it is entitled under Chevron and adding in the special solicitude
to which that interpretation is entitled because it favors natives -- we -- could uphold
the agency's interpretation." '' Undertaking his own survey of the circuits, Judge
Kozinski further explained:
The IBIA's interpretation gains little extra weight from the rule that statutes must
be construed liberally in favor of natives. While at least one of our sister circuits
regard this liberal construction rule as a substantive principle of law .... we
regard it as a mere guideline and not a substantive law .... We have therefore held
that the liberal construction rule must give way to agency interpretations that
deserve Chevron deference because Chevron is a substantive rule of law. As a
result, if the IBIA's interpretation does not prevail despite Chevron's help, the less
powerful liberal construction guideline will not save the day.2"2
Judge Kozinksi notwitstanding, the Ninth Circuit accepts the supremacy of Indian
206. 112F.3d 1455, 1462 (10thCir. 1997).
207. 891 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989).
208. Id. at 240.
209. Id. at 239 (citations omitted)
210.
211. 115 F.3d 657, 660-61.(9th Cir. 1997)(italics added).
212. Id at 663 n.5 (intemal quotations and citations omitted)(italics added).
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canons in cases where the agency interpretation is consistent with the Indian canons.
In State of Washington Dep 't of Ecology v. United States Environmental Protection,
for example, the Ninth Circuit held the EPA regional administrator adopted a
reasonable interpretation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in
conformity with the interpretive canon that state jurisdiction over Indians will not be
easily implied.213 Upholding the agency interpretation which protected tribes from
state environmental regulation, this court stated:
.Our conclusion that the EPA construction is a reasonable one is buttressed by
well-settled principles of federal Indian law. States are generally precluded from
exercising jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country unless Congress has clearly
expressed an intention to permit it. This rule derives in part from respect for the
plenary authority of Congress in the area of Indian affairs. Accompanying the
broad congressional power [over Indian affairs] is the concomitant federal trust
responsibility toward the Indian tribe. That responsibility arose largely from the
federal role as a guarantor of Indian rights against state encroachment. We must
presume that Congress intended to exercise its power in a manner consistent with
the federal trust obligation." 4
Here, the Ninth Circuit willingly assumed that the trust responsibility appropriately
informed congressional intent, and that the trust responsibility required express,
rather than vague or ambiguous intent to limit Indian statutory rights. However, in
Haynes, the existence of an agency action inconsistent with the trust responsibility
rendered theNinth Circuit unwilling to make the same assumptions about congressio-
nal intent or statutory interpretation.2" 5
Few courts have provided a decisive precedent in a case where the agency
interpretation is informally promulgated, under a questionable delegation of authority,
and where the interpretation urges a result opposite to the Indian canons - factors
present in Venetie. In Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, plaintiffs sued the
Department of the Interior for failing to extend Indian preference to hiring practices
in various offices.216 Although affirming summary judgment against the plaintiffs
for lack of standing, the D.C. Circuit did consider in dicta a recent Department of the
Interior Solicitor's Opinion stating that Indian preference under the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act applied only to hiring in the Bureau of Indian Affairs.2 7 That informally
213. 752F.2d 1465,1470,1472(9th Cir. 1984).
214. Id. at 1469-1470 (citations omitted).
215. The Ninth Circuit may rely on federal Indian law -- except when it is reviewing an agency action which has
transgressed federal Indian law. In these cases, the Ninth Circuit abandons the well-settled principles of federal Indian
law and defers to the agency interpretation. The rationales advanced by the D.C. Circuit, including the trust
responsibility, the principle of self-determination, and the interest in equitable relations between the federal government
and Indians, suggest a certain irony in according judicial deference to an agency interpretation which violates these
fundamental principles. To the contrary, it would seem that such an unlawful agency action is exactly the kind that
merits judicial review. See generally, Chambers, supra note 156, at 1213 (Evaluating actions for equitable and legal
relief in actions alleging violation by Congress and the Executive Branch of fiduciary and other duties created by the
trust responsibility).
216. Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
217. See id.
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issued opinion departed from the Department's long history of broadly interpreting
Act to require Indian preference in all Department units providing services to Indians.
The court first commented on the propriety of issuing a new interpretation in an
informal format:
[W]e note that if we were evaluating the merits, it would pose a difficult task
because of the scant agency record available... Should DOI choose to reevaluate
its present interpretation of the Indian preference provision, it may wish to conduct
a rulemaking process, thereby providing a reviewing court with a more informative
record... The departure might be especially problematic in the area of regulations
applicable to American Indian affairs. Federal law has long recognized that the
United States government, in view of "a distinctive obligation of trust incumbent
upon [it] in its dealings with [the] dependent and sometimes exploited" Indian
nations, "has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsib ility and
trust." The Supreme Court has recognized that this "overriding duty" requires that
where the Department of the Interior (specifically the BIA) had traditionally
expressed one position to Congress and the Indian tribes, "it is essential that the
legitimate expectation of Indians not be extinguished by what amounts to an
unpublished ad hoe determination." 218
In addition to the format problem, the court noted the Solicitor's
Opinion might also be flawed because it advanced an interpretation contrary
to the Indian canons:
The same special relationship of trust and enhanced obligation of moral dealing
could create a further problem in any future review of the Department's decision
to narrow its definition of terms and its application of the hiring preference.
Notably, certain canons of construction may apply with greater force in the area
of American Indian law than do other canons in other areas of law. More
specifically. DOI's interpretation may compel itto confront the longstanding canon
that "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interreted to their benefit."2 9
Even though Chevron might nevertheless urge deference to the Solicitor's Opinion's
new and informal interpretation, the court recalled similar situations where it had
declined to defer to an agency interpretation that violated the Indian canons. 220 The
D.C. Circuit's rationale directly disagreed with Judge Kozinski's reason for allowing
Chevron to trump the Indian canons:
[l]n the area of American Indian law, the Department may wish to consider that
the liberality rule applied in Blackfeet Indians and other cases involving native
218. Id. at 58 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
219. Id. at 59 (emphasis supplied).
220. See Id. (citing Muscogee Creek Nation at 1445 n.8)
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Americans derives from principles of equitable obligations and normative rules of
behavior, rather than from ordinary statutory exegesis. It is true that at least one
of our sister circuits has treated this rule of liberal construction in favor of Indians
as it would treat other canons, "deferring to the agency charged with [the statute's]
administration". However, it is also true that we have not.22
The D.C. and Tenth Circuit cases suggest, as a general matter, where an
overarching canon governs construction of a particular statute222 or entire area of
law," courts should use that canon in interpreting vague or ambiguous statutory
language, even when an informal agency interpretation urges an opposite result. The
Indian canons are even more powerful than other canons because they are a
component of the trust relationship between tribes and the government.2" But, as
Judge Kozinski's opinions reveal, not all courts agree with the approaches of the
Tenth and D.C. Circuits.
D. Federal Indian Law Attempts at Reconciling the Indian Canons and Chevron
Commentators have discussed several federal Indian law justifications for
applying the Indian canons over Chevron deference.22 According to Peter S.
Heinecke, Chevron and the Indian canons are bothjudicialinventions for effectuating
congressional intent. 6 Chevron step one reflects that congressional intent is supreme
and canons of interpretation "are assumed to effectuate congressional intent by
protecting certain values."227 Congress itself may expect that its statutes will be
interpreted under certain canons that have become standard, such as the plain
meaning rule of statutory interpretation.22 Substantive canons such as those reading
statutes to protect constitutional rights, to avoid retroactive application, and to protect
Indian interest reflect Congressional intent in a certain policy areas.229 InIndianlaw,
221. Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49,59. (D.C. Cir. 1991).
222. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450(1)(a) (2) (1994) (contracts shall be construed for the
benefit of the contractor).
223. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990) "[W]e are construing a criminal statute and are
therefore bound to consider application of the rule of lenity. To the extent that any ambiguity over the temporal scope
of [the statute] remains, it should be resolved in the petitioners' favor unless and until Congress plainly states that we
have misconstrued its intent."
224. See Ramah Navajo, 112 F.3d at 1461.
225. See Heinecke,supra note 174, at 1015; Soil, supra note 196 at544 (1994); Raymond Cross, Wen Brendale
Met Chevron: The Role ofFederal Courts in the Construction ofan Indian EnvironmentalLaw, 1 GREATERN. CENT.
NAT. RESOURCES J. I (1996); see also See e.g., Max Minzer, Case Note, Construction Work: the Canons of Indian
Law, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 107 YALEL. J. 863 (1997) (Atwo pagenotewhichdoesnot discuss Chevron
but argues the canons should not apply in Venetie because Congress did not act as trustee when it enacted ANCSA).
226. See Heinecke, supra note 174, at 1015-17.
227. Id. at 1022.
228. See Id. at 1023. This is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's position in State ofWashington that it must presume
that Congress intended to exercise its power in manner consistent with the trust responsibility. State of Washington v.
United States Env. Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465, 1470 -72. It follows that Congress expects its statutes to be
interpreted in light of the Indian canons, consistent with the trust responsibility.
229. See Heinecke, supra note 174, at 1025. The canon holding that "courts should interpret ambiguous treaties and
statues broadly in favor of Indians" originates out of the wardship doctrine. The trust doctrine also originates in this
wardship doctrine which "covers a different facet of this [wardship] relation. Rather than supplying an interpretive
principle for the Court, the trust doctrine defines thepower and responsibilities that accrue to Congress and the executive
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"wardship" is "the best justification for continued application of the canon favoring
Indians," because it reflects continuing congressional policy.2 30 Further, "history and
evolution of the wardship relation" create a presumption that "Congress would not
want agencies to have the power to administer any element of the relationship.""1 In
addition, Heinecke contends two of the usual rationales for Chevron deference --
political accountability and agency expertise -- do not apply in cases involving
Indians. He notes:
Because Native Americans were, and still are, powerless politically, they benefit
little from the greater political accountability of the agencies. Furthermore
because so much of the legislation that affects Native Americans is directed solely
at them, they cannot depend on other affected groups to change agency behavior. 1 2
And on the subject of agency expertise:
Agency competence cuts both ways. Agencies may be better able to discern and
implement congressional policy, but they may not also give Native American
interests sufficient weight. In the administrative state, one of the functions of
agencies is to balance competing policy goals... [Algencies should give stronger
credence to Indian interests: as the Court has repeatedly noted, the executive has
strict fiduciary obligations toward Native Americans. But when faced with
competing goals, agencies may well disregard the legitimate claims of Native
Americans.233
Heinecke surmises that because: (1) congressional policy protects the
"wardship relationship" between Indians and the federal government and judicial
monitoring of executive agency action is crucial to that relationship and (2) the
rationales for Chevron deference may be missing in Indian law cases, it is unlikely
that Congress intended to delegate to agencies power to negate the canons favoring
Indians.? The Indian canons can be useful at both steps of Chevron: "in some cases
[the canon's] application will give a definitive answer to the first step... [T]he canon
can be applied in the second step to narrow the range of possible interpretations.."23 5
But because the application of interpretive canons could obviate the need for
deference to agency interpretation in every case, Heinecke argues that "a court,
branch as a result of the wardship notion." Heinecke's useful, although not entirely accurate, analysis of the Supreme
Court cases that gave rise to the Indian canons, is detailed in Section I infra.
230. Id. at 1036; see also Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose
Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far, 20 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 199,328 n.504 (YEAR)
("Sunstein contends that substantive canons, such as the Indian canons should not be overridden simply because the
agency wants them to be [because] judicial application of Indian canons will better effectuate trust relationship between
federal government and Indians than application of Chevron principle") (internal quotations omitted).
231. Heinecke, supra note 174, at 1036.
232. Id. at 1038.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 1040.
235. Id. at 1040-41.
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therefore, should invoke a canon only if, after considering the factors motivating
Chevron deference, it concludes that judicial application of the canon is still the best
way to protect the values underlying the canon. "
236
E. Evaluating and Improving Federal Indian Law's Approach to Chevron and the
Indian Canons
Heinecke rightly raises the issue of whether the main rationales for Chevron
deference -- expertise and accountability -- do not apply in cases involving Indians.
And he correctly states courts should protect and uphold the special relationship
between Indians and the federal government, and they may do so by applying the
Indian canons instead of Chevron deference. 7  On several levels, however,
Heinecke's analysis is flawed.
First, it is doubtful that Congress would like to keep agencies completely
excluded from the relationship between Indians and the federal government. After all,
Congress has passed statutes giving the Department of the Interior general and
specific authority in administering Indian affairs. And if agencies amass and exercise
real expertise, deference to agency interpretations may be in Indian interests. Second,
in invoking an anachronistic and inaccurate analysis of the cases that gave rise to the
Indian canons, Heinecke perpetuates a paternalistic "wardship" relation between
Indian and the federal government. Although the wardship problem requires a new
conception of Indian law, detailed below in Section IV, here I discuss an improved
federal Indian law approach to agency involvement in Indian affairs.
Heinecke's arguments ignore some realities in Indian law and politics. Although
the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs is not well-known for its
competence," it is the agency authorized to have expertise in Indian affairs."
Similarly, while the fact that Indians comprise less than one percent of the United
States population makes it extremely difficult to influence politics, Indians do take
advantage of political processes. Theseprocesses include voting, running for political
office, lobbying legislators, negotiating with federal, state, and local governments,
and, when given the opportunity, participating in notice and comment procedures
afforded by the APA. This is not to suggest that the representation of Indian interests
in the federal government is sufficient,2' but rather to point out the error in assuming
236. Heinecke supra note 174, at 1024 (italics added).
237. See, e.g., 25 USC §§ 2,9; 43 U.S.C. § 1624 (1994).
238. Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law, 31 Mici. J.
L. REF. 899,942 (1998) (discussing the BINs "long and undistinguished record in managing the federal government's
relationship with the Indians").
239. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9; 43 U.S.C. § 1624 (1994). The BIA has specific statutory authority to administer
hundreds of statutes pertaining to Indians
240. The Native American population comprises 1% of the total US population, thus achieving accountability
through the democratic process is unlikely. See BARSH AND HENDERSON, supra note 178, at 233 ("We have
argued that Indian representation is inadequate because of federal electoral policy and apportionment. A second and
possible more powerful argument is that Indian representation fails because of Indian poverty. Poverty results in an
inability to collect information, disseminateinformation, and monitor the political processes, all apart from the fact that
wealth is the wherewithal of political corruption."). In Alaska state politics, Heather Kendall-Miller, attorney for the
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that the rationales underlying Chevron are always completely absent in Indian law.
F. Mediating the Chevron Deference Versus Indian Canons Problem
Neither Heinecke's treatment of the Chevron deference Indian canons problem, nor
the above critique provides a resolution to the problem - what is a court to do when
an agency interprets a statute enacted for the benefit of Indians contrary to Indian
interests? Without forgetting the real conflict that the competing doctrines create for
courts, perhaps it would be more useful, from a practical standpoint, to address the
problem in a preventive fashion. That is, encourage agencies to act within the dictates
of both administrative law and federal Indian law when they deal with Indians, and
to understand how these bodies of law complement one another. Ideally, courts will
less often be presented with an agency interpretation that forces a choice between
Chevron and the Indian canons.
Federal Indian law puts a special burden on agencies to comply with the APA.
Transgression of APA procedure may trigger a violation of the trust responsibility.
Reid Peyton Chambers notes:
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), considered whether the Bureau of Indian
Affairs was obligated to provide welfare benefits to unemployed Indians living off
the reservation ... The Court [states] that the BIA's failure to publish its eligibility
requirements for general assistance, as required by its internal procedures and the
Administrative Procedure Act is inconsistent with its "distinctive obligation of
trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with" Indians."24t
Because the statutes and regulations at issue in the case themselves required
publication, Chambers finds it "odd" that the trust relationship was invoked in
Morton. However:
[W]hat the Court may be saying is that federal agencies must administer general
statutory schemes with scrupulous regard in dealing with the Indians. In this
sense, the trust responsibility would be sort of a broad "fairness doctrine" rather
than a more precise doctrine that can be used to enforce particular rights.24
Native Village of Venetie, has pointed out that representation in state politics is inadequate. See Indian Country Forum
supra note 146 at 14. ("Out of 40 legislators, only 10 represent rural Alaska... there are only 10 legislators that
represent Bush Alaska and that have any say whatsoever in state laws. And take, for example, Irene Nicholai. One
representative represents 75 communities within her district. Is that representation?"). Still, Heinecke is misinformed
if he thinks Native Americans are completely powerless in the political realm. See, e.g., CASE supra note 3 at 412
(discussing Alaska Native local and regional political organizations and accomplishments). The problem of
underrepresentation in the democratic majoritarian system is complex and beyond the scope of this article, but it is
important not to overlook Native political work, such as that undertaken by the AFN, the Alaska Native Brotherhood
and Sisterhood, the United Tribes of Alaska, as well as by grassroots organizations and village members.
241. Chambers, supra note 162 at 1245-46.
242. Id. at 1246.
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Consistent with the trust relationship, federal agencies entrusted with
administering Indian statutes should be held accountable for failing to follow the
procedures which provide for public participation in lawmaking which directly affects
them. The federal trust relationship and its Indian canons enhances the agency's
responsibility to follow APA procedure. The canons were announced, in part, to
remedy inequitable lawmaking,243 and it is incumbent on executive agencies to avoid
perpetuating these inequities in contemporary settings.
At the very least agencies should publish proposed rulemakings in the Federal
Register so Indian communities will have opportunities to make comments.2' In light
of the marginalization of Indians in the democratic process, agencies must also
consider going above and beyond the minimal requirements for public participation
in rulemaking.245 President Clinton has described additional measures Bureau of
Indian Affairs and other agencies should take to involve Indian tribes and individuals
in the administrative law process. His 1998 Executive Order calls for agencies "to
establish regulatory and meaningful consultation and collaboration with Indian tribal
governments in the development of regulatory practices on Federal matters that
significantly or uniquely affect their communities... 246
In formulating policies significantly or uniquely affecting Indian tribal
governments, agencies shall be guided, to the extent permitted by law, by
principles of respect for Indian tribal self-government and sovereignty, for tribal
treaty and other rights, and for responsibilities that arise from the unique
relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribal governments...
Each agency shall have an effective process to permit elected officials and other
representatives of Indian tribal governments to provide meaningful and timely
input in the development of regulatory policies on matters that significantly or
243. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Consitutionalism and Interpretation in
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv.L.REv.381,397(1993): "ChiefJusticeMarshall was noteager to concludethatthe
Cherokee had abandoned it [tribal sovereignty] through subsequent treaty negotiations... His sense of the treaty
negotiations between the British crown and later the United States on the one hand, and tribes on the other, strongly
suggested that the former had not sought and the latter would not have desired any loss of internal tribal sovereignty...
He also emphasized another reason to be suspicious of any argument that the Cherokee had agreed to relinquish internal
sovereignty: the treaties in question had been negotiated in a language foreign to the Cherokee, and therefore the tribe
could not be held strictly accountable for any nuances of treaty text."
244. See Exec. OrderNo 13,084, 63 C.F.R. 27655 (1988), § 5. To involve Indians in the administration of Indian
affairs, the Order provides: Further, "on issues relation to tribal self-government, trust resources, or treaty and other
rights, each agency should explore, and where appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for developing regulations,
including negotiated rulemaking."
245. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidelines, Manuals and the Like -- Should
Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DuKE LJ. 1311, 1376 (1992) [hereinafter Interp. Rules]
reprinted in THOMAS 0. SARGENTICH, ED., ADMNSrRATrvE LAv ANTHOLOGY 136 (1994). "It would champion the
worthy precepts ofthe APA... if in certain circumstances agencies would voluntarily make use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures to develop interpretive rules. Implicit in the doctrine that notice-and-comment procedures are
not required for interpretations is a notion that affected parties are in some sense continuously on notice of any
imaginable interpretation, and that it is theirbusiness (ortheir counsel's) to anticipate and guard against all possibilities.
But when substantial interpretive changes are afoot, the values of fair notice and public participation and agency
accountability demand something better."
246. See Exec. Order No. 13084 of May 14, 1998, "Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal
Governments."
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uniquely affect their communities. "247
If the BIA, or other agencies, fail to involve affected Indians, courts should question
their expertise at the procedural level.248 Although the above-and-beyond approach
may be costly, one commentator has stated:
It must be remembered that agencies exist solely to serve the public in accordance
with the law. The costs of observing the law and fair procedure are bedrock
obligations that cannot legitimately be slighted simply because an agency might
lack adequate resources or prefer to direct them elsewhere. At worst, they are a
price to be paid for lawfulness and openness and accountability.249
If the agency has failed to abide by procedural requirements, its interpretation does
not merit Chevron deference.
If the reviewing court finds that the agency has satisfied its procedural duties,
it can then turn to the substantive aspect of the agency interpretation. In the case of
vague or ambiguous language, a court can recognize a range of permissible agency
interpretations consistent with application of the Indian canons. That is, several
interpretations of a statute might be in the Indians' interests, reflect Indian under-
standing of statutory language, and preserve existing Indian rights. If so, the
reviewing court will accord Chevron deference to the agency's choice among these
interpretations. It is not up to the court to choose among several reasonable
interpretations. But if the interpretation is inconsistent with the canons, it automati-
gAjy violates the trust responsibility and is outside the range of permissible
interpretations and the reviewing court should not defer to the interpretation.
To facilitate the job of the reviewing court, certain presumptions about agency
expertise can inform an analysis of the interpretation before it. The BIA would be
expected to have greater expertise on Indian issues, gained through historical
247. The order provides, in part: (b) "To the extent practicable and permitted by law, no agency shall promulgate
any regulation that is not required by statute, that significantly or uniquely affects the communities of the Indian tribal
government, and that imposes substantial direct compliance costs on such communities, unless: funds necessary to pay
the direct costs incurred by the Indian tribal government in complying with the regulation are provided by the Federal
Government; or the agency, prior to the formal promulgation of the regulation, in a separately identified portion of the
preamble to the regulation as it is to be issued in the Federal Register, provides to the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) a description of the extent of the agency's prior consultation with representatives
of affected Indian tribal governments, a summary of the nature of their concerns and the agency's position
supporting the need to issue the regulation; and makes available to the Director of the [OMB] any written
communications submitted to the agency by such Indian tribal governments. Id.(emphasis supplied) Further, "on issues
relations to tribal self-government, trust resources, or treaty and other rights, each agency should explore and where
appropriate, use consensual mechanisms for developing regulations, including negotiated rulemaking." Id. at § 5.
248. See, e.g., EDLEY supra note 75, at 48. ("In spite of common observations by commentators that agencies may
not be so expert and that expertise is oversold, courts commonly rule that deference is due the agency's action because
of expertise."). In the Indian law context, courts might consider whether a lack of expertise obscured the necessity of
translating a proposed regulation into a Native language? Overlooked that an affected Indian tribe had no access to the
Federal Register? Ignore funding limitations prohibiting Natives leaders from communicating proposed rulemakings
to their constituents?
249. Anthony, supra note 97, at 137.
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experience, field offices in Indian Country, and employee specialists, than would an
agency with little contact with Indian tribes. The presumption of expertise held by
agencies with experience in Indian affairs would be rebuttable in cases where it was
shown that the agency had not actually applied expertise." Failure to apply the
Indian canons in accordance with federal Indian law would be clear evidence of an
agency's failure to exercise expertise in the area of Indian affairs. Similarly, failure
to ascertain how to involve affected Indians in the proper administrative procedure
would rebut the presumption of expertise."
Unless they dismantle the BIA252 and recall other agencies' authority in Indian
affairs, they should seek to improve agencies' expertise, accountability, and
responsiveness in these matters. Therefore, it is premature and at odds with the
wellbeing of Indians to deny Chevron deference to all agency interpretation of
statutes affecting Indians. Above are suggestions for just a few ways agencies and
courts can fulfill their APA duties as heightened by the trust responsibility.
Generally, if courts announce that when a statute affects Indians, agency interpreta-
tions must obey APA requirements and trust responsibilities, agencies will work
toward meeting their procedural and substantive duties to Indians. Indians will also
have incentive to participate in the procedural and substantive aspects of lawmaking
that affect them. Ideally, courts will only apply Chevron deference to agency
interpretations that incorporate the Indian canons and these interpretations will be
more in-touch with affected communities by virtue of their participation.
Under how Federal Indian law complements administrative law strengthens the
case against deference for the Solicitor's Opinion on Indian Country in Venetie. As
detailed in Section II, the Solicitor failed to abide by the bare APA procedural
requirements; most Alaska Natives and other affected parties did not have the
opportunity to read a proposed version of the Solicitor's Opinion in the Federal
Register and they could not participate in notice and comment. The Solicitor did not
employ any of the above-and-beyond procedural options which might have increased
accountability, such as translation of the Opinion into Native languages, dissemina-
tion of the Opinion in village Alaska, or education for leaders and village members
as to its legal, social, and economic implications.
There is also much evidence to rebut the presumption of the Department of the
Interior's expertise in this area. In ignorance of or disregard for federal Indian law,
the Solicitor failed to apply the Indian canons in interpreting ANCSA's silence on the
250. My call for increased scrutiny of expertise is applicable beyond Indian affairs. See, e.g., EDLEY, supra note
75, at50-51 (As opposed to "hard look" judicial review, "[t]he far more common judicial stance is to presume expertise
rather than to probe its genuineness... And it is rarer still to see aggressive judicial inquiry into questions of political
representativeness or adjudicatory neutrality. ... What assurance is given by administrative law, including judicial
review, that the agency has in fact acquired and deployed the capital stock of expertise, professional skills, and insights
(or judgment) that justify the delegations and deference the agencies receive?").
251. As in other areas of administrative law, expertise could bejudged by ability to garner scientific and empirical
evidence, capacity to analyze data effectively, and tendency to implement successful solutions to problems.
252. Of course, the idea of dismantling the BIA has some merit. See, e.g, Porter, supra note 238, at 991 ("The
decolonization of federal Indian control law cannot occur unless the federal government's colonial administrative
infrastructure, theBIA, is dismantled and anew institution for handlingrelations withtheIndian nations is established.")
Professor Porter envisions that "the BIA would be transformed into a kind of tribal Department of State." Id. at 1003.
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Indian Country issue.21 3 Beyond minimal efforts to garner the opinions of some
Native leaders, the Solicitor did not incorporate Alaska Native knowledge into his
interpretation. 4 This failure exposed the Solicitor's lack of expertise in communicat-
ing with, or achieving political representativeness among, the Alaska Native
community. It also diminished the informational content and accuracy of the
Opinion. The Solicitor's qualification that "should the outcome of this opinion be at
variance with what lawmakers believe is the proper view of Native village jurisdic-
tion, Congress is free to legislate again in this area to provide certainty," does not
excuse the Opinion's many flaws. 5 Chevron deference is inapplicable when an
agency has failed to interpret a statute enacted for the benefit of Indians consistent
with the Indian canons, or where deference would not accomplish the goals of
promoting expertise and accountability in the administration of Indian affairs. For
both of these reasons, an interpretation like the Solicitor's Opinion in Venetie would
merit no deference under an administrative law analysis informed by federal Indian
law.
V. INDIGENOUS INDIAN LAW
When they were lucky, they harvested lots of animals and everyone would share
the meat equally, storing most of it for future survival. This food would last until
the middle of the winter and when it began to run out, they moved to another
location to hunt for food again. This is what we call the nomadic life and this is
where we come from 5 6
"Th6 Native people of America had these governments thousands of years
before... I mean, when Caesar was conquering Britain for pete's sake, and they
were, you know, worshiping rocks, I mean the Native nations of Alaska had
goverments. ' 257
"Indigenous Indian Law" is my attempt to identify existing and developing
theories and practices which indigenous peoples can use to address their legal
problems. Several problems with more conventional legal frameworks inspire me to
253. For a general analysis of the ANCSA that conforms to the Indian canons, see CASE supra note 2 at 16-18.
254. See EDLEY supra note 175, at 49 ("So in reality the agency may have.., tried to accommodate competing
interests but forgot to listen to some important voices... Judicial review is most likely to catch and act on a failing of
expertise ...but this cases are in the minority.., and it is still rarer to see aggressive judicial inquiry into questions of
political representativeness... ")
255. See id. at 98-99 ("It is odd to justify abdicative deference by asserting that Congress will fix things: the broad
delegations and modem administrative law) arose because everyone conceded Congress' institutional inability to get
involved in the details.").
256. Resp. Br., supra note 16, Testimony of Moses Sam, Appendix at 31aa-33aa.
257. Will Mayo, President, Tanana Chiefs Council, in Indian Country Forum, supra note 154, at 13.
[Vol. 35:73
1999] INTERPRETING INDIAN COUNTRY
do so." In recent years, federal Indian law, alone or in combination with other
jurisprudence, has failed in almost every case before the Supreme Court. 9 Venetie
is an example where tribal arguments based on conventional legal doctrine (in this
case administrative law) and bolstered by Federal Indian law failed to win the vote
of even a single Supreme Court justice. Thus, the first problemis that, no matter how
strong the advocacy, Indian litigants propelled through the federal courts very often
lose at the Supreme Court on federal Indian law arguments.260
Second, existing federal Indian law is fatally flawed because it often leaves
out the Indians. 261 Rennard Strickland has described, "a sound contemporary Indian
258. I am hardly the first person to point out that something serious must be done to federal Indian law. Professor
Porter, for example, has advocated a complete decolonization of federal Indian law, and a radical change of the
relationship between Indian tribes and the United States. See Porter, supra note 238, at 903 (calling for (1) defining
all aspects of the federal-tribal relationship by agreement; (2) reforming the BIA; (3) repealing colonial federal Indian
law; and (4) abandoning the colonial foundation of federal Indian control doctrine).
259. In most cases involving an Indian tribe as a party, the Supreme Court currently applies the rule: "the Indians
lose." See Cass County, Minnesota v. LeechLakeBandof Chippewa Indians, 118 S.Ct. 1904 (1998) (Deciding against
tribe in action for declaratory and injunctive relief and refund of taxes, interest, and penalties paid on land the Band
acquired in fee simple after allotment to members or conveyance to non-members. Because Congress clearly intends
to subject to state and local taxation reservation land made alienable, the repurchase by an Indian tribe does not cause
the land to reassume tax-exempt status.); Montana v. Crow Tribe, 118 S.Ct. 1650 (1998) (Deciding against tribe in
claim to recover Montana severance and gross proceeds taxes paid on coal extracted from mines held in trust for the
tribe. Because Secretary had not approved tribal tax before 1983, and tribe should not receive excessive restitution, tribe
was not entitled to disgorgement of taxes improperly assessed by state against mineral lessee before 1983.); South
Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 118 S.Ct. 789 (1998) (Deciding against tribe's action for declaratory judgment to
enforce right to regulate landfill site claimed to be within exterior boundaries of reservation. Because the land surplus
act did not preserve opened tract's reservation status, it resulted in diminishment of reservation such that State acquired
primary jurisdiction over disputed lands ,and State's environmental laws applied.); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 117 S.Ct. 2028 (1997) (Deciding against tribe in claim of ownership of submerged lands and bed of lake which
were within 1873 reservation boundaries and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state. Because the quiet
title action did not fall within Ex parte Young exception, state maintained 11 th Amendment sovereign immunity from
suit.); Stratev. A-1 Contractors, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (1997) (Deciding against tribe in its attemptto assertjurisdiction over
insurance case arising out of car accident between non-Indians on state highway running through reservation. Because
the accident occurred on portion of highway maintained by state under federally granted right-of-way, tribal courts had
no jurisdiction absent a statute or treaty authorizing tribe to govern conduct of nonmembers on the highway.); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996) (Deciding against tribe in its suit to compel Florida to engage in negotiations
under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Because doctrine of Ex parte Young did not apply in light of intricate remedial
provisions of IGRA, and Congress lacked authority under Indian commerce clause to abrogate 11 th Amendment, state
retained sovereign immunity from suit.). In the past three years, one Indian party has prevailed before the Supreme
Court. See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 118 S.Ct. 1700 (1998) (Deciding in favor of
tribe in its assertion of sovereign immunity against state court action by payee to recover on promissory note executed
by tribe. Because Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity, it applies regardless of whether the note was signed
on or off the reservation, and whether the note related to commercial activities.). Amazingly, in this single recent
Supreme Court case, decided in 1996-98, where the Court held in favor of the tribe, Justice Kennedy devoted two pages
to a critique of the "accident[al]" judicial origins of tribal sovereign immunity, expressing doubt aboutperpetuating the
doctrine when Indians act "well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities" and "takepart in theNations commerce
... [which includes] ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians". Id. at 1704. In this Supreme Court,
federal Indian law and other conventional legal approaches do not work for Indian tribes.
260. A very recent case indicates tribes may still have a chance when the case involves treaty rights to hunt and fish
on traditional lands. See Minnestoa v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, __ S.Ct. 1187, (Chippewa retain
usufructory rights guaranteed to them in an 1837 Treaty.)
261. See ROBERT A. WILmis, JR., LiNKING ARMS TOGETHaR: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW &
PEAcE, 1600-1800 6 (1997) [hereinafter "WILLIAMS"] ("As Vine DeLoria, Jr. ... once instructed me, a major
problem with the way that most non-Indian scholars have discussed the law governing relations between the United
States and Indian tribes is that there are no Indians in the story.").
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policy must recognize that the Indian way is very much alive and well.""26 But
today's legal institutions do not recognize Indian ways at all. Courts produce
"anglocentric" jurisprudence;2 63 legislatures believe they can pass Indian statutes
without consulting Indians.264 As a result, federal law generally alienated Indian
constituents and does not meet their needs.265 In Alaska, lawmaking events that
severely underrepresent Alaska Native perspectives include the issuance of the
Solicitor's Opinion on Indian Country266 and Justice Thomas' Venetie opinion.267
Federal Indian law rarely reflects Indian visions of law.
Finally, federal Indian law oppresses Indians by applying outdated, harmful
theories, including the ward/guardian version of the trust relationship. As I discuss
below, the Native Village of Venetie faced an impossible position before the Supreme
Court - in order to establish its authority to govern tribal lands, Venetie had to show
262. RENNARD STiCKLAND, ToNTO's REVENGE: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE AND POLICY 112
(1997) [hereinafter STRICKLAND]; see also JOHANSEN, supra note 178, at I (quoting Joyotoaul Chauduri,
American Indian Policy: An Overview, in VINE DELORIA, JR. ED., AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TwENTiETH
CENTURY 15 (1995) ("The field of American Law and Policy, historically and systematically, has had little to do
conceptually with American Indian law or methods ofconflict resolution.... Rather than being a branch of comparative
law, the formal field of American Indian law is a very special, complex, and often contradictory and confusing branch
of Anglo-American legal thinking.").
263. See Philip P. Frickey, Divestiture of Indian TribalAuthority, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 78 (1999) (The [Supreme]
Court's aalogical exercises seem more ad hoc than adept, more Anglocentric than analytical. In the diminishment
cases, the Court seems to havejettisoned the canonical approach [to statutory and treaty interpretation] in favor of a fact-
based analogical process.... To put it bluntly, the Court seems to be asking, 'is this area like the rest of South Dakota,
or is it truly Indian in nature.' One might question the objectivity of this analysis from a group ofjurists who may know
little about South Dakota, much less about Indian reservations found there.).
264. See Porter, supra note 238, at 939 (One reason Indian policy has been a failure is that it "has been based upon
a paternalistic ethnocentrism that has never viewed Indigenous people as capable of determining our own future.
American policymakers have assumed that their way of life was superior and worth emulating, that their society was
in a superior position to safeguard Indian interests, and that'their opinions about the future of Indian people were the
correct ones."); see also STRICKLAND, supra note 262, at 100 (detailing 19th and 20th Century historical, political,
and legal events supporting that "The Indian question' is a question most often viewed in the final analysis from a non-
Indian perspective. I am not saying that this view is villainous simply because it is non-Indian - in truth, almost all
Indian policy has been urged by its advocates as a policy for the 'benefit' ofthe Indians. But policy regularly emanates
from non-Indian sources which may not be entirely sensitive to or understanding of the complex problems involved.
A recurring facts is that Indian policymakers have believed, or acted as if they believed Indians themselves could not
know what was good Indian policy.").
265. Although many commentators have noted the pattern wherein the federal government announces a broad Indian
policy, watches it fail, then replaces it with another policy, and watches it fail, see, e.g., Blake A. Watson, The Thrust
and Parry of Federal Indian Law, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 437,486-91 (1998). federal lawmakers have not realized
one of the elements dooming these policies is the lack of Indian involvement in their formulation.
266. Alaska Natives were very likely underrepresented in the passage of ANCSA itself, although this issues is
debatable and beyond the scope of this Article. In the Solicitor's Opinion, the Solicitor himself described how he
formulated his Opinion based on federal, and not Native, perspectives, even while recognizing the huge effects it would
have on Alaska Natives. See Op. Sol. Gen., supra note 40, at 131 ("I understand the significant impact of this decision.
To conclude that areas are not Indian courts greatly limits the powers those Native Villages may exercise with respect
to the establishment of courts, police powers and other sovereign attributes that attach to jurisdiction over land. Yet,
this opinion reflects what we believe is the best reading of the law. Our decision on this matter is very much based on
what Congress did in ANCSA, and subsequent amendments and other legislation do not change this conclusion.").
267. JusticeThomas' 13-pageopinion reflects nothing about the perspectives ofthe Neetsaii Gwich'in peoples despite
the Venetie's lawyers attempts to be knowledgeable about and present these perspectives to the Court. The lawyers
travelled to the villages and visited with members before arguments; submitted villagers' narratives as appendices to
the Supreme Court briefs; and answered questions at oral arguments with information about the way villagers live and
govern. Were the justices even listening? Had they ever been to rural Alaska? Had they ever seen an Alaska Native
before Ms. Kendall-Miller appeared before them? Professor Frickey's questions about the Court's ability to analyze a
South Dakota Indian reservation come to mind. See supra note 260.
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its complete dependence on the federal government. The Court so framed the issue in
these terms, making for a case that was both counter-intuitive and unwinnable. With
its explicit and implicit vestiges of "wardship," federal Indian law fails to offer
Indians effective, empowering ways of asserting their rights.
268
Despite these legal deterrents, many indigenous peoples intend to thrive as
independent communities and in relation with their non-Indian neighbors. Recogniz-
ing that several hundred years of exploitation and colonization have created
contemporary problems, and that the federal government must continue to meet its
obligations to tribes, indigenous peoples nevertheless "accept that the burden of
safeguarding [their] future rests on [their] shoulders."'269 Thus, instead of relying on
oppressive relics of federal Indian law, they look to their own traditional and
contemporary visions of community health and diplomacy - they are practicing
indigenous Indian law.
Indigenous Indian law can work as an alternative, or complement, to existing
jurisprudence, depending on the situation. It does not require abandoning useful
elements of federal Indian law, but does critique and reject the negative aspects. In
this case, indigenous Indian law provides that, despite the inadequacy of administra-
tive law, Alaska Natives must be able to participate in lawmaking affecting them, and
despite the failings of federal Indian law, courts must interpret vague statutory
language in the Indians' favor. Further, Alaska Native visions of Indian Country may
illuminate the legal discussion in ways neither administrative law nor federal Indian
law even suggests.
A. Sources of Indigenous Indian Law
Indigenous Indian law emanates from at least three overlapping sources:
tribal law, Encounter-era law, and international law. These categories are not
mutually exclusive. Indigenous peoples brought their traditional tribal customs to
bear on their earliest relations with settlers; international law shaped treaties between
Indians and Europeans; and indigenous peoples are now infusing international law
with their own conceptions of justice. Here, I focus on Encounter-era law and
international law, recognizing where they reflect tribal law.27
i. The Encounter-Era Law of Trust
268. See Porter, supra note 238, at 902 ("Vhile [federal Indian] law may seem to have a neutral purpose, it would
be more accurate to say that 'federal Indian law' is really 'federal Indian control law' because it has the twofold mission
of establishing the legal bases for American colonization of the continent and perpetuating American power and control
over the Indian nations.").
269. Porter, supra note 238, at 900.
270. In my view, internal tribal law is most appropriately discussed by thosewithimmediate and specific knowledge -
in this instance, members of the Native Village of Venetie. For a survey of traditional tribal laws, see JOHANSEN,
supra note 178, at I ("The Encyclopedia ofNativeAmeican Legal Tradition isthe first attempt in book form to inject
traditional Native American political and legal systems into the study of law in the United States. It includes detailed
descriptions of several Native American Nations' legal and political systems, such as Iroquois, Cherokee, Choctaw,
Cheyenne, Creek, Chickasaw, Comanche, Sioux, Pueblo, Mandan, Huron, Powhatan, and Mikmaq.").
1999]
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
When we look at laws created a year, decade, or century ago, we often
inquire into the intent of the lawmakers. Thus, when federal Indian law scholars
want to understand early legal agreements between Europeans and Indians, they study
the legal traditions of the English, Spanish and French participants. But they rarely
study the legal traditions of the Wampanoag, Iroquois, or Cherokee participants.
Legal scholarship thus reflects what Europeans intended when they entered into
agreements with Indians but it does not reveal what the Indians intended by their
assent to the same agreements.
The result of this scholarship is the dominant theory that Indian tribes have
survived only by the grace of European and Anglo-American law:
The story builds on a narrative theme, either expressed or implied, that the
legal rules and principles adhered to in the course of this country's historical
dealings with Indian peoples are the exclusive by-products of the Western legal
tradition brought to America from the Old World. These by-products, so the
familiar story goes, were then developed here by the courts and the policymaking
institutions established by the dominant European-derived society into a
redemptive force for perpetuating American Indian tribalism's survival. Without
the European Law of Nations, without the English common law's recognition of
fiduciary duties arising from a guardian-ward relationship, without the elasticity
of feudalistic property law concepts to recognize and protect lesser rights of
aboriginal occupancy on the land, without the precedent of the King's sovereign
prerogatives of centralized control over colonial affairs, and so on - that is,
without the white man's Indian law, as this story tells it - the Indian would no
longer be among us27
This "White Man's Indian law" story ignores that, like Europeans, Indians
brought their own politics, diplomacy, and rituals to early encounters. From the
earliest Indian-white encounters, Indians were influencing the law governing relations
between the groups, and ensuring their survival. Although it is legitimate for scholars
to look to European and Anglo-American legal traditions as they try to understand
Encounter-era law, their study will reveal only one side of the legal history and
theory.27 Not content to perpetuate only half of the story, indigenous Indian law also
analyzes the contributions of indigenous legal traditions to the formative relations
between Indians and non-Indians.
Robert Williams, Jr. examined how various indigenous peoples brought their
own practices sought to bear on early interactions with Europeans. 27 Iroquois tribes,
for example, insisted that condolence and mourning rituals, wampum exchange, story
telling, and gift giving were appropriately conducted in their dealings with whites.
These practices allowed Indians and whites to act in proper relation to one another
271. Id. at 6.
272. See generally, Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Lam: The Hard Trial ofDecolonizing
andAmericanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 219 (1986).
273. See WILLIAMS, supra note 261. Iam necessarily abbreviating Williams'detailed descriptions of indigenous
legal traditions, the complexities and subtleties of which I cannot recreate here.
[Vol. 35:73
INTERPRETING INDIAN COUNTRY
and with a good mind in numerous treaty negotiations.274 Creek delegates carried
eagle wands, sang, and danced warrior songs before presenting delegates from the
colony of Georgia, or England's King George, with white feathers as gifts as part of
a complex ritual signaling peaceful intentions in entering into alliances with the
English and colonists.275 Delaware, Shawnee, Fox, and Cherokee Indians extended
kinship, clan terminology, and other practices that "organized tribal ceremonies, the
central events of tribal life, and the reciprocal patterns of gifting and exchange that
made relationships within the tribe strong and reliable" to their encounters with the
white "communities at a distance. '276 In this manner, tribal "connective systems"
were used to establish relationships of obligation between Indians and whites. For
example, during the French and Indian War, Maryland officials were designated
"elder brothers" to their Cherokee "younger brothers." The designation reflected that
Maryland had a duty to protect the Cherokees, as "an elder brother had the duty of
primary protection of his younger siblings in Cherokee tribal life."277
"Rituals, precisely because of their communicative power, were used for all
types of purposes connected with the task of achieving mutual understandings with
treaty partners." 78 By ritual diplomacy, Indians intended to establish peace and good
thought, maintain harmonious relationships, and create trust.279 According to
Williams, such diplomacy did establish real connections between the groups, provided
sacred texts to govern relations, and constituted a body of emergent law. This law
imposed obligations on both Indian and European (later, American) parties by virtue
of customary expectations and contractual promises. In 1756, during the French and
Indian War, for example, before the Cherokees would fulfill their "obligations of
blood feud imposed by their symbolic kinship with the English" by attacking the
French, the Cherokee leader Culloughculla insisted that the English fulfill promises
made by the Governor of South Carolina in a treaty signed at Saludy (such as
constructing forts and providing a safe haven for Cherokee women and children)." °
This example, and many others, demonstrate that, during the Encounter era, "Indians
helped create a legal world... a world made up of multicultural negotiations, treaties,
and diplomatic relations with Europeans. "281
A recurring element of the Encounter-era legal relationship was "trust."
Williams explains:
The theme of trust in the language of Encounter era Indian diplomacy teaches us
many important lessons about American Indian visions of law and peace. For
Indians of the Encounter era, relationships of trust with different peoples were
essential to survival and flourishing in a multicultural world. The language of
274. See WILLIAMS, supra note 261, at 40-61.
275. Seeid. at79-81.
276. l at 71-72.
277. ld. at 72.
278. Id. at76.
279. See id. at 40-61.
280. WILLLAMS, supra note 261, at 104.
281. Id. at 8.
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Indian forest diplomacy reflected this basic understanding in richly evocative
vocabulary describing the paradigms for behavior for behavior that Indians
believed nurtured trust and reliance in a treaty relationship.282
Evidence of mutual trust has often been ignored by scholars looking for wardship as
the defining characteristic of the Indian role in the relationship. But Williams argues
this mutual trust, also described as "putting our lives' in each others' hands" or
"linking arms together" was operative and reflected indigenous visions of law and
peace. This trust allowed treaty partners to meet each other's needs, engage in acts
of forgiveness, bind future generations, meet to renew or alter treaty terms and
"sustain the sacred bonds that, as a matter of constitutional principle, could be relied
on for survival in a hostile and chaos-filled world."283
Examining an indigenous understanding of the trust relationship provides a
counter to the ward/guardian version that dominates federal Indian law. By revisiting
the seminal Indian law cases from an indigenous perspective:
We begin the complex process of rendering a more complete accounting of the
importance of Indian ideas and values in protecting Indian rights under U.S. law.
The trust doctrine was not the exclusive by-product of the Western legal tradition
brought to North American from the Old World. This central protective principle
of Indian tribal rights under our law has deep roots in Encounter era Indian visions
of law and peace.'
Below, this article analyzes the seminal Cherokee Cases, wherein the
Supreme Court acknowledged the trust relationship, in light of indigenous visions of
"trust," as well as international legal principles.
Before moving on to international law, it is important to discuss the
limitations of Encounter-era law as a source of indigenous Indian law. Above all, we
know that many, if not most, treaty meetings and other encounters between Indians
and non-Indians lacked "trust." As Rennard Strickland has rightly asserted, "I cannot
be a consensus historian and willingly pretend that 'the Colombian Exchange' was a
consensual experience. I am by training a legal historian, and I object to the concept
of discovery and western settlement as a mutual or equitable exchange. In my view,
Indians gave - Europeans took.2 85 Without pandering to White Man's Indian law,
Strickland, Deloria, and others argue that encounters between Indians and whites
were characterized by invasion, conquest, genocide, outright theft, and fraud - in
short, the antithesis of "trust." I agree with them, as I imagine Professor Williams
would. Treaty-making was often an act of overt deception, followed by an abrogation
of ostensibly agreed upon terms. Tribal leaders were frequently forced to negotiate
282. Id at 131; Cf, STRICKLAND, supra note 262, at 204 ("I cannot be a consensus historian and willingly
pretend that 'the Colombian Exchange! was a consensual experience. I am by training a legal historian, and I object to
the concept of discovery and western settlement as a mutual or equitable exchange. In my view, Indians gave -
Europeans took.').
283. WILLIAMS, supra note 261, at 113.
284. Id
285. STRICKLAND, supra note 262, at 204.
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under duress and in a foreign language.286 Sometimes Europeans and Americans
secured signatures from individuals not authorized to sign on behalf of the tribe.
Other times, there were no negotiations; Indians victims of white extermination
missions, by firepower or disease warfare, were not successfully articulating
traditional tribal custom to those killing them. However, it is time to acknowledge the
difficult gray areas of Indian law and history. Desi outright destruction and
deception at the hands of Europeans and Americans, Indians managed to shape
numerous written treaties, oral agreements, and ongoing relations with whites. Not
every encounter between the groups was a genocidal event where Indians were
passive victims; to some extent, they dictated the contours of relations with non-
Indians. This aspect of the legal history has been largely ignored by federal Indian
law scholars and practitioners, and as a result, European and Anglo-American
perspectives dominate the Indian law landscape. We can not forget that Europeans
and Americans quite often deliberately harmed Indian peoples, but we must begin to
examine how Indian legal ideas and values have been instrumental in protecting and
promoting indigenous American tribalism's cultural survival over time.2" 7
Second, Professor Williams' study of indigenous contributions to Encounter-
era law pertains specifically to Eastern and Woodlands Indians through the 18th
century. Further study will be needed to analyze the contributions of Indians to legal
encounters with whites in other regions and after 1800. Indigenous peoples' had
varied Encounter experiences; for example Alaska Natives never signed treaties,
unlike the Eastern and Woodlands tribes. We need to examine what kinds of
diplomacy Alaska Natives used in their early relations with non-Natives and what
kind of customary law evolved from these interactions.288 Is federal Indian law the
only law that grew out of the Alaska Native early encounters with whites? Balancing
Indian law's current focus only on the "white man's" and/or "federal" side of the
story," 9 will require additional tribal-specific research, and we should resist the urge
286. See JOHANSEN, supra note 178, at 331-32 (citing VINE DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OFBROKEN
TREATIES: AN INDIAN DELCARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 110 (1985)).
287. WILLIAMS, supra note 2621. at 132.
288. Althoughcourts and commentators sometimes imply treaties comprise the only binding law resulting from early
Indian-non-Indian encounters, it is possible, or even likely, diplomatic missions, oral agreements, and community
expectations created a body of law governing relations (e.g. land use, trade networks, military engagements) between
Indians and non-Indians. Professor Anaya's argument on the binding nature of customary international law, discussed
in greater detail below, may have implications for early encounters between Europeans and indigenous peoples. See,
S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (1996) [hereinafter ANAYA].
289. According to the Solicitor, for example, "Alaska Native groups did not have legal systems in the modem
European sense, but all had systems of social and political control, some quite elaborate." Op. Sol., supra note 39, at
12. He later stated that the U.S. did not deal with Alaska Natives through treaties and the relationship was different than
that with Indians in the Lower-48. See id. at 46-53. However, the Solicitor never considered what indigenous law
contributed to the relationship. One academic source does begin to study Alaska Native traditional law and its
contributions to their encounter-era dealings with non-Indians. See CASE, supra note 2, at 333-370. Case describes
his analysis as only a "modest contribution" to a "fuller understanding of Alaska Native village histories and cultures
[which] seems vital to an understanding of past successes and failures of the federal-Native relationship and to future
improvement of that relationship for the benefit of all." Id. at 333. However, he does provide a useful starting point by
discussing both pre-contact traditional governments and early contact political relations between Russian traders,
missionaries and churches, individuals and later, representatives of the United States government. This discussion
suggests that, like the Iroquois and Woodlands Indians describedby Williams, AlaskaNatives, too, had traditional laws
governing their communities, and these legal systems influenced their interactions with non-Indians. For example:
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to assume all Indians have had the same history.
Nevertheless, federal Indian law imposes on all Indians and Alaska Natives
tribes the broad precedents established in the Cherokee Cases, and other Indian law
jurisprudence. For these reasons, all tribes involved in litigation may have to develop
indigenous responses to the foundational cases of federal Indian law - even when
those cases pertained to very distant Indian peoples, land, and issues. Venetie is the
perfect example. Although the dispute arose in the 1980's on Neets'aii Gwich'in lands
near the Arctic Circle, the Supreme Court's decision relied heavily on definitions of
"Indian Country" cases arising decades earlier in Southwestern Pueblos and a Nevada
Indian Colony.'9 Like almost every modern Indian law case, Venetie referenced
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia,291 and throughout oral
arguments, the justices asked questions based on the trust relationship enunciated in
these cases.292 The district court's opinion in Venetie surveyed every Indian Country
precedent from King George II's Proclamation of 1763 establishing for the first time
a boundary between Indian and white lands to 19th century federal liquor regulation
in the Dakota territories.293 If federal courts subject tribes to their (federal)
interpretation of history and case law involving any and all tribes, there is no reason
why tribal advocates cannot respond with an (indigenous) interpretation of the same
history and cases. In this article, therefore, I evaluate, with caution, relations between
Alaska Natives and the federal government in light of the "mutual trust" suggested
by Professor Williams.
"At contact, the Tlingit were divided between two large moieties, Raven and Wolf... Each contained over twenty naa
(matrilineal claims). These social groupings functioned to formally regulate the institution of marriage and to define
ceremonial activities. Clans from opposite moieties often formed alliances. Claims and theirlocal divisions, which were
made up of one or more hit housegroups or houses, figured prominently in Tlingit political organization." Id. at 335.
Clan and territorial groupings, lwaans, dictated geographic, military, hunting and fishing, family relations, economic,
and other social elements ofTlingit communitylife. Further, Tlingit villages had a "peacemaker" who settled disputes.
During the contact period: "Although economic and religious changes were very apparent by 1900, the clan
organization remained intact. Clan leaders were important throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century as the
contact points with agents of the American government. For example, in 1879, a U.S, Naval Commander solicited the
help of two Tlingit claim leaders to form a council of chiefs to act as a judicial body responsible for local Indians.
Similarly, in 1890, a Tlingit clan leader was hired by a local factory to keep order among its employees and in the
nearby villages."Id at 338-39. Case notes that Tlingits and other Indians learned parliamentary procedures and the
principles of elective government from non-Indian peoples, and have been involved in mainstream politics. However
"accomplishments within white society, however, have not detracted from many basic Tlingit beliefs." Id. at 339. As
William Paul, Jr., the first Alaska Native elected to the territorial legislature, explained "Tlingits are their own
governors, which is the purest democracy. Their link to their origins is one of respect; indeed that is the basis of Tlingit
law." Id. More immediate to Venetie is Professor Case's description of traditional northern Athabaskan "band"
organization which depended onfamily, linguistic, subsistence, andgeographic elements. He describes how in the 1850's
Russian trading managers and Orthodox priests appointed "chiefs," to facilitate their dealings with Athabascans, but
that the "the chief had no power unless he was also a successful traditional leader, and the Indians always made a sharp
linguistic distinction between the two roles (traditional leader, "qeshqa," and chief "tayen") as they still do today." Id.
at 344. These examples from Case's work just begin to suggest how indigenous legal traditions shaped interactions with
white settlers in Alaska.
290. See Venetie, 118 S.Ct. at 951,953-955.
291. See id at 954, fu. 5.
292. See, e.g., infra note 330.
293. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, No. F81-0051, 1995 WL 462262, at *2 (D. Alaska Aug. 2,
1995).
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ii. The International Law Principle of Self-Determination
International law provides a second source of indigenous Indian law.
Drawing from international law at this point is appropriate for three reasons. First,
the Native Village of Venetie has exhausted its domestic remedies by litigating this
case through the highest court of the land,294 and can consider bringing action in
international forums.295 Second, the role of international law in the claims of
indigenous peoples is generally expanding,296 as contemporary norms and principles
of international law increasingly reflect indigenous interests. 97 Third, the Cherokee
Cases that provided the judicial foundation for the trust responsibility and canons of
construction were based significantly in international law and should continue to be
interpreted against that body of law.29
294. See id. at 151-182 (Exhatistion of domestic remedies is a common requirement in various international
adjudicatory bodies.).
295. See also, Tom Kizzia, Indian Country Claims Fails, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 26, 1998, at Al.
("Tribal aspirations in Alaska could find several other directions to move in the aftermath of the Venetie decision.
Native groups have talked of making appeals to international human rights organizations and the United Nations,
Native leaders and their lawyers said Wednesday (the day the Supreme Court announced its decision.").
296. See generally, ANAYA, supra note 288, at 134-140. Both international and domesticlegal bodies incorporate
international legal principles in their decisions affecting indigenous peoples. Examples in the U.S. include the federal
district courts. E.g., U.S. v. Abeyta, 632 F.Supp. 1301, 1302 (D. N.M. 1986) (1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo
between the U.S. and Mexico, along with the religious free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution, were found to be
the bases for dismissing a criminal proceeding against a Pueblo Indian who had killed an eagle for religious purposes
without a federal permit.); but see, Jenny Manybeads v. U.S., 730 F. Supp. 1515, 1521 (D.Ariz. 1989) (International
legal claims are "frivolous" where international law is relevant only in the absence, and where there is no controlling
executive, legislative, or judicial decision; the U.N. Charter is not a self-executing international obligation on the U.S.;
and the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act did not violate plaintiffs rights under customary international law or the U.N.
Charter.) .Executive statements, such as President Clinton's May 9, 1994 "Remarks to American Indian and Alaska
Native Tribal Leaders," and legislative actions, such as the passage of the Native American Graves and Repatriation
Act (1990), also reflect acceptance of the norm of self-determination, consistent with developing international law.
Outside of the U.S., the international legal principle of self-determination is more readily incorporated into national
constitutions, such as that of Colombia, see ANAYA, supra note 288, at 145 n.42, and the decisions of national high
courts, see, e.g, Mabov. Queensland, [199215 C.N.L.R. 1 (High Ct. ofAustralia). U.S. tribes have alsobrought claims
in international settings, such as the Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights, See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. U.S.,
Case 11.071, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.IJV/II.95 doc.7 rev 610 (1997).
297. See ANAYAsupra note 288, at 183 ("Overthelast several years the development ofinternational law has been
influenced by indigenous peoples' efforts to secure a future in coexistence with all of humankind. Through the
international human rights program, they and their supporters have been successful in moving states and other relevant
actors to an ever closer accommodation of their demands. The traditional doctrine of state sovereignty and related,
lingering strains of legal thought the originated in European or Western perspectives have tended to limit the capacity
of the international legal order to affirm the integrity and survival of indigenous peoples as distinct units of human
interaction. Nonetheless, the movement toward an ever greater international affirmation of indigenous peoples' rights
- fueled by the world community's burgeoning commitment to human rights in general and its move away from
Eurocentric bias - is apparent. Moreover, while the movement can be expected to continue as indigenous peoples
continue to press their cause, international law has already developed in substantial measure to support their survival
and flourishment.").
298. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 93 (1996) ("The Court
currently uses canons to buffer congressional excesses in these other constitutionally sensitive structural areas, and the
same strategy is evident in Chief Justice Marshall's creation and application of the Indian law canons. Because he
modeled these canons against the backdrop of international law, they should be nurtured by international norms as well
as domestic values.") (Citing Angela R. Hoeft, Note, Coming Full Circle: American Indian Treaty Litigation from
an International Human Rights Perspective, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 203, 212 (1995)) (stating Marshall incorporated
international law into the domestic law of Indian affairs).
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A fundamental international legal principle for indigenous peoples is self-
determination. The United Nations Charter, perhaps the most widely accepted
instrument of international law, affirms the principle of self-determination299 and
accepts that nation-states have an obligation to promote non-self governing peoples
within their borders.00 The U.S. is generally reluctant to sign the numerous
international treaties confirming indigenous rights, but even the U.S. is a member of
the U.N and is bound by the charter.31 The United Nations Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples ("Draft Declaration") recognizes that indigenous
peoples should enjoy human rights under the U.N. Charter and other elements of
international law, and that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination."'
Under the U. N. Charter and other international documents, self-determination is "a
principle of customary international law and evenjus cogens, a peremptory norm. "303
The principle of self-determination thus influences the body of conventional
and customary international law involving indigenous peoples. This principle abhors
empire building and conquest and instead requires that all peoples exercise control
over their own existences. Self-determination means ,that indigenous peoples
participate in lawmaking affecting them. The Draft Declaration states: "Indigenous
people have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, through procedures
determined by them, in devising legislative or administrative measures that affect
them. States shall obtain the free and informed consent of the peoples concerned
before adopting and implementing such measures.
' 04
The Draft Declaration also calls on states to implement both prospective and
remedial measures and to ensure that such measures also take into account the
principle of self-determination, meaning that indigenous peoples must shape the
remedies themselves.
S. James Anaya has identified two stages at which self-determination should
prevail, and where, if it has not prevailed, remedial measures are in order.
Constitutive self-determination occurs when institutions are conceived or significantly
altered, and ongoing self-determination ensues in the relations between nations and
299. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, sec. 2.
300. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.
301. RecognizingU.S. hesitance to delegatedomestic lawmaking authority to theinternational community, Professor
Frickey suggest international norms serve as a backdrop for constitutional and quasi-constitutional claims. Frickey,
supra note 298, at 79.
302. See ANAYA, supra note 288, at Chs. 4-6 (Because the Declaration, in draft form, has been accepted by the
U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, but has not been passed as a
Resolution by the Subcommission or by the higher bodies of the U.N., it constitutes an element of customary
international law. Customary international law may be less binding than formally ratified treaties and conventions, but
nonetheless contributes to the expectations of the international community and supports indigenous rights in domestic
settings. Several conventions assert specific rights for indigenous peoples. ILO 169, for example, has an entire part on
"Land" and articles on indigenous participation in government actions which affect them. These aspects ofILO 169
could be used to support Alaska Native claims on Indian Country. The U.S. has not ratified ILO 169, but it, too,
contributes to customary international law, and reflects certain principles such as self-determination, human equality,
property and state responsibility, that are accepted by the international legal community.).
303. Ilat79nn.l &2,89nn.14-16.
304. U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. EJCN.4/1995/2,
EICN.4/Sub.2/1994/Sub.2/1994/56, at 105 (1994).
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indigenous peoples. More specifically:
Constitutive self-determination .. corresponds with the provision common to the
international human rights covenants.., that state that peoples 'freely determine
their political status' by virtue of the right self-determination. At a minimum, this
means that "procedures toward the creation, alteration or territorial extension of
governmental authority normally are regulated by self-determination precepts
requiring minimum levels of participation on the part of all affected peoples
commensurate with their respective interests." 5
Ongoing self-determination "requires a governing order under which individuals and
groups are able to make meaningful choices in matters touching upon all spheres of
life on a continual basis... [including] economic, social, and cultural development. 3 06
In today's international law, "the principle [of the state's special duty to indigenous
peoples] rests on widespread acknowledgement, in light of contemporary values, of
the relatively disadvantaged condition of indigenous peoples.307 These contemporary
values, including the principle of self-determination, cast new light on the trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes. International law
recognizes that trusteeship toward indigenous peoples is grounded in centuries of
Western jurisprudence and state activity and has included oppressive treatment of
indigenous peoples in the past. However, "the idea of a guardianship or trusteeship
relationship between the U.S. federal government and Indian nations is not itself
objectionable, if the sources and objects of that relationship are adjusted to
contemporary values of Indian self-determination and cultural integrity."30'
B. Application of Indigenous Indian Law to Interpretation
Both Williams' work on Encounter-era Indian-white relations and Anaya's
work on self-determination in international law allows us to look at indigenous legal
problems in a new way. Here, I am prompted to re-examine the trust relationship in
order to understand how the Indian canons work today. The fact that in Venetie,
neither the Supreme Court nor the Solicitor felt compelled to apply the Indian canons
to ANCSA suggests the federal Indian law framework is inadequate. Adding Indian
305. ANAYA, supra note 288, at 82.
306. Id.
307. S. James Anaya, In the Supreme Court of the American Indian Nations Lone Wolf, Principal Chief of the
Kiowas, et al., 7-WTR KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLY 117, 129 (1997).
308. Id. at 131. International law, in particular the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra
note 304, provides substance to the ideals of self-determination and cultural integrity. For example, Article 21 of Draft
Declarationprovides: "Indigenouspeopleshave rights to maintain and develop their ownpolitical, economic, and social
systems, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all
their traditional and other economic activities. Indigenous peoples who have deprived of subsistence and development
are entitled to just compensation."; See also Article 23 (right of indigenous peoples to pursue and determine economic
development), Article 25 (indigenous rights to maintain and strengthen spiritual and material relationship with land and
uphold land-based responsibilities to future generations), Article 27 (restitution of indigenous' lands, territories, and
resources traditionally used and confiscated, used or damaged without free and informed indigenous consent), Article
28 (indigenous involvement in environmental management), Articles 31-36 (indigenous self-government), and Articles
37-41 (indigenous participation in domestic and international settings to enforce the Declaration).
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visions of law and peace, as well as the principle of self-determination, will reveal a
more complete and effective understanding of the trust relationship and Indian
canons.
i. Critique of Federal Indian Law Wardship
The concept of "trust" as being confined to "wardship" derives from an oft-
repeated tendency to cast Indians in the role of non-actors, incapable of managing
their own affairs.30 9 When the federal government looks at Indian communities and
see indicia of self-determination, including economic enterprise, revitalized
governments, and thriving cultural practices, it does not see wards.310 Wardship puts
Indians seeking application of the Indian canons in a catch-22. If Indians are wards,
the argument goes, agencies may be "the best administrators of the wardship
relation." Therefore, if the agencies have elected not to apply the Indian canons in
their administration of Indian statutes, the courts should not interfere.311 If Indians
are not wards, "the premises of the canon are no longer valid" because they first
evolved to recompense Indians for unfair bargaining positions in treaty negotiations,
whereas many of today's interpretations involve Congressionally passed statutes in
which "may or may not reflect consultation with Native Americans.1s12 Further,
when Indians are not wards, the government is not a trustee, and when the govern-
ment is not acting as trustee, the canons do not apply.313
There are federal Indian law responses to these problems -- including that
courts should apply the canons outside of treaty interpretations because Congressio-
nal statutes are passed in attempt to fulfill broader wardship obligations. 4 And,
even though Indians are no longer "in a state of pupilage" or an "unlettered people,"
they are still "dependent on and live their lives controlled by the federal government."
315 Therefore application of the canons, which grew out of wardship, is still
meaningful because Congress intends to treat Indians as wards and, in fact, Indians
are still wards.
Beyond their circularity, these federal Indian law responses are unsatisfactory
for several reasons. First, they perpetuate values and politics that are not acceptable
309. See Tadd M. Johnson and James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to
Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251,1253-54(1995) ("When viewed as an addled, eccentric'ward,' Indian tribes
were definitionally incapable of making informed and intelligent choices for their own benefit. They, therefore, were
not given choices nor required to make even the most fundamental decisions required for self-governance.").
310. The Supreme Court pays attention when, from its perspective, Indians are not acting like Indians "traditionally"
do. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 118 S.Ct. 1700 (1998) (dicta) (expressing
doubt about perpetuating the doctrine of sovereign immunity when Indians now act "well beyond traditional tribal
customs and activities" and "take part in the Nation's commerce... ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-
Indians").
311. Heinecke, supra note 174, at 1036.
312. Ild.
313. See Max Minzer, Note, Construction Work: the Canons of Indian Lav, Alaska v. Native Village of Venete,
107 YALE L. J. 863 (1997).
314. See Heinecke, supra note 174, at 1037.
315. Id. at 1037.
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in the 21st century. As I argued above, the "Indian as ward" concept is a moderate
formulation of the myths of Indian inferiority and European superiority expressed
more forcefully by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama,116 and Tee-Hit-
Ton v. United States,311 the cases which established the plenary power of Congress
over Indian tribes.31 To talk about "wardship" today evokes the racist assumptions
of those earlier cases. It is true that, in Chief Justice Marshall's time, international
law "upheld imperial spheres of influence asserted by Western powers and deferred
to their effective exercise of authority over lands inhabited by 'backward,' 'uncivi-
lized,' or 'semi-civilized' people. 3 19 Modern lawyers are not bound to perpetuate
reasoning which is now abhorrent because of racist or other immoral
underpinnings.32
In addition to the moral concerns, "wardship" is not now, and may have never
been, an accurate description of Indians' status in relation to the federal government.
Williams argues that Marshall's use, in the 1830's, of the terms "guardian" and
"ward" should be understood as an example of the "patriarchal terminology that white
Americans of his generation typically used in translating the language of Indian forest
diplomacy."32' These terms, therefore, might not have correctly or objectively
described the actual nature of relations between the groups even in Chief Justice
Marshall's time. And during the past several centuries, the tribes and federal
government have been dependent on one another in ways that "ward" and "guardian"
do not capture. Consider several anecdotal examples. Until the 1800's the Iroquois
tribes negotiated with Europeans and Americans in somewhat equitable conditions,
but as their populations, community health, and land base declined, treaty-making
increasingly favored greedy and opportunistic whites. After several centuries of
changing circumstances, some Iroquois tribes now have revitalized economies,
cultures, and ongoing traditional governments. In 1999, the Oneida Nation's self-
sufficiency and self-determination prompted it to reject over two million dollars of
BIA funding, asking these monies be redistributed among needier tribes.322 In the
1670's, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation suffered heavily in warfare;
subsequently, it declined in population and land base until only two sisters lived on
its reservation by the 1970's. During this period, most non- Indians thought the
316. U.S. v. Kagama, 188 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1885) ("These Indian tribes are... communities dependent on the
United States. Dependent largely for their daily food... their weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course
of dealing of the Federal government with them... The power of the general government over these remnants of a race
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
among whom they dwell.").
317. 348 U.S. 272 (1955) ("Every schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of the continent were deprived their
ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food
and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conqueror's will that deprived them of their land.").
318. See also, Lonewolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
319. ANAYA, supra note 288, at 83.
320. See Anaya, supra note 30 , at 133 ("The operativel aw in the United States should not be allowed to be infected
by doctrine or theory [such as race discrimination] that is contrary to modem values, as reflected in international law.").
321. Id. at 183 n.44 (emphasis added).
322. See OneidaNation, Oneida NationRejectsBA Fund; Wants Them Redistributed to OtherNYNations, USET,
http://204.168.77.2/press/BIAI.HTML.>.
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Pequots extinct. But in the 1980's and 1990's, the tribe began a rebirth,323 and in
1999, the Pequots' have stunning economic clout and are an active lobbying force on
Capitol Hill. The Navajo Nation retains much of its traditional land base, language,
and culture and successfully resists the federal governing model imposed on other
tribes through the Indian Reorganization Act. Nevertheless, the Navajo Nation still
relies on the federal government to meet its treaty obligations by supporting
education, health and social programs. Following Venetie, the Native Village of
Venetie is apparently "free" of federal supervision over tribal lands, but it continues
to rely on federal Indian programs. These are just four examples; each of the 550
federally recognized tribes "depends" on the federal government in a unique, evolving
manner.
The federal government's "dependency" has also changed with the times, and
differs with respect to various tribes and regions. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the
emergent government depended on the Indian tribes to relinquish the lands that
became the United States. Today, the federal government is not necessarily seeking
additional territory, but does depend on the coal, oil, and uranium below the surface
of tribal lands, and also uses tribal lands to store nuclear waste.324 In the late 1700's,
the government relied on Eastern tribes as military allies in wars against Indian and
European nations. In 1999, the United States does not turn to Indian tribes, as such,
when it needs military allies, but it does rely on the American Indian tribal members
who have consistently enlisted in the military at a rate "far exceeding their percentage
of the population" and served with unusual distinction.Y
None of these scenarios represents a static "ward/guardian" relationship;
rather, each illustrates the mutual and evolving dependency of the federal government
and Indian tribes. The government and Indian tribes are not equally dependent on
one another; to be sure, the federal government is the dominant power in the United
States, as it is internationally, and Indian tribes are "specially disadvantaged
groups.3 26  The federal government has often failed in its trust responsibili
323. See generally, Mashantucket Pequot Museum. and Research Center, Building the Dream,
http://www.mashantucket'com/pdatelhome.html.>.
324. See Arlene Hirschfelder and Martha Kreipe de Montano, THE NATIVE AMERICAN ALMANAC 214-15
(1993) (describing tribal oil, gas, coal, and mineral resources as important to U.S. energy needs); Winona LaDuke, ALL
OUR RELATIONS: NATIEV STRUGGLES FOR LAND AND LIFE 2-3 (1999) (describing "reservations as targets
for nuclear waste" and the effects of uranium and coal mining on Navajo health). See also U.S. land transfer to Utah
tribe would be largest in 100 years, http:lwww.cm.comI2OOIUS/01/l4fmdian.lands/index.html> (describing plan to
return title to 80,000 acres of land to the Whiteriver, Uintah, and Uncompahgre bands of Ute Indians with the
"stipulation that the tribe return a percentage of revenue generated by oil and gas development on the land to the Energy
Department" providing the Department with funds to clean up uranium tailings at an abandoned mine in Utah).
325. ArleneHirschfelderandMarthaKreipedeMontano,THENATIVEAMERICANALMANAC227-36 (1993)
(discussing high rates of Indian enlistment; detailing the contributions of Choctaw, Comanche, and Navajo "Code
Talkers" in World Wars I and II; and listing Medals of Honor awarded to Indians).
326. William M. Bryner, Toward a Group Rights Theory for Remedying Harm to the Subsistence Culture of
AlaskaNatives, 12ALAsKAL. REv. 293,333 (1995). "Mutualtrust" doesnotmean thefederalgovernment andlndians
are equally powerful; obviously they are not. Disparate positions of wealth, military strength, or land base should not
automatically weaken the trust between the parties. As Williams explains, the Cherokees described the relationship as
one between an elder and younger brother. See WILLIAMS, supra note 261, at 104: "Indians regarded the duty to
provide aid and assistance to a treaty partner, like all of the customary bonds of a treaty relationship, as a constitutional
obligation. Changes in circumstances or the original bargaining positions of the parties were therefore irrelevant as far
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ties, sometimes deliberately harming tribes. And many tribes, suffering seriously the
ongoing effects of colonialism,327 need the federal programs designed to alleviate
problems of Indian health, poverty, and social ills. On the other hand self-determining
tribes often work in partnership with the federal government to solve these problems
in proactive, culturally meaningful, and effective ways.3" And, today's tribes
regularly engage in negotiation and diplomacy with non-Indian neighbors to address
conflicts, not unlike their ancestors did during the Encounter era.329
In short, the relationship between tribes and the federal government
encompasses a wide-range of mutual "dependencies." By virtue of early diplomacy,
the Constitution, treaty promises, statutes, judicial decisions, executive orders,
negotiations and settlements, the tribes and the federal government are now, and will
always be, engaged in a trust relationship. 330 The relationship must not be viewed as
a paternalistic federal "wardship," but rather as an ongoing mutual trust informed by
indigenous legal traditions and the principle of self-determination. 33' The federal
government's responsibilities are not going to evaporate at some magical moment
when tribes "outgrow" their "ward" status. Nor will the federal government's past,
present, or future transgressions of indigenous trust terminate the relationship.3
as Indians were concerned. Throughout the treaty literature, Indians can be found trying to educate their European-
American treaty partners that they duty to provide aid and assistance under a treaty did not change simply because one
party became weaker over time. If anything, because a treaty connected the two sides together as relatives, the treaty
partner who grew stronger was underanincreased obligation to protect its weakerpartner."; Seealso, ANAYA, supra
note 288, at 3 (describing the disavantaged conditions of indigenous peoples worldwide and the corresponding duties
of nation-states and the world community).
327. See Porter, supra note 238, at 903 ("We [indigenous nations] are weak from the efforts taken by American
before you [President Clinton] to transform our tribal societies and way of life by force. Accordingly, your help is
needed to make changes over those matters that are within your control."); see also, Gigi Berardi, Natural Resource
Policy, Unforgiving Geographies, and Persistent Poverty in Alaska Native Villages, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 85
(1998) (describing how an AlaskaNative attempts to ameliorate "persistentruralpoverty in Alaska villages" necessarily
involves factors including culture, geography, and subsistence patterns, as well as confronting difficulties imposed by
ANCSA).
328. The present Self-Governance Policy restores to tribes the ability to govern themselves, reduces federal control
over decision making, and allows tribes to assume all programming previously administered by the BIA. However, it
leaves intact the federal trust relationship, indicating that tribal problem-solving is not completely incompatible with
federal partnership. See Porter, supra note 238, at 969-81 (criticizing the Actbut noting it, " authorizes Indian nations
to 'redesign or consolidate programs,services, functions, and activities,' allowing each to tailor programs to suit tribal
tradition, custom, and circumstances best").
329. See Philip P. Fri ckeyAdjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1754, 1784 n.141 (1997).
330. See Kathleen M, O'Sullivan, Wat Would John Marshall Say? Does the Federal TrustResponsibility Protect
Tribal Gaming Revenue?, 84 GEo. LJ. 123, 131-32 (1995) ("On the other hand, [Chief Justice] Marshall might have
meant that the trust concept exists independently as a legal doctrine - in other words that the "trust relationship is not
so much created by the treaties as it is implicitly recognized by them.... [I]f the duty inheres in the relationship between
the dominant European society and the less powerful Indian tribes, the term of the duty might be infinite, and tribes
might be entitled to the same level of federal protection, regardless of a particular treaty or the tribe's level of self-
government, assimilation, or wealth.").
331. See Exec. Order No. 13084,63 Fed. Reg. 27655 (1998) ("The United States has a unique legal relationship
with Indian tribal governments as set forth in the Constitution of the United States, treaties, statutes, Executive orders,
and court decisions. Since the formation of the Union, the United States has recognized Indian tribes as domestic
dependent nations under its protection.").
332. Some argue Congress' "plenary power" over Indian affairs would allow it to terminate the relationship with all
and any tribes; in fact, Congress "terminated" several tribes in the 1950's, although some have regained federal
recognition, and Congress declared the policy a failure. A scholarly debate exists as to whether there are limits on
plenary power - such as Congress' duty to enact statutes rationally related to the trust responsibility, the contemporary
need to reject the doctrine's origins in late 19th/early 20th century theories of Euro-American cultural superiority, and
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Both the Indian nations and federal government seem committed to jointly occupying
the United States for a long time to come. The Supreme Court must stop waiting for
the end of the relationship between them.
333
The Venetie case itself is a poignant illustration of the lingering, harmful
presence of wardship in federal Indian law. ANCSA called for a land claims
settlement "with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights
and property ... without creating a ... lengthy wardship or trusteeship. 3 34  But
applying their earlier precedents, the Supreme Court justices indicated they could not
find Indian Country absent proof the Native Village of Venetie was dependent on the
federal government for services and supervision of Village affairs. 335 They wanted
the Indian canons. See, e.g., Anaya, supra note 307, at 131-134 (citing Nell J. Newton, Federal Power OverIndians:
Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984); see also Aiken, supra note 168, at 150 (under
the implied social contract theory, the federal promise to protect tribal self-government is a limit on federal power,
"equivalent to the constitutional rights foundational to the federal-citizen relationship"); Frickey, supra note 298, at
407-418 (discussing Indian treaties as "constitutive documents" with attendant "quasi-constitutional clear-statement
rules "immunizing" them from "a construction that would violate [their] underlying nature and purposes). It is well
beyond the scope of this article to analyze the tensions between sovereignty and plenary power, except to say that in a
legal regime, informed by indigenous theory and practice, the unilateral eradication of tribes, as such, by the federal
government could not occur.
333. In Venetie, Justice Thomas relied on United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 23, 46 (1913) which explained:
"Taking these decisions together, it may be taken as the settled doctrine of this court that Congress, in pursuance of the
long-established policy of the government, has a right to determine for itself when the guardianship which has been
maintained over the Indian shall cease. It is for that body, and not the courts, to determine when the true interests
of the Indian require his releasefrom such condition oftutelage. "Id. at46 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
334. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b)(1994). See, e.g., Shannon Work, TheAlaska Native Claims SettlementAct: An Illusion
In the Questfor Native Self-Determination, 66 OR. L. RV. at 211-216 (ANCSA reveals the perceived tension in the
"self-determination without termination" Indian policy of the Nixon-era.).
335. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Oral Arguments, State of Alaska v'. Native Village of
Venetie, 1997 WL 762053, at *27-31 (December 10, 1997).
QUESTION (Scalia): Ms. Kendall, what do you do with section 1601(b), in which ANCSA said that its purpose was't
to convey the land to the Indian people with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and
property withoutestablishing anypermanently racially defined institutions, rights, privileges or obligations and without
creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship?
KENDALL-MILLER: Yes, Justice Scalia. That particular provision speaks to the creation ofa wardship, but it doesn't
speak to the ongoing relationship that existed, and it is true that Congress, through that particular provision, announcing
its policy that it was going to adopt a new approach to Indian affairs through ANCSA, and that was one that would
disavow the reservation system. The reservation system is one in which the federal government owns the lands and has
ultimate control over the decisions with respect to development of those lands. Keep in mind at the time that ANCSA
was passed the average income of Alaska Natives was less than $1,200 per year. They lived in dire poverty, and it was
viewed to be necessary to be able to develop some kind of economic vehicle to help the Native people come into the
mainstream, economic mainstream. That was the purpose, to get the villages out from underneath the Bureau of Indian
Affairs' control ...
QUESTION (Scalia):Well, you say to get them out oftheir control. That's the whole definition ofwhat's Indian countr,
whether they're within the control, wardship, and trusteeship of the government. (emphasis supplied).
KENDALL-MILLER: I disagree.
QUESTION (Scalia): It seems to me incompatible to say that you want to get them out the control, and yet you still
want it to be Indian country.
KENDALL-MILLER: Yourhonor, section... 1151 (b), the categorythat covers theIndian communities, that particular
category does not turn on lands being in federal ownership. It turns on a community that under the protection and
guardianship of the federal government, and that's what we have today with respect to Venetie.
QUESTION (Scalia): Dependency. Dependency to the federal government, which is what you're just telling me they
were trying to eliminate.
KENDALL- MILLER: Not the dependency, the BIA control over development issues of their land. The dependency
relationship stayed intact and in fact was confirmed by the Congress in the 1994 federally recognized, -Tribal List Act,
where Congress expressly affirmed its ongoing relationship to all federally recognized tribes, including Venetie, and
that fact fundamentally undermines all of petitioner's arguments, because from that was two important points, the first
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Venetie to explain how it could be a ward when ANSCA ended wardship. Venetie
acknowledged the federal government no longer owned held Venetie's lands in trust,
but explained Venetie remains politically dependent on the federal government as
evidenced by its status as a federally recognized Indian tribe, entitled to the political
protections provided by that status.336 Further, the federal government exercises
supervisory powers by providing to Venetie various monies and programs like the
Indian Health Services, the Housing and Urban Development Indian Housing
Project, and the Administration for Native Americans. 337 When the State countered
that Alaska Native communities were "well-off' and "not dependent on the federal or
territorial government for their existence," Venetie responded:
Though legally irrelevant, this all too sadly is not true. When ANCSA was
considered Alaska Natives lived in dire poverty. The median age of death was
34.5 and Native infant mortality for some age classifications was 12 times the rate
for the general population. The median village cash income for working Natives
was $1,204 (a quarter of the white rate), Native unemployment stood at 60
percent, and only 8 percent of Natives completed high school. Unfortunately,
today Native villages remain plagued by poor health, unemployment, welfare
dependence, suicide, poor education, disproportionate incarceration, and
substandard or nonexistent housing and basic water and sewer service. Estimated
1968 federal "Indian program" expenditures "chiefly" for Alaska Native villages
were $43 million, and today exceed 10 times that suMr33
But it was not enough to show Venetie relied on the federal agencies' provision of
basic social services, or that Venetie was engaged in an ongoing political relationship
with the United States. 339 Rather Venetie had to show it was the ward and the federal
government was the guardian. As Justice Scalia put it, "That's the whole definition
of what's Indian country, whether they're within the control, wardship, and trusteeship
of the government."'  For a native community that survived because of its self-
sufficiency, owns its land in communal fee simple, and engages in self-government,
that the c&ntinuing guardianship means that Congress a trustee cannot terminate something as important as rights that
Venetie possessed before 1971 without expressly saying so. Second, the guardianship relationship goes to two of the
important components necessary to establish Venetie's character as a dependent Indian community. You need that the
tribe that's under federal protection and you need an area that is occupied by tribe under federal guardianship....
336. See Resp. Br., supra note 16, at 7-8 n.6. Alaska Native villages deal with the United States according to the
nation-to-nation relationship in which the federal government protects and enhanced native self-governance and
institutions.
337. See id. at 25-27.
338. Id. at 15 n.13.
339. See Venetie, 118 S.Ct. 954 n.5: "[T]he tribe asks us to adopt a different conception of the term 'dependent
Indian communities.' Borrowing from Chief Justice Marshall's seminal opinions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and
Worcester v. Georgia, the Tribe argues that the term refers to its political dependence, and that Indian country exists
wherever land is owned by a federally recognized tribe. Federally recognized tribes, the Tribe contends, are 'domestic
dependent nations', and thus ipso facto under the superintendence of the Federal Government... .This argument ignores
our Indian Country precedents, which indicate both that the Federal Government must take some action setting apart
the land for the use of Indians 'as such,' and that it is the land in question, and not merely the Indian tribe inhabiting it,
that must be under the superintendence of the Federal Government. "(citations omitted).
340. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Oral Arguments, State ofAlaska v. Native Village ofVenetie,
1997 WL 762053, at *28 (December 10, 1997).
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proving wardship presented an impossible task.341 Unsurprisingly, the wardship
argument did not prevail in Justice Thomas' disposition of the case. He wrote:
ANCSA ended federal superintendance over the Tribe's lands by revoking all
existing Alaska reservations but one ... and by stating that ANCSA's settlement
provisions were intended to avoid a 'lengthy wardship or trusteeship'.... The
Tribe's contention that such superintendence is demonstrated by the Government's
continuing provision of health, social, welfare, and economic programs to the
Tribe is unpersuasive because those programs are merely forms of general federal
aid, not indicia of active federal control. Moreover, the argument is severely
undercut by the Tribe's view of ANCSA's primary purposes, namely, to effect
Native self-determination and to end paternalism in federal Indian relations."2
Justice Thomas' belief that self-determination diminishes the trust relationship
is itself "severely undercut" by the fact the Indian Self-Determination Act itself
preserves the trust relationship343 and requires the Act be construed according to the
canons of federal Indian law, in favor of Indian contractors. 3" Congress did not
envision that assertion of tribal rights, such as exercising jurisdiction over tribal
lands, would be contingent on showing federal control. Neither did Congress
preclude application of the Indian canons when a statute affects a tribe that is not
totally dependent on the federal government. Only the wardship version of the trust
relationship could lead to such conclusions.345
341. See id. (Despite the Justices' fixation on dependency, Ms. Kendall-Miller did not hide Venetie's strengths,
distinctiveness, and non-ward-like qualities):
KENDALL-MILLER: But that [acting like a municipality] would be an act of assimilation. Venetie is a federally
recognized tribe, and it has been governing its own community and its own affairs since time immemorial.
QUESTION (O'Connor): Well by becoming a municipality under state law would it give up control, or wouldn't
it continue to exercise control?
KENDALL-MILLER: It would give up its culture. It would be assimilated into the state and it would for, it would
relinquish, it would be forced to relinquish its viable Native governing entity that it has utilized and is an entity that
has been recognized by the federal government as existing and that is entitled to all the same benefits and
protections as other federally recognized tribes. A municipal government is not one that is necessarily compatible
with decision-making of tribal governments. The Venetie people make their decisions by consensus- by looking
to their tribal elders, by sitting down together and conferring upon the problems.
342. See Venetie, 118 S.Ct. at 950.
343. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-20 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.S.C.A.N. 7775,7781.
344. See 25 U.S.C. §450()(a)(2)(1994) ("each provision of the Indian Self-Determination Act shall be liberally
construed for the benefit of the contractor.").
345. And the wardship version of the trust relationship certainly influenced Justice Thomas. Consider the
characterization of Indian "dependency" in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), one of the main cases he
relied on in defining "dependent Indian community." In Sandoval, at 38-41, the Court's decision as to "whether the
status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands is such that Congress competently can prohibit the introduction of
intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico into statehood, relied on "the reports
of the super-intendents charged with guarding their interests [which] show that they are dependent upon the fostering
care and protection of the government, like reservation Indians in general; that, although industrially superior, they are
intellectually and morally inferior to many of them; and that they are easy victims to the evils and debasing influence
of intoxicants." The Court quoted extensively from the reports which are too lengthy to reproduce here. Reading the
description of Indian dependency and federal "superintendence" in Sandoval makes me wonder if Venetie is not a
"dependent Indian community" because, in the 1990's, no government official had described the tribe in the racist,
derogatory, and xenophobic terms used by the superintendents to describe the Pueblos in the 1910's.
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We must expose the ridiculous irony of requiring tribes to prove they are
wards before they can exercise basic governmental powers. Tribes should not have
to aspire to a certain degree of neediness, vulnerability, or poverty in order to assert
jurisdiction over lands they occupy.3 6 On a policy level, the dependency scheme is
blatantly at odds with the current Congress' goals of promoting tribal self-determina-
tion, self-governance, and economic recovery. From an evidentiary perspective, it is
unreasonable to make tribes produce examples of their dependence on federal
government supervision when, for hundreds of years, the federal government has
shirked its responsibilities to tribes. Playing the wardship game is also dangerous in
a political climate where some legislators are eager to reduce federal responsibilities
to tribes deemed less "ward-like. 3 4
7
Wardship is theoretically unsound, misrepresents historical and contemporary
Indian experiences, and violates contemporary values. When tribes pander to
wardship they suffer real legal, economic, and cultural consequences. It is time to kill
wardship.
ii. Reconsidering Trust & the Indian Canons
For purposes of this article, the biggest problem with "wardship" is that it
suggests the federal government's trust responsibilities, such as application of the
Indian canons, may be terminated, or at least weakened, when and if the Indians
escape their perceived state of incapacity.
The typical justification of the canons ... often reflects a sometimes hidden,
sometimes overt ethnic and cultural paternalism. Principles of legal thought and
practice that are based in a paradigm of wardship will have to be reconsidered in
an era of resurgent political sovereignty on the part of Indian peoples. The canons
of federal Indian law, if based in wardship, would be put at risk if that wardship
346. While acknowledging the real problems and conditions of Indian tribes, advocates cannot pander to such an
unworkable scheme, particularly in a climate where lawmakers would like to reduce federal responsibilities to tribes
that are less ward-like. The federal programs for Indians derive from treaty promises, statutory law, and other elements
of the trust responsibility; the federal government cannot shirk its obligations simply because Indians are not poor, or
otherwise "wards." See, e.g., William Claibome, At Indian Affairs, A Tough Act to Balance,WASH. POST, November
17, 1998 (In 1998 there was "a controversial means-testing proprosal by [U.S. Senator Slade] Gorton [R-WA] that
would gut federal Priority Allocation funding to tribes that have become wealthy through casinos and other business
enterprises, taking half the funds from the richest 10 percent of the tribes and giving it to the poorest 20 percent. The
measure was aimed at reducing allocations to tribes such as the Mashantucket Pequots ofConnecticut, whose Foxwoods
Casino, the largest in the Western Hemisphere, earns more than $1 billion a year.").
347. See, e.g., William Claiborne, At Indian Affairs, A Tough Act to Balance, WASH. PosT, November 17,1998
(In 1998 there was "a controversial means-testing proprosal by [U.S. Senator Slade] Gorton [R-WA] that would gut
federal Priority Allocation funding to tribes that have become wealthy through casinos and other business enterprises,
taking half the funds from the richest 10 percent of the tribes and giving it to the poorest 20 percent. The measure was
aimed at reducing allocations to tribes such as the Mashantucket Pequots ofConnecticut, whose Foxwoods Casino, the
largest in the Western Hemisphere, earns more than $1 billion a year."). Such tactics and threats pit Indian peoples
against each other in a dismal competition for resources and federal attention - it is not uncommon to hear some tribal
peoples criticizing wealthier gaming tribes as being "less Indian" than other tribes, or to witness membership disputes
wherein enrolled members keep out others who would share in resources. These tactics also provide obvious
disincentives to tribal economic growth. Through such wardship policies, the federal government continues to divide
and conquer tribes, and invidiously encourages tribes to divide and conquer themselves.
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were repudiated in favor of less paternalistic relations between the tribes and other
governmental institutions of the United States. 4
Indigenous Indian law cannot tolerate that ongoing reliance on the wardship
justification for the canons puts Indians and their advocates in the impossible position
of having to prove enough Indian dependency/federal control every time they assert
tribal rights. Although the canons are certainly applicable when tribes rely on federal
Indian legislation and programs, there is no reason to limit application of the Indian
canons to situations where tribes act as "wards" dependent on the United States as
"guardian. 349
The "appropriate justification for the canons is that they reflect the sovereign-
sovereign relationship of tribes within the United States."'35 With the benefit of
indigenous Indian law our understanding of the sovereign-sovereign relationship is
informed by the principles of trust and self-determination. Cherokee Nation and
Worcester were the Supreme Court's first formulations of an ongoing relationship
between Indian nations and the United States, and were also the cases that gave rise
to the Indian canons. Revisiting these cases in light of the principles of trust and self-
determination makes clear that application of the Indian canons does not depend on
the wardship version of the trust relationship.
In Cherokee Nation, Justice Marshall concluded the Supreme Court did not
have original jurisdiction over the action because the Cherokee Nation was not a
"foreign nation" for purposes of Article 3 of the Constitution. The tribes were
"distinct political communities" participating in "unique" relationship with the United
States. This relationship "resembled" that of a "ward to his guardian." Marshall
elaborated:
348. Steiner, supra note 187, at 16 (emphasis supplied). He notes the law of nations justification for the canons is
not diminished when indigenous peoples are not wards and in fact may be more consistent with enhanced respect for
Indian tribes on the part of those other governmental institutions. The "law of nations" refers to 18th century
international law. Steiner argues that the Indian canons are based in this international law "and... are a reflection of
the rights of the Indians as the original possessors and occupiers of the land and the obligations one sovereign owes to
another. This argument "necessarily contributes to the resuscitation and reinvigoration of the notion of Indian
sovereignty. It both recognizes and participates in the emergence of an alternative conception of Indian legal identity
as indigenous peoples, subjects of international law and yet confederated the United States, an image that escapes the
trap of pupilage and dependency. "Id. at 17.
349. Looking like wards is particularly difficult in light of present Indian policy. In contrast to prior successive
policies ofconquest, relocation, assimilation, termination, and urbanization, the current policy ofthefederal government
to Indian tribes is one of self-determination for tribal sovereigns engaged in a nation-to-nation relationship with the
United States. See, e.g., Resp. Br., supra note 16, at 16 ("Beginning in the 1960's, both Congress and successive
Presidents moved Native American policy into the 'Self-Determination' era, a policy most clearly articulated by
President Nixon's 1970 Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs. The President's policy... called upon the
Federal Government to 'explicitly affirm the integrity and right to continued existence of all Indian tribes and Alaska
Native governments... The new congressional Self-Determination policy has consistently been to renounce federal
paternalism, protect Native control over Native resources, promote Native economic development, strengthen tribal
institutions, and expand federal Indian programs and the opportunity for tribes to operate and redesign those programs,
all while preserving the federal-tribal trust relationship."(citations omitted). The current policy toward Indians,
therefore, is inconsistent with a notion of trust in which Indians are wards. Rather, it insists on a continued trust in
which tribes can act independently and in cooperation with the federal government to ensure their continued existence.
350. Philip P. Frickey, Divestiture of Indian TribalAuthority, 109 YALE J. 1, 78 n.362 (1999) (describing that
the justification for the canons is not "application of a principle favoring discrete and insular racial minorities").
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[The Cherokees] look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and
its power; appeal to it for relief of their wants; and address the president as their
great father. They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as
by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the
United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political
connection with them would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory
and an act of hostility.351
Reflecting elements of both indigenous352 and international law,353 this "protection'
of Indian tribes by the federal government would not compromise tribes' inherent
sovereignty. In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall explained:
[Tribes are] distinct, independent political communities... and the settled doctrine
of the law of nations, is that a weaker power does not surrender its independence
- its right of self-government - by associating with a stronger, and taking its
protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under
the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of
government, and ceasing to be a state.354
Marshall was guided by the responsibility of the federal government to protect the
Cherokee Nation and by the ongoing sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation.
The Cherokee Cases continue to be cited as the source of the Indian
canons.355 The question in Cherokee Nation required interpretation of the Treaty of
Hopewell between the Cherokee Nation and the United States. Attempting to apply
its laws over the Cherokee Nation on grounds the Cherokee Nation had surrendered
its inherent sovereignty, the State pointed to the Treaty provision "allott[ing]"
Cherokee Territory. Under the State's interpretation, "allotment" meant that the land
had been given to the Cherokee Nation by the U.S., and was distinguishable from the
term "marked out" which would mean that the Territory has been demarcated by a
351. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,17-18 (1831).
352. SeeWILLIAMSsupranote261, at 183 n.44 (Explaining Marshall was usingthe "patriarchal terminology that
white Americans of his generation typically used in translating the language of Indian forest diplomacy" when he used
terms like "ward" and "guardian."). As discussed earlier, Cherokee kinship terms translated as "elder brother" and
"younger brother" were used in diplomacy to explain the relationship between the colonial governments and Cherokee
Nation. It is interesting that Marshall used the term "father" here, perhaps another meaning lost in translation or a
deliberate attempt to change the nature of the relationship.
353. Chief Justice Marshall relied on Swiss international law scholar Emmerich Vattel when he described this
protectorate relationship. See id. at 561 ("Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe. "Tributary and feudatory
states,' says Vattel,' do not thereby cease to be sovereign and eign and independent states, so long as self-government
and sovereign and independent authority are left in the administration of the state.' At the present day, more than one
state may be considered as holding its right of self-government under the guarantee and protection of one or more
allies.").
354. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,559-560 (1830).
355. Cf. JOHANSEN, supra note 178, at 5-6 ("The Constitution says nothing about 'domestic dependent nations,'
"trust responsibility,"" or "wardship." ... When JusticeMarshall laid thefoundation fordomestic dependenttribal status,
he" may have intended neither 'wardship' or 'trust' as legal doctrines. He was trying to salvage a degree of sovereignty
for the Cherokees and other peoples who were about to be removed to Indian territory....").
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boundary separating it and another political boundary. Marshall disagreed, stating
that it was not "reasonable to suppose, that the Indians, who could not write and most
probably could not read, who certainly were not critical judges of our language,
should distinguish the word 'allotted' from the words 'marked out.'
3 56
In the concurring opinion, Justice McClean provided what has become the
"classic formulation of the canon. 35 7 According to McClean:
"The language used in treaties with Indian should never be construed to their
prejudice... How the words of the treaty were understood by this unlettered
people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of construction. '358
Worcester, therefore, realized rules of statutory construction favoring Indians should
serve as a tool when the federal government acts in fulfillment of its trust relationship.
True to their origins, the canons grow out of trust and reflect the roles of the
federal government and Indian tribes in the trust relationship.5 9 Indigenous Indian
law has expanded our understanding of that relationship. Historically, the Supreme
Court has, at times, conceived of the trust relationship as a wardship, and the Court's
formulation of the canons has sometimes reflected that notion. And whenever tribes
are dependent on the federal government,3'6 the canons should certainly apply,
consistent with federal Indian law. This does not mean, however, that the canons are
limited to contexts in which the federal government perceives tribes are acting as
wards. Indigenous Indian law shows the canons apply whenever Indian nations deal
with the federal government pursuant to the trust relationship, no matter what degree
of dependency happens to exist at a particular point in the course of that
relationship.
361
356. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552.
357. Heinecke, supra note 174, at 1026.
358. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582.
359. Butsee Steiner, supra note 187, at 34 ("Trusteeship cannot be the basis for the canons, since the canons predate
the trusteeship doctrine... Though particular treaties, or an aggregation of treaties, might be read to establish a trustee
relationship.., it is not clear that a treaty must be read as if it were negotiated under the terms of a relationship that does
not exist until after the treaty is ratified. Furthermore, why should a trustee relationship bind the guardian to the
opinions of the ward... A trustee is given a fiduciary responsibility over the interests of a ward that cannot be disposed
of simply due to the wishes, beliefs, or opinions of the ward."). Although I appreciate Steiner's critique of the trust
responsibility, I think he fails to move trusteeship out ofthe 19th century. If the trust relationship is illuminated in terms
of the contemporary principle ofself-determination, and if the canons apply to statutes and regulations which grow out
of the trust relationship, it is relevant today and avoids paternalism and other negative elements of "wardship."
360. AsProfessorPorterlhasargued "colonization has partialiy succeeded in destroying Indian nations." SeePorter,
supra note 238, at 953. Indigenous Indian law acknowledges all tribes are probably dependent on the federal
government to some extent. States, corporations, and foreign nations, too, could all be described as "dependent" on the
U.S. government. The challenge is to develop a real understanding of the tribal-federal relationship without relying on
the wardship model.
361. SeeAiken, supranote 168, at 149,151: "Because, asrecognizedbyChiefJusticeMarshall, 'it isinconceivable
that [the Indians] could have supposed themselves ... to have divested themselves of the right to self-government,' and
because the reach of state laws and regulations into Indian Land is both a form of encroachment on the land and a
divestiture of self-government, it is arguable that the right to self-government was included in the rights the Indians
believed theUnited States to have undertaken to protect. The canon ofconstruction requiring that treaties be interpreted
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Some federal Indian law scholars debate whether the Indian canons apply
beyond treaty interpretation. Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law
recognizes:
[The Indian canons] have been applied to situations which do not involved treaties.
The essential policy for the development of the canons in treaty cases was not
based on the form of the transaction, a treaty, but rather was rooted in the special
trust relationship between the United States and Indian tribes. In addition, in
implementing the federal-tribal relationship Congress has not drawn distinctions
between treaty tribes and nontreaty tribes. Statutes, agreements, and executive
orders dealing with Indian affairs have been construed liberally in favor of
establishing Indian rights.362
However, the Handbook then suggests at least one of the canons might not apply in
instances where Indian participation in lawmaking is limited:
The only apparent exception to the extension of treaty rules of construction to
nontreaty situations involved the rule that treaties should be construed as the
Indians would have understood them. That rule would logically apply to
agreements, which like treaties are bilateral transactions, but would not seem to
apply to executive orders and statutes, neither of which directly involve negotia-
tions with the tribes.363
A contrasting model suggests that treaties, statutes, regulations, and executive orders
are all elements of lawmaking that accommodate the interests of affected groups and
individuals, most often the federal, state and tribal governments, as well as private
individuals and corporations. 36 Under this model, treaties and statutes are not
completely different beasts, and indigenous peoples, as well as other affected parties,
have legitimate interests in participating in both.
I have discussed that under indigenous Indian law, the trust relationship is
informed by the principle of self-determination. And self-determination means
Indians "should be in control of their own destiny, and that systems of government
should be devised accordingly, and not imposed upon them by alien domination."365
The United States has recognized self-determination's importance for indigenous
as the Indians vould have understood therr, mandates adopting the Indians' understanding of the obligation undertaken
by the United States in its early treaties with the Indians.... The tribal right to self-government, as foundational right
in the federal-Indian relationship, is equivalentto theconstitutional rights foundational to the federal-citizen relationship
[where the right of a citizen to be secure in his home is like the right of a tribe to be secure on its reservation]....
Because the government's trust obligation is not based on the individual treaties or on Congressional power, but rather
on rights inherent in the federal-Indian implied social contract, that obligation binds all branches of government,
imposing an obligation on the Court to enforce tribal rights" (emphasis added).
362. COHEN, supra note 25, at 223.
363. Id. at 224 n.60.
364. See Frickey, supra note 330, at 1757; see generally ANAYA at 134-150.
365. WILLIAMS, supra note 261, at 51.
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peoples in international settings 366 and expressed its basic support for the U.N. DraftDeclaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples367 which states:
"Indigenous people have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, through
procedures determined by them, in devising legislative or administrative measures
that affect them. States shall obtain the free and informed consent of the peoples
concerned before adopting and implementing such measures. 368
Because Indian involvement will advance indigenous self-determination, it must occur
in all lawmaking which affects Indians.
Self-determination requires "belated state-building" though negotiation or
other appropriate peaceful procedures involving meaningful participation by
indigenous groups.369 As Professor Erica-Irene Daes, the chair of the United Nations
Working Group on Indigenous Populations, has explained self-determination entails
a lawmaking process:
... through which indigenous peoples are able to join with all the other
peoples that make up the state on mutually-agreed upon and just terms, after many
years of isolation and exclusion. This process does not require the assimilation of
individuals, as citizens like all others, but the recognition and incorporation of
distinct peoples in the fabric of the state, on agreed terms.370
Under the policy of self-determination, therefore, Indian tribes should
participate in lawmaking without relinquishing their special status. If the resulting
statutory enactment or negotiated settlement has vague or ambiguous terms, 371 there
is no reason why the Indian canons should not govern intepretation of the document,
consistent with the trust relationship.
If Indians and the federal government are engaged in an ongoing trust
relationship informed by the principle of self-determination, Indian involvement in
interpretation must occur in ways which are meaningful - culturally, socially,
linguistically, spiritually, and economically. Perhaps the Indian canons, tools of
judicial interpretation, can inspire direct involvement of Indians in Indian law.372 The
366. ANAYA, supra note 288, at 86 (The United States government delegation to the 1994 session of the [United
Nations] working group [on the rights of indigenous peoples] ... stated "since the 1970's, the U.S. Government has
supported the concept of self-determination for Indian tribes and Alaska Natives within the United States.").
367. See 1d.
368. U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 304, at 105.
369. See ANAYA, supra note 288, at 87.
370. Id.
371. ANCSA itself is an example of a negotiated settlement, now enacted as a federal statute, which contains vague
or ambiguous language.
372. Native involvement in interpretation is accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada. However, the Court seems
to waffle on the degree to which that interpretation is involved. See, e.g., John Borrows, Frozen Rights in Canada:
Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 37, 45-46 (1997) (observing that in R v.
Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.RAth 289, (Can. 1996), the Court "noted that it must consider the perspective of Aboriginal
peoples themselves on the meaning of therights at stake... [but] that the Aboriginal perspective must be'framed in terms
cognizable to the Canadian legal and constitutional structure. "' Borrows also points out that dissenting Justice
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canons dictate that ambiguous laws be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, as
the Indians would understand statutory language, and as reserving Indian rights.
Why cannot judges and agency officials faced with construing a vague Indian statute
actually ask tribal leaders and memberships what they would view as a liberal
construction, how they actually understand statutory language, and what reserved
rights mean according to historical and contemporary tribal perspectives.
In accordance with indigenous people's constitutive and ongoing self-
determination, Indian participation should also occur at the points of statutory
drafting and administration. Legislators drafting new statutes and administrators
implementing them must solicit, address and encompass Indian knowledge. Several
provisions of domestic and international law can be used to support increased Indian
participation in law making consistent with self-determination. Statutes such as the
Indian Self-Determination Act (1974), 7 Indian Financing Act (1974),' 74 the Indian
Child Welfare Act (1978), 375 the Indian Tribal Justice Act (1993),376 and the Native
American Graves and Repatriation Act (1995), 377 and Executive Order 13084
(1998)37' have confirmed self-determination and tribal self-governance as a national
policies. While helpful in certain substantive areas, these laws have not led to
widespread efforts to involve Indians in lawmaking.379 Domestic policy may be
reinforced by international law's call for indigenous participation in lawmaking, as
expressly affirmed in documents such as the International Labour Organisation
Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent
Countries (1989) and the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
L'Ieureux-Dube stated, "I do not think it appropriate to qualify this proposition by saying that the perspective of the
common law matters as much as the perspective of the native when defining Aboriginal rights." Id. at n
373. The Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994), provides: "(a) The Congress hereby recognizes
the obligation of the United States to respond to the strong expression of the Indian people for self-determination by
assuring maximum Indian participation in the direction of educational as well as other federal services to Indian
communities so as to render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of those communities.
(b) The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Government's unique and continuing
relationship with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the Indian people as a whole through the
establishment ofa meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly transition from the Federal
domination of programs for, and services to, Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in
the plannine. conduct, and administration of those programs and services. In accordance with this policy, the United
States is committed to supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal governments,
capable of administering quality programs and developing the economies of their respective communities." (emphasis
added).
374. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1534 (1994).
375. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
376. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631(1994).
377. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013(1994).
378. See Exec. Order 13084, supra note 332.
379. See Portersupra note 238, at 981-84 (Some efforts to involve Indian tribes and individuals in lawmaking have
been madeby theDepartmentofJustice, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Health and Human Services,
and Energy and Commerce Departments.). Professor Porter points out that administrative efforts to strengthen tribal
sovereignty may be doomed from the beginning. "The problem with federally sponsored programs- even those that
originate with tribal requests - is that the federal 'solutions' can only be conceived of in terms of activities in which the
federal agency already engages, e.g., enforcing federal, laws commandering the states, and providing funding for
federally-defined priority programs." Id. at 985. 1 agree with Professor Porter that "the federal government can[not]
actually make the Indian nations more sovereign." Id. Nonetheless, I believe Indian involvement in lawmaking is still
essential to prevent the unilateral imposition of laws that harm Indian communities, and possibly, to enact and
implement laws, that, while federal in origin, reflect indigenous needs and cultures.
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Indigenous Peoples (1993).38 o
Indigenous involvement in lawmaking is consistent with domestic and
international law, and may lead to workable local solutions, trust between Indians and
the federal government, and increased legitimacy of legal institutions in Indian
communities - elements desperately needed to improve today's Indian affairs.38'
iii. Possible Criticisms of Indigenous Indian Law
Before moving on to practical applications of indigenous Indian law for the
Indian Country in Alaska problem, I want to address several possible criticisms:
First, the non-Indian legal community may not be trained to practice law from
indigenous perspectives. Second, federal courts are even less likely to apply
indigenous Indian law than federal Indian law. Third, indigenous Indian law leaves
out the concerns of non-Indians. Fourth, indigenous Indian law is wildly strange and
unlikely.
As toe first issue, there are many practical problems of interpreting Indian
cultures in legal and other contexts, and lawyers must tread lightly in this area.382
Under the principle of self-determination, indigenous community leaders should make
choices about how to participate in lawmaking; the decision about whether and how
to present indigenous interpretations of the law is one of those choices. Lawyers,
courts, legislators, and executive agencies are generally unequipped and unprepared
to properly hearindigenous interpretations of thelaws that affect indigenous peoples,
380. Reproduced in ANAYA, supra note 288, at 193-204,207-16. For a concrete discussion on the United States'
position on these, and other documents of international law, see generally, Dean B. Suagee, Human Rights of
Indigenous People: Will the United States Rise to the Occasion?, 21 AM. INDIAN. L. REv. 365 (1997).
381. For example, recent developments in the attempt to deal with the BIAs historic mismanagement of billions of
dollars in Indian trust funds illustrate how federal-Indian relations are crying out, literally, for more "trust." First, the
special trustee appointed to clean-up the accounts of 300,000 Indians quit, claiming Interior Secretary Bruce Babbit
reorganized the trustee's office and deprived him ofauthority and resources. Next a federal district court judge held in
contempt Babbitt, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, and Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Gover for failure
to produce certain documents in the suit alleging mismanagement, and Babbitt apologized to the court for the
government's falures. Federal and tribal representatives then tried to engage in talks about the problems. But on March
3,1999, Interior officials cancelled a meeting with tribal leaders afterIndian leaders and members of Congress criticized
their work. As reported in the Associated Press: "(You can't call me a liar in the morning and that afternoon ask me
to trust you, said Gover, himself an Indian. We're not sure there is enough trust between the two parties to continue to
negotiate without somekind ofcongressional involvement.) Tribal leaders say his responsewas childish. (I came 1,400
miles to give the testimony and meet with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. They told us their feelings were hurt and they
didn't want to meet,) said Charles Tillman, chief of Oklahoma's Osage Nation." Philip Braser, Interior Officials End
Indian Talks, 1999 WL 13837889 (March 12, 1999).
382. These include problems of language, context, culture, authority, legitimacy, and power, to name only a few.
The act of offering Native perspectives raises questions such as: "Does the speaker want to be cited?" "What was lost
in translation - whether from Native language to English, from oral to written stories, from Native to non-Native
context?" "For what purpose is this testimony provided? Whose community is served?" "What are the short and long-
term repercussions?" In cultures where spoken words are powerful and everything powerful is respected, it is crucial
to treat testimony, stories, and interpretations carefully. These issues were considered at Yale University, in
"Translating Native American Cultures: A Conference on Representation, Aesthetics, and Translation," February 6-8,
1998. The presentations of American Indian and Alaska Native scholars suggested that problems of interpretation must
be addressed by indigenous communities themselves. If scholars are to be involved, they should engage in
interdisciplinary efforts that include linguistics, history, anthropology, and religion. Lawyers should keep in mind the
various types of "experts" who may bring wisdom to this subject.
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and Native communities are sometimes reluctant, unable, or unwilling to provide
these interpretations. 3 In fact, Professor Frickey has argued that the problems
involved in presenting indigenous perspectives to non-Indian legal institutions may
be prohibitively large:
One obvious problem with theoretical reconceptualizations of federal Indian law
that have practical impact as a goal is that they must appeal to the legal elite -
which is, of course non-Indian. For example, Robert A. Williams, Jr. has
demonstrated that indigenous practices and values have influenced federal Indian
law, and under a broader conception of the field, should influence it more
substantially in the future. But how can any transformation of the field occur when
judges, cabined by the blinders of precedent, will dismiss such indigenous aspects
as irrelevant, and when (largely non-Indian) scholars, though often sympathetic,
will have difficulty identifying the Indian side of the stor, much less integrating
it into conceptual arguments for reform of the field? Scholars may exhort judges
to hear the other side of the story, but may know too little about that side
themselves, and thus may offer only abstract (and ultimately hollow) exhortations
to think about things from the Indian perspective."
Although the cautions are important, we should not thrown in the towel too
quickly here. Indian attorneys who may have the advantages of familiarity with tibal
languages, community ties, and education in traditional worldviews and practices
often do understand the other side of the story.3"' They can and should address
themselves to the difficult task of assisting clients who seek to present indigenous
perspectives.3 11 Numerous Indian scholar-practitioners already incorporate indigenous
perspectives in their work.387 And several non-Indian scholars have sensitively
provided legal analyses that allows indigenous peoples to speak for themselves.388
383. See, e.g., Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The
Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625,628-30,658 (1990); James Clifford, Identity in Mashpee, reprinted in
Jo CARLLO, ED., READiNS IN AmmCAN INDIAN LAW 19-26 (1998) [hereinafter CARILLO].
384. Frickey, supra note 330, at 1778 (emphasis added).
385. See STRICKLAND,supra note 262, at 115-1I18 (Although "being an Indian is also no guarantee of wisdom
of legal policy or purity of motive, ... there is one area in which I think law-trained Indians can be of value. You, as
an Indian lawyer, can convince both whites and Indians that the way of the statute book and the municipal court is in
no way inherently superior to the way of the wampum belt and the warrior society; in fact, Indian ways may be superior
in many respects."). However, Strickland also offers a warning: "Not only have Indian people been treated with
indifference by governmental organizations, but the legal profession has too often behaved rather badly itself. On
balance, the record of the relationship of lawyers and Indians has not been altogether an ennobling one."
386. See, Robert B. Porter, Tribal Lanyers as Sovereignty Warriors, 6-WTR KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 7, 9-11
(1997) (discussing the role of tribal lawyers as having "unique duties and responsibilities in comparison to non-tribal
lawyers in private and governmental practice.").
387. See, e.g., Borrows, supra note 372; Dean B. Suagee, Turtle's War Party: An Indian Allegory on
Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENvrL. L. & LITIGATION 461 (1994); Chadwick Smith and FayeTeague, The Response
ofthe Cherokee Nation to the Cherokee Outlet Centennial Celebration: A Legal and HistoricalAnalysis, 29 TULSA
Li. 263 (1993), and the works of S. James Anaya, Lorie M. Graham, Robert B. Porter, Rennard Strickland, Gloria
Valencia-Weber, Robert A. Williams, Jr., Justice Robert Yazzie, and Christine Zuni, to name a few. Note also the effort
of Venetie's lawyers to include Native testimony as appendices to their briefs to the Supreme Court of Alaska.
388. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of Laws: Tribal Court Jurisdiction in the
Crazy Horse Case, 41 S.D. L. REV 1, 1-2 (1996). Discussing tribal court jurisdiction, Professor Singer acknowledges
the importance of Crazy Horse in terms of tribal culture and contemporary experience, stating, "Liquor has been a
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Further, the closed-mindedness of attorneys and judges should not lead us to abandon
the Indian perspective; rather it should suggest educating the ignorant to whatever
extent possible. The question of professional responsibility in Indian law is a
complex one, but it is wrong to excuse lawyers who ignore the legal traditions of their
indigenous clients.389
Second, the best approach to dealing with the federal courts is to avoid them.
Litigation over Indian law issues often ends up at the Supreme Court where the tribes
usually lose. Even if tribes "win," the adversarial process may exacerbate, rather
than mediate, relations with non-Indian neighbors. And finally, when they turn first
to the federal courts,39 tribes perpetuate the fallacy of the white man's Indian law that
federal, rather than indigenous, institutions offer the best answer to their problems. 391
Instead, tribes first should examine various forms of dispute resolution, including
their own traditional methods, those of other tribes, and mainstream arbitration to see
whether they might offer a more effective and less costly solution, in both human
and economic terms. As Professor Frickey has pointed out, tribes are already
choosing negotiation over litigation in many instances.9
On the other hand, if litigation becomes unavoidable, which it often does,
tribes can take some assurance in the fact some domestic and international courts
have begun to admit, analyze, and understand Native perspectives,393 including
scourge on Indian people. The devastating effects of alcoholism and fetal alcohol syndrome for Indian people are
horrific. In the face of these facts, the Hornell Brewing Company has chosen to name one of its beers after Tasunke
Witko, known in English as 'Crazy Horse.'... Tasunke Witko was one of the great spiritual and political leaders of the
Sioux Nation. To allow the name of Crazy Horse to be used to sell liquor suggests that he has no 'relatives who can
stand up for him." Professor Singer cites the complaint brought by tribal members for the cultural relevance of
"relatives" and the work ofa leading Indian scholar on the problems of alcoholism-raising these crucial points without
appropriating or silencing Indian voices.
389. TheModel Rules ofProfessional Conductprovide, "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
the representation." MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIoNAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1997). The Comments to the Rules specify
that when a lawyer lacks certain background knowledge or skills, s/he can still "accept representation where the
requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation." Making an effort to become reasonably
knowledgeable about indigenous perspectives as they inform the representation of indigenous clients is consistent with
the rules. See Porter, supra note 387, at 10: "Because of its important role in the lives of all native people, the tribal
lawyer must have a mastery of this area [federal Indian] of the law. So, too, must the tribal lawyer master his or her
client's tribal laws. This is often more of a challenge, because these laws may not be written down. Indeed, many of
these laws may noteven look like laws and may be in the form of custom, legend, story, and myth. Thus, a tribal lawyer
presented with a problem while drafting his or her client's family law must look to the underlying legal tradition within
the community, rather than, say, to the state code."
390. Tribal courts are a whole different story, not discussed here, except to acknowledge the Native Village of
Venetie first tried to collect its tribal tax in tribal court -and look where it ended up. See generally, POMMERSHEIM,
supra note 35, at 57-139, for a discussion of tribal courts and principles of comity that should inspire state and federal
courts to defer to tribal adjudications.
391. See Frickey, supra note 330, at 1783 ("In the last analysis, negotiation seems to promise to bring Indians into
Indian law far better than does adjudication.").
392. See id. at 1784 n.141.
393. See, e.g., United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301,1302,1308 (D.N.M. 1986) (holding Abeyta's taking of
eagle feathers in circumvention of the EPA "is a lawful and protected expression of religious liberty secured by the
Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo and by the first amendment to the United States Constitution" and the procedures
required under the EPA "invade the private, even secret, province of Indian religious conviction and offend the ancient
tradition ofpueblo religious independence."). Judge Burciaga's reasoning relied heavily on Isleta tradition: "In its ritual
and reverent use of eagles and their feathers in religious ceremony, the Katsina Society is indistinguishable from myriad
pueblo religious fellowships. The central tenets of ancient Indian religious faith are shared among New Mexico's
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traditional oral stories.394 Tribal advocates can advance an indigenous Indian law
argument if their tribal clients believe this is a good approach and want to participate
in preparations I do not suggest abandoning a winning, mainstream legal position.
In briefs and oral arguments to today's courts, lawyers should present indigenous
Indian law as additional support for more conventional arguments; in this case,
lawyers might first present the administrative law argument, then discuss how it is
enhanced by federal Indian law, and how both are consistent with indigenous Indian
law.
Third, I anticipate that states and non-Indian individuals may point out that
they, too, are often affected directly or indirectly by laws enacted for the benefit of
Indians. They may wonder why I do not discuss enhanced opportunities for their
participation in the lawmaking process.395 Ideally, the representation of Indians in all
legal processes will result in a more complete law making, not the disenfranchisement
of other groups. Indians should reach out to marginalized peoples and local
neighbors. But they should also remember that their legal arguments differ from other
groups. Arguing for enhanced opportunities to affect the legal process, Indian nations
rely on the federal trust relationship between Indian nations and the United States, not
on racial or other minority status.396 Finally, Indian involvement in lawmaking might
pueblos and, of all birds, the eagle holds an exalted position in all pueblo religious societies... The ceremonial use of
the feathers is especially important at the winter solstice. Then the Katsina, or spirit of life, and the eagle the
embodiment of the overseer of life are the central forces in pueblo religious belief... Without such feathers, the religious
purposes of the solstice ceremonies are defeated and a cardinal sacrament of the Isleta people is forfeited." Id.
394. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1067, 1071 (1997), in which the Supreme Court of
Canada considered: "The Aboriginal tradition in the recording of history is neither linear nor steeped in the same
notions of social progress and evolution [as in the non-Aboriginal tradition]. Nor is it usually human-centred in the
same was as the western scientific tradition, for it does not assume that human beings are anything more than one - and
not necessarily the most important - element of the natural order of the universe. Moreover, the Aboriginal historical
tradition is an oral one, involving legends, stories and accounts handed down through generations in oral form. It is less
focused on establishing objective truth and assumes that the teller of the siory is so much a part of the event being
described that it would be arrogant to presume to classify or categorize the event exactly or for all time...The adaawk
and kungax of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en nations, respectively ,are oral histories of a special kind. They were
described by the trial judges as a 'sacred official litany, or history, or recital of the most important laws, history,
traditions and traditional territory of a house.'(citations omitted). Id. This detailed evaluation of indigenous
perspectives on oral tradition contributed to the conclusion: "A court should approach the rules of evidence, and
interpret the evidence that exists, with a consciousness of the special nature of aboriginal claims, and of the evidentiary
difficulties in proving a right which originates in times where there were no written records of the practices, customs
and traditions engaged in. The courts must not undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants simply
because the evidence does not conform precisely with the evidentiary standards that would be applied in, for example,
a private law torts case." Id.
395. Anxiety that Indians will take over the legal systems seems real - no matter how remote as a practical reality.
See Singer, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 54 ("The Court's fear that Indian nations will oppress non-Indians in their midst is
not matched by a similar understanding that American Indians are vulnerable to oppression at the hands of federal and
state governments."). Those who feel contempt (or perhaps guilt) for the oppression suffered by Indians and a fear that
Indians will claim what 'rightfully' belongs to whites may not support increased Indian rights. Even scholars, far
removed from local politics and interactions, reveal their fear and contempt. See, e.g., Joseph D. Matal, Revisionist
History ofIndian Country, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 283, 351 (1997) ("Eventually the Supreme Court ... will have to
decide whether 18 U.S.C. § 1151 reverses the work of subsequent termination statutes, and if Indian housing projects
really are sovereign nations. More immediately, it must decide whether Alaska is to lose control of forty-four million
acres of territory.").
396. See e.g., Morton v.Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,553-54 (1974) (wherein the SupremeCourtupheldthe employment
preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs against a racial discrimination challenge, reasoning: "Contrary
to the characterization made by appellees, this preference does not constitute 'racial discrimination.' Indeed, it is not
even a 'racial' preference. Rather it is designed to further the cause ofIndian self-government and to make theBIA more
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affect all citizens positively. In his foreward to the new Encyclopedia of Native
American Legal Traditions, Charles Riley Cloud reminds us:
[I]t is out a rich Indian democratic tradition that the distinctive political ideals of
American life emerged. Universal suffrage for women as for men, the pattern of
states that we call federalism, the habit of treating chiefs as servants of the people
instead of their masters, the insistence that the community must respect the
diversity of men and the diversity of their dreams - all these things were part of the
American way before Columbus landed.3"
But U.S. citizens today have lost faith in their legislative, judicial, and executive
branches of government. Cloud states:
An answer seems to be that we are straying from our Indian ideals and democratic
tradition. Instead of striving for consensus, many political leaders seem to insult
and only search for power. No longer do the people seem to have an equal
opportunity to select their leaders. Campaigns are so costly and the need to raise
money is so great that the rich gain what seems to be undue influence. Our leaders
seem no longer to be our servants, and like masters, they often accumulate their
greatest wealth while in office. As was the case in Europe, individual families
and corporations seem to have become all-powerful. Inequality seems to be
growing. To save our democracy, we need to return to our Indian democratic
roots.
398
Thus, to the extent indigenous peoples will share their knowledge, indigenous Indian
law may offer all citizens better law and government. As Cloud points out, it is
already happening to some extent. The General District Court of the City of Norfolk,
Virginia, for example, has a peacemaking system of dispute resolution based on
contemporary Navajo and Iroquois Peacemaker Courts. Participants find that this,
and other methods of mediation, serve their interests better than adversarial
litigation. 99 Similarly, Anaya instructs that Iroquois Great Law of Peace in which
"all are invited to follow the roots to the tree and join in peaceful coexistence and
cooperation under its great long leaves," reflects a growing trend of international
"linkages, commonalities, and interdependencies among people, economies, and
spheres of power. When we try to fit today's institutions -- like the World Bank,
Microsoft Corporation, or United Nations -- into the picture, this indigenous model
may be a better fit than the present world order wherein the nation-state is all-
responsive to the needs of its constituent groups. It is directed to participation by the governed in the governing
agency.... The preference is not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of Indians; instead, it applies only to
members of'federally recognized' tribes This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified
as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature" (emphasis added).
397. JOHANSEN, supra note 178, atxi.
398. Id. at xii.
399. Butsee CaroleE. Goldberg, OverextendedBorrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Applied in Non-Indian Disputes,
72 WASH. L. REv. 1003 (1997).
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powerful."'  These are only two examples of how indigenous Indian law can provide
all U.S. and world citizens with productive and harmonious lawmaking- progressive
lawmakers could imagine and implement many more."
Finally, indigenous Indian law will appear strange and unlikely to anyone
schooled in federal Indian law. Therein lies its value. It may seem beyond the realm
of comprehension that Indians should be able to sit down with federal lawmakers and
propose something along the lines of: "We, Indian nations, and you, federal
government, are involved in an ongoing relationship. You - your ancestors, allies,
and founders of the nation - entered into this relationship by coming to our lands,
encountering us, and making promises. We are now going to tell you how we tried
to extend our vision of peace to you and what "mutual trust" means to us. You have
violated our trust numerous times. We are going to tell you how those violations have
injured us and suggest how to remedy the situation. You hope we are going to
disappear. We will explain our plans to exist on this continent forever. Some of
what we tell you must now be incorporated into the federal laws of this land. The rest
will exist in our own tribal laws and institutions. Shared storytelling, listening, and
hard work will help us solve tribal problems and relate better to non-Indians, and we
need your cooperation in this endeavor. Will you join us?" Indigenous Indian law is
radical -- and essential.
C. Alaska Natives Interpreting Indian Country
Indigenous Indian law can evaluate to what extent Alaska Natives have been
meaningfully involved at in various significant lawmaking events including the Treaty
400. ANAYA, supra note 288, at 79.
401. See also, Porter, supra note 238, at 986-87 ("To assist you in conceptualizing how the United States might
decolonize its Indian control law, I would like to draw upon the teaching of the Gus-Wen-Tah, or the Two Row
Wampum... These two rows will symbolize two paths or two vessels, travelling down the same river together. One a
birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian people, their laws, their customs and their ways. The other, ship, will be for the
white people and their laws, the customs and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in our
own boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel.").
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of Purchase (1967),402 Statehood Act (1958),403 ANCSA (1971), 4° and Solicitor's
Opinion on Indian Country (1993). If Alaska Natives were able to significantly
shape these laws, they can provide immediate insight into the intent of treaty and
statutory drafters, thereby contributing to the process of statutory administration and
interpretation. If Alaska Natives have not been able to participate in lawmaking at
any of these stages,4 °5 the federal government must recognize and remedy these
violations of constitutive and ongoing self-determination.4"6 Whether Alaska Natives
were or were not meaningfully involved in enacting the ANCSA and other laws, they
can still explain how these laws affect them today.
Insufficient opportunities for Alaska Natives to explain the importance of
retaining jurisdiction over their lands has led to the current situation where the Alaska
Native interests, such as subsistence hunting, health and welfare, and cultural
402. See DONALD CRAIG MTHCELL, THE STORY OF ALASKA NATIVES AND THEIR LAND 382-383 (1997). In
Mitchell's opinion, Inupiats only began to question formally the purchase of Alaska by the United States when one
young Alaska Native man inadvertantly and suddenly came across a certain historical volume: "At Edgecumbe (a
Native boarding school), when [Charles Edwardsen, Jr., a young Inupiat from Barrow, Alaska] read Hubert Howe
Bancroft's History ofAlaska, Edwardsen hadstumbledon aparagraph in whichBancroft attributed the army's problems
in Southeat Alaska to the Tlingit and Haida Indians' resentment that the czar has sold their land to the United States
"without their consent." Bancroft's spin on Alaska history caused the young Eskimo to ask himself whether the United
States really "owned" the tens of millions of acres of tundra on which the Inupiat at Barrow and elsewhere on Alaska's
north slope hunted and trapped and gathered. On December 1965 the idea had so piqued the twenty-two year-old
Edwardsen's interest that he wrote a letter to each north slope village, soliciting support for creating an organization to
file a land claim that would assert Inupiat aboriginal title to every acre of land north of the Brooks Mountain Range."
According to Mitchell, Edwarden's "stumbl[ing]" across this historical "spin" led to the creating of the Arctic Slope
Native Association and "set in motion" the land freeze leading to the entireAlaska Native land claims process. I wonder
what is missing from this version of this story.
403. See CASE, supra note 2, at 67-70. Notably the Statehood Act protected aboriginal title from federal and state
encroachment except to the extent Congress provided otherwise or individual natives owning their land in fee decided
to alienate it.
404. The extent ofAlaska Nativeinvolvement in drafting ANCSA is a contentious issue. See, e.g., Work, supra note
334, at 216. "Some might argue that the government's duty [under the policy of self-determination to facilitate Native
Americans' contributions to law making] was fulfilled because Alaska Natives participatedextensively in thelegislative
process ad supported ANCSA's passage. To discontinue the analysis here, however, is to ignore the federally sanctioned
actions that initially motivated the Alaska Natives to file land claims and to lobby in favor of a settlement. Pure self-
determination was impossible because the Alaska Native's decision-making process was tainted by prior federal activity
that virtually forced the Natives to act. Certain that they would lose most if not all of their aboriginal lands and rights,
the Natives bargained only for what they felt was attainable, willingly giving up much that they might have sought to
retain under more favorable circumstances. Overwhelming pressure to settle the land claims made arms-length
negotiations impossible." Id.
405. Indigenous Indian law does not mean we pretend interactions between Indians and non-Indians have always,
or ever, been consensual or fair if history shows otherwise.
406. IfIndians have already missed an opportunity "to participate and consent such that the end result in the political
order can be said to reflect the collective will of the people, or peoples, concerned," then remedial measures are in order
for violation of the trust responsibility. ANAYA, supra note 288, at 82. Remedies might be appropriate for events
stretching all the way back to Russian exploration and exploitation of Alaska Native lands and resources. These
"remedies to redress historical violations of self-determination do not necessarily entail a revision to the status quo ante,
but rather are to be developed in accordance with the present-day aspirations of the aggrieved groups, whose character
may be substantially altered with the passage of time." Id. at 83; see also, Bryner, 12 ALASKA L. REV. at 333
(advancing three justifications remedies to Alaska Native groups: unlike some other minority groups, Alaska Natives
have no other "homeland" in which to maintain culture; Alaska Natives did not voluntarily accept individualistic
principles of liberalism by immigrating to the United States; Native Americans are a "specially disadvantaged group"
protected under the equal protection claims.).
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survival, are threatened.' Although they have reached the end of litigating
opportunities in the United States courts, Alaska Natives are considering addressing
their Indian Country claims in other domestic and international forums. This section
is provided with the immediate intent of contributing to the discussion of available
options to pursue in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Venetie.408 There are
both existing Alaska Native interpretations of Indian Country and legal forums where
community members and their advocates might present these interpretations.
i. Alaska Native Opinions on Indian Country
I've listened to a variety of people talk about, you know, what the Congress
intended and what ANCSA intended. It's funny, no one has ever asked me what
my thoughts were about this. And I was there. I mean... my friend, the attorney
general, never asked my opinion, nor has our counsel fighting on the Indian side.4'
There has never been a need to write our laws down or write up descriptions
of how we operate. But recently, more and more State government and federal
government programs are causing us to do things more formally. We received a
grant ... to interview our elders and write down traditional knowledge, customs
and advice about how to preserve our land and tribe. We also plan to write down
our traditional laws as part of our ANA project. The goal is to ensure future
protection for our tribe and its membership and to make sure that our tribal
government remains in control of all local matters.41 °
We cannot look to ANCSA, the Solicitor's Opinion, or Justice Thomas' opinion
in Venetie for the Alaska Native side of the story. The ability of Alaska Natives to
voice their interpretations of ANCSA and opinions on Indian Country was severely
impaired. Nonetheless, there are some Alaska Native statements, including affidavits
provided for the Venetie litigation, that begin to shed light on what the Solicitor's
Opinion left out.
From legal, academic, and traditional perspectives, there may be several types
407. On May 7, 1998, thousands of Alaska Natives joined in a march called "We the People - Alaska Tribes -
Standing Our Ground." The March was a response to the Venetie decision and other federal and state actions that
jeopardize Native human rights, susbsistence rights, and civil rights. Thus, Alaska Natives are already "affirm[ing] the
power of the people to stand their ground against a political agenda that would diminish the fundamental rights of
Alaska Natives to forever live the Native way of life." 4,000 Alaska Natives March for Sovereignty, 23 NATIVE
AMERICAN RIGHTs FUND LEG. REv. 10,11 (Sumner/FalU 1998).
408. AlaskaNativesareclearlyalreadyconsideringawholespectrum foptions.See, e.g, TomKizzia.NativesRally
for Self-Rule: AFNSummit May Mull Secession from Alaska, Reprinted in INDIAN COUNMY TODAY ONLINE, Week
ofNov. 9-16,1998, http.//www.indiancountry.com("Frustratedby whatdelegates say is thestate's continuing resistance
to tribal government's, Alaska Federation of Natives has called for state constitutional convention that would consider
new governance possibilities for rrual Alaska - including secession and formation of a new state or commonwealth in
parts of the Bush.").
409. Willie Hensley, Co-chairman of Alaska Federation of Natives in Indian Country Forum, supra note 154, at
6.
410. Resp. Br., supra note 16, Testimony of Gideon James, Appendix I at 68aa - 69aa.
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of Alaska Native interpretations of Indian Country.411 These may include formal
statements made by community officials in the context of litigation and other legal
processes, informal discussions among leaders and members, and written editorials
and commentaries in the Alaska press. They may also include traditional oral stories
related over time that are essential to cultural survival and community life. The
various interpretations carry different legal weight. Courts have tended to ascribe to
"expert" witnesses the most legitimacy, particularly when the expertise is based on
Western sciences, such as anthropology, archaeology, linguistics, and economics.
Courts have frequently failed to accord significant or appropriate evidentiary weight
to traditional stories told by elders.412
Some of the available, public Alaska Native interpretations on Indian
Countryare reproduced in an Appendix to this article.413 Alaska Native leaders have
articulated specific theories of statutory interpretation vis it vis ANCSA's silence on
Indian Country.414 In the context of the Indian Country question, leaders and
villagers have also commented on the regulation of land use and ownership,415 hunting
and fishing,416 alcohol regulation,417 police powers and keeping the peace,418 tribal
courts,4 19 childrearing practices,420 village government and community membership, 421
Native worldviews, subsistence, and identity,422 and human rights and self-determina-
tion.4' Other issues may include protection of sacred sites, ceremonies and items,
environmental regulations, and economic development.424 These Alaska Native
411. In any Indian law case, the types ofinterpretation available will be specific to the cultural, linguistic, social and
historical aspects of the group. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. British Colombia, 3 S.C.R. 1010 [1997], wherein the
Supreme Court of Canada recognized that Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Natives had tried to introduce three types of oral
testimony at trial: "(1) the adaawk of the Gitksan and the kungax of the Wet'suwet'en; (ii) the personal recollections of
members of the appellant nations, and (iii) the territorial affidavits of filed by the heads of the individual houses within
each nation."
412. Cf. id., where the Supreme Court of Canada held, "This appeal requires us... to adapt the laws of evidence so
that the aboriginal perspectiveontheirpractices, customs and traditions and on their relationship with theland, are given
due weight by the courts. In practical terms, this requires the courts to come to terms with the oral histories ofaboriginal
societies, which, for many aboriginal nafions, are the only record of their past."
413. I try to undertake my comments on the past and present legal issues of Alaska Natives with a great deal of
humility. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Listen, 3 MiCH. J. RACE & L. 523,538 (1998) (recounting personal experience
in writing Indian law article for ostensible publication): "I have another story to tell. This piece, this poem, this
monologue, at one time, was titled, "The Half-Life ofRadioactive Colonialism;' Tribal Sovereignty andA Case Study
of the Mescalero Apache." ... The piece was never finished. It was not a story I could tell. To fulfill the requirements
of a student-written Note, I would need to draw conclusions and make judgments and recommendations in order to
formulate a solution. To create a document worth publishing, I would have to twist the story to suit my purposes. I
would have to make the story work for me. To be persuasive, I would have to hide the weaknesses in my argument,
and there were many. In order to publish, I would have to use the story, destroy it and remake it in my image as if it
were clay. This I did not do. The Mescalero Apache are not clay "(emphasis added).
414. See Appendix, Item 1.
415. See Appendix, Item 2.
416. See Appendix, Item 3.
417. See Appendix, Item 4.
418. See Appendix, Item 5.
419. See Appendix, Item 6.
420. See Appendix, Item 7.
421. See Appendix, Item 8.
422. See Appendix, Item 9.
423. See Appendix, Item 10.
424. See generally, Special Section on Indian Country, ANCHORAGE DAmY NEws, June 29,1997 - July 5, 1997.
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perspectives, reflecting traditional knowledge and contemporary realities, have been
largely ignored when the state and federal legislatures, courts, and agencies have
made law on Indian Country. 4' Alaska Native interpretations, then, may supply
exactly the expertise that should guide legislative enactments, agency administration,
and judicial review of Indian laws.
Although this selection of short quotations begins to suggest the subject
matter and scope of Indian Country concerns, the statements I have chosen to quote
here are likely not the same ones members of Arctic and Venetie villages might put
into a formal statement on Indian Country.426 Administrators, legislators, judges, and
others involved in Indian law, must realize their understanding of indigenous peoples
will not be the same understanding held by community members. The experiential
wisdom that comes from living in, and being a member of, a native community is not
easily reproduced on paper.
Venetie tribal members may decide that legal and political pressures, such as
Supreme Court litigation or international complaint procedures, do provide adequate
grounds for explaining what Indian Country means to them; they may not. If they
seek to share interpretations in a domestic or international legal setting, they might
first evaluate the experiences of other native peoples who have made similar
attempts,' and they might turn to Alaska Native lawyers who may be aware of the
problems of interpretation and of the rules that govern storytelling in the
community." Alaska Native Opinions on Indian Country -- as the short excerpts in
the appendix just begin to suggest-- could provide real substance to the ideal of
reading and enacting Indian laws consistent with Indian understanding and rights.429
425. In the Appendices, I haveprimarly relied on formal testimony and affidavits provided in the course oflitigation
and contemporary recent media, including Alaska radio and newspaper. The traditional stories of Neets'aii Gwich'in
people are best heard from members of the community, who may or may not want to share or translate them for
outsiders. However, at least one such traditional story has been published in English for wide commercial
dissemination. See VELA vALLS, Two OLD WOimN (1996). Another published work, a personal narrative,
references some aspects ofNeets'aii Gwich'in oral tradition as it relates to Venetie lands. See Lincoln Tritt, A Glimpse
of the Aborginal Society, in JOSEPH BRUCHAC, ED., RAVEN TELLS STORIES 213-216 (1991). Although they are not
specific to Venetie, other printed sources for Alaska Native narratives and stories are: AJ. MCLANAHAN, OUR STORIES,
OUR LIVES: A CoLLEcrION oFTWENTY-THREETRANSCRIBED INTERVIEWS WrrIELDERS OFTHE COOKINLET REGION
(1986); THOMAS BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW COMMISSION (1985);
SUSANB. ANDREWSANDJOHNCREED,AUrHENTICALASKA: VOICESOFrrsNATIVEwVR1TERS;ROBERTHEDIN &GARY
HOLTHAUS, EDS., THE GREAT LAND: REFLECTIONS ON ALASKA (1994).
426. Alaska Native Opinions on Indian Country might also be oral, village-specific, state-wide, in Native languages,
in English - generally, in any form that the people choose.
427. See, e.g., CARILLO, supra note 383, at 9-49 (discussing the Mashpee Tribe's land claims suits).
428. For a discussion of tribal members/lawyers engaging in interpretations for legal battles involving their own
communities, See EdmundJ. Ladd, Achieving True Interpretation, reprinted in CARILLO, supra note 383, at 324-27.
429. In addition to creating their own Opinion on Indian Country, Alaska Natives might consider making an
indigenous historical-legal response to Donald Craig Mitchell's, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Statutory
Construction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14ALASKAL. REV. 353 (1997) (arguingIndian Country
cannot exist in Alaska because from the time of'Russian exploration through Congressional enactment of ANCSA, white
explorers, setters,judges, administrators, governors, clergy, and legislators have never intended AlaskaNatives to retain
jurisdiction over their lands.). This article would be the most stunning example of "white man's Indian law" out there
if not for DONALD CRAIG MiTCHIL, THE STORY OF ALASKA NATIVES AND THEIR LAND, 1867-1959, 9 (1997)
(attempting to contribute to "the fight" for the "social and economic justice that is their [Alaska Natives] due as U.S.
Citizens," the author deliberately details non-Native perspectives on Alaska Natives and their lands, rationalizes that
Alaska Natives can write their own histories, and pronounces his product as a "clear understanding of Native
involvement in ... history." Clearly one-sided, perhaps.).
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ii. Domestic Actions
Although its appearance before the U.S. Supreme Court marked the
exhaustion of Venetie's domestic litigation opportunities, other domestic institutions
may be willing to listen to Alaska Native interpretations of Indian Country. In
Venetie, Justice Thomas suggested that "modification" of Indian Country to include
ANCSA lands is a matter for Congress. The Solicitor, too, indicated that if it was
unhappy with its opinion on Indian Country, Congress could enact law to the
contrary. The most obvious course of action for the Neets'aii Gwich'in people of
Venetie, then, is to seek domestic legislative redress in the form of amendments to
ANCSA or the passage of another statute.
In the most optimistic scenario, Alaska Natives and their supporters would
successfully lobby for Congressional amendments to ANCSA.430 Depending on the
substance of Alaska Native input, these amendments might expressly state that
Alaska Native lands had been Indian Country prior to ANCSA and that lands
conveyed to village and regional corporations or tribal governments pursuant to
ANCSA retained their Indian Country status. Such a law would be consistent with
the doctrine of reserved rights in Indian law and with the trust responsibility to protect
Indian interests. More specifically, findings supporting such a Congressional
clarification could state that Alaska Natives must retain jurisdiction over their lands
in order to protect their interests in land use and ownership, hunting and fishing,
alcohol regulation, police powers and keeping the peace, tribal courts, childrearing
practices, village government and community membership, Native worldviews,
subsistence life ways and identities, human rights, protection of sacred sites,
ceremonies and cultural patrimony, environmental regulations, economic develop-
ment, and other interests. Alaska Native leaders and others with experience in these
areas could work to bring their local, culturally-specific understandings of these
issues to the attention of Congress. 43'
The suggestion that Alaska Natives bring their post-Venetie concerns to
Congress in the hope of achieving a legislative solution might ring hollow to some
Alaska Natives, particularly because ANCSA itself was supposed to be "accom-
plished rapidly... in conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives...
with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and
property,"432 and many feel that ANCSA fell short of those goals. Further, the present
Congress is entertaining legislation that would constrict tribal sovereign immunity,
threaten tribal funds, and diminish tribal court jurisdiction. And the federal
430. See Work, supra note 334, at 217 ("Amendments to ANCSA should attempt to adhere to the spirit of self-
determination, and Congress should seek the advice and counsel of the Alaska Natives. Self-determination cannot exist
absent meaningful participation in the political process.").
431. See Suagee, supra note 387, at 504: "In this land we now call America, we are blessed with continued
presence of some of the indigenous cultures, and we are blessed to have among us, within some of these cultures, a
relatively small number of elders who possess a great deal of traditional cultural knowledge. Sometimes what tribal
elders have to say should carry more than the force of conscience; rather, it should carry the force of law."
432. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1994).
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government has not been historically receptive to international law claims. In such
a hostile climate, it is unlikely that the Congress would pass legislation explicitly
protecting the sovereignty of Alaska Native tribes over their lands. However, some
Native leaders have discussed lobbying Congress for limited authority over alcohol
regulation and economic development.433
To date there have been no new amendments to ANCSA, but several state
and federal proposals were announced just after the Supreme Court's decision in
Venetie. U.S. Senator Ted Stevens raised the possibility of enhancing local control
over village law enforcement by calling on Attorney General Janet Reno to establish
a federal-state plan for village law enforcement. Senators Stevens and Frank
Murkowski also discussed crafting a solution to subsistence hunting and fishing
problems. At the state level, a new Commission on Rural Alaska Governance and
Empowerment was created to address state services and local governments.434 These
measures must be undertaken in light of the principle of self-determination with
opportunity for real Native participation in the process and substance of lawmaking.
Then perhaps real improvement in relations between the State of Alaska and Alaska
Natives - and workable solutions to their problems - will occur.
iii. International Actions
If the attempt to arrive at a domestic solution fails, looks unlikely, or comes
too slowly,435 international institutions offer other alternatives.436 And the various
provisions of international law cited above might be better received in the interna-
tional forums. The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations accepts requests
for monitoring of domestic indigenous rights situations. States are not required to
submit reports on particular indigenous issues, but they generally do in order to avoid
a one-sided record or negative public press attention. The process of regular
reporting to the most prestigious and influential international legal institution often
has the effect of encouraging states to improve the condition in question.437 If Alaska
Natives detailed their perspectives on the Indian Country issues in light of the
433. See Kizzia, supra note 295, at 2.
434. Id. at 3-4.
435. See Don Hunter, Natives Put Rights in Writing, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 8, 1998 (In response to the
Venetie decision, "Tribal leaders from Alaska vowed Thursday to stand united as Alaska's "sovereign First Nations,"
and ratified a sweeping bill of rights that claims authority to decide what happens to lands, waters and fish and wildlife
used by Natives ... The result of the talks is a bold statement of tribal independence. But the delegates said they
understand it's one thing to assert their rights and another to get Congress and the state government to recognize them.
They said they expect it to take years of effort and that they will need the help of non-Native Alaskans, tribes in the
Lower 48 and effective lobbyists in Washington, D.C.").
436. Many indigenous communities and their lawyers in the U.S. see international procedures as distant, ineffective,
or just farfetched. It may be helpful to look at the experiences of other tribes attempting to deal with the United States
in front of international legal institutions. See Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Toward Consent and Cooperation:
Reconsidering the Political Status ofIndian Nations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 507,602- 612 (1987) (surveying
Hopi and Mohawk complaints to United Nations Commission on Human Rights). Although the United States is less
responsive to internationalpressure than othernations, tribes may learn somethingindigenouspeoples dealing with other
nations. See, e.g., S. James Anaya, The Awas Tingi Petition to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights:
Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and Governmnet Neglect in Nicaragua, 9 ST. THomAs L. REv. 157 (1996).
437. ANAYA, supra note 288, at 154.
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international law provisions listed above and in terms of their own indigenous laws,
the federal government might be compelled to submit a plan indicating how it will
address these concerns. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights and its
Subcommission also engage in monitoring and reporting procedures, but, unlike the
UN Working Group, they only permit states and Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGO's) to participate. In general, the monitoring and reporting procedures cannot
result in binding obligations for states, but rather the creation of norms of expected
behavior, as impelled by relations among the actors of the international community.
By contrast to the monitoring and reporting procedures, complaints and
petitions can have more immediately tangible results. The complaints procedure
before the U.N. Working Group also lacks direct enforcement measures but
sometimes results in high level diplomatic acts addressing indigenous claims.438
Complaints before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and its Subcommission
can result in the adoption of resolutions regarding indigenous claims and can pressure
states to answer specific allegations regarding human rights violations against
indigenous peoples. 439  Limited by the various standing, exhaustion, and other
requirements, these complaints procedures have been utilized with some effectiveness
with respect to the federal government's role in the Hopi-Navajo land dispute and in
problems faced by traditional Seminoles, Haudenousaunee, Hopi, Western Shoshone,
and Lakota Nation."' The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, of which
the U.S. is a member, also has a petition procedure. Pursuant to the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,"' which holds member states
accountable to certain human rights norms, indigenous groups may bring a petition
for advisement before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 442
Indigenous groups such the Miskito in Nicaragua have used this process in arriving
at friendly settlements between the Nicaraguan government and exiled Indian
438. See id at 159 (detailing the process by which the Working Group Chair obtained the permission of the U.N.
Secretary General to travel to Brazil to effectuate a solution of Yanomami problems raised before the Working Group).
439. Id. at 158-160.
440. IL at 160, 177 n.60. The U.S. has not signed onto treaties with more stringent enforcement mechanisms such
at the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination or the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These can lead to complaints and adjudications
before the Committee on theElimination ofRacial Discrimination ("CERD") and theU.N. Human Rights Commission,
respectively. However, Canada and other nations have been required to participate in adjudications of indigenous
claims before the HRC, forexample. See id. at 163 (discussing Ominayak, Chief ofthe Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada)
Such actions may contribute to a climate in North America and internationally where it is not politically desirable or
economically advantageous to violate the rights of indigenous peoples.
441. O.A.S. Res.XXX, adoptedby theNinth International Conference ofAmerican States (1948), reprinted in Basic
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.l at 17 (1992).
The Declaration's substantive provisions on rights ofequal protection, association, movement, religion, and family are
more general than those expressed in some of the international law on indigenous rights, but still might be used
effectively by Alaska Natives in expressing violations regarding the Indian Country issues.
442. See ANAYA, supra note 288, at 166-167. The Commission engages in fact-finding through the review of
written submissions by the parties, hearings and on-site investigations. The fact-finding procedure itself can stimulate
dialogue resulting in solutions, but the Commission can also act as mediator if needed. Initially, the Commission's
findings and conclusions are not published so that parties have an opportunity (and incentive) to comply. In the event
that its recommendations are not implemented or settlement is not achieved, the Commission can publish its findings
and thereby bring international scrutiny to the offending nation. See id.
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leaders. 3
As Professor Anaya has suggested, the ultimate goal for indigenous peoples
invoking international law is to encourage nations to meet their human rights
obligations. International law may influence federal court decisions or assist in
bringing about negotiated settlements, legislation, or executive action on the domestic
level'4 - in the alternative, it may provide international forums for complaints
procedures. These options may or may not provide immediate relief, especially since
many nations resist complying with international law, citing the principle of non-
intervention. However, where indigenous peoples have exhausted other legal avenues:
"Existing international procedures do provide limited means of coalescing interna-
tional concern for the benefit of the world's indigenous peoples, and these procedures
have functioned in numerous instances to promote remedies for the violation of
indigenous people's rights in accordance with contemporary norms."'4
Alaska Native interpretations of Indian Country suggest several substantive
claims under international law. International law also suggests that Alaska Native
interpretations should both enter the lawmaking process and should influence the
outcome. For these reasons, it may be appropriate for Alaska Natives to consider
how international law could support efforts to retain control over their lands, cultures,
and futures.
VI. CONCLUSION
On the day after the Supreme Court announced its decision in Venetie, people
in Alaska offered several perspectives. Two of these stand out as particularly
illustrative of the necessity of indigenous involvement in the lawmaking that affects
indigenous peoples. Alaska Attorney General Bruce Botelho stated:
This decision should be a cause for introspection for all Alaskans who love this
state. I think we need to be asking ourselves why it was that the Venetie case
became a cause of hope for so many Alaskans... We also have to recognize that
it was a fight because there are (people) in Alaska who believe our state
government wasn't doing its job. We need to be talking about that, and we need
to be doing something about it.4 6
Venetie tribal member Larry Williams stated:
It doesn't change a thing, the way I see it. It's always been Indian country and it
will always be Indian country, no matter what the Supreme Court has to say about
443. See id. at 170.
444. Negotiated settlements or executive actions may be the preferable options, particularly in 1998, when the U.S.
Supreme Court has been granting certiorari and deciding against tribal sovereignty with unusual frequency and zeal,
and when the U.S. Congress is also notably hostile to Indians.
445. Id. at 184.
446. Kizzia, supra note 295, at 4.
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it. I have a sense of belonging to this land.... I'm not going to ask the state if I can
of fish over there. That's what Indian country means to me." 7
As well meaning as the Attorney General may be, he lumps indigenous Alaskans into
the category of "all Alaskans," does not call them "Alaska Natives," and indicates that
the state can meet the needs of all of its citizens simply by pulling them into the
system." Mr. Williams reiterates the indigenous sense of attachment to the land that
predated any state or federal government and that will continue to exist. Attorney
General Botelho fails to acknowledge that Alaska Natives seek to maintain a distinct
and sovereign identity, and that they do not want the state to be the answer to their
problems. Mr. Williams does not concede that the State of Alaska may tell him he
cannot fish "over there" even if he does not ask.
After ten years of litigation and nearly thirty years of dealing with ANCSA, the
affected parties have not come closer to understanding one another's worldviews. The
distance between Natives and non-Natives in the wake of the Venetie litigation makes
a workable solution to jurisdiction, subsistence, language and many other issues less
and less likely." 9 In the Venetie case, at least three kinds of law should have kept the
relationship between the federal government and Neets'aii Gwich'in people in balance:
administrative law, federal Indian law, and indigenous Indian law. Because
administrators violated the procedural safeguards of administrative law, they created
an agency interpretation lacking in expertise and accountability. Because courts
ignored the Indian canons, they interpreted ANCSA contrary to federal Indian law.
And because lawmakers at every stage turned a deaf ear to indigenous Indian law's
call for Alaska Native participation in lawmaking, the current state of the law on
Indian Country reflects only federal intent and power.
Administrative or federal Indian law alone should have provided a more correct,
harmonious, and just result in this case. As has been the typical indigenous
experience in the United States, however, the law did not protect the people or land
of Venetie. Although cases like Venetie may cause indigenous peoples to question the
legitimacy of western governmental institutions and lawmaking processes, they realize
447. Liz Ruskin, Villagers Doubt Ruling Will Change Lives, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEws, Feb. 26, 1998, at 4.
448. See Tom Kizzia. Natives Rally for Self-Rule: AFN Summit May Mull Secession from Alaska, Reprinted in
Indian Country Today Online, Week of Nov. 9-16,1998, http://vrww.indiancountry.com ("When I hear the phrase 'We
are all people,' I cringe," said Robert Keith of Elim, co-chairman of a state task force on rural governance alternatives.
He went on to say such phrases are often used to attack Native rights.").
449. See Tom Kizzia, Urban-rural Divide Widens in Juneau, ANCHORAGE DAiLY NEWS, May 3, 1998 ("When
Gene Tagaban, a young Tlingit actor froom Juneau, attended a hearing on subsistence in the state capital earlier this
year, he was moved by th epassionate voices from rural Alaska telling of their way of life via speakerphone. But as
bored legislators flipped through magazines and wandered in and out of the committee room, Tagaban grew angry and
stalked out, deciding not to testify. The next day, Tagaban mounted the Capitol steps with a traditional Indian hand
drum and sang a Tlingit love song about his grandfather's land. Tagaban has been there at noon most days since,
drumming and singing the same song of the Chilkat Lux'aadi clan, which he describes as akind of prayer. 'Our presence
wasn't being felt here,' he says. Four flights up, behind an office window above the Capitol steps. Re. Ramons Barnes,
R-Anchorage, is upsets about plans for a Native protest in Anchorage ... accusing the Legislature of insensitivity,
prejudice, even racism. The state government has been pouring money into the Bush for years, the redoubtable
Muldoon legislator protests. In fact, most people in urban areas feel they have been discriminated against because of
all the money that has gone into rural Alaska.").
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the law can sometimes be adapted to indigenous needs. Although the federal
government has violated all of its treaties and most of its trust responsibilities to
Indian tribes, it still makes an occasional attempt at upholding its relationship with
Indian peoples. We must insist the federal government fairly apply its conventional
legal doctrines and we must add a new framework, indigenous Indian law. Creating
a place for indigenous interpretations of Indian law will help balance the relationship
between the Indian nations and federal government, perhaps even restoring the mutual
trust between them.
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APPENDIX :SOME ALASKA NATIVE OPINIONS ON INDIAN COUNTRY
1. INDIAN COUNTRY, ANCSA & STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
What we started out to try to do, was we would rather have had just our
territory up there. Because some of you might recall that the state wasn't even
hardly a presence in rural Alaska. I mean, as far as the state was concerned... the
rural areas were Uncle Sam's problem. I mean, hell, the state didn't have enough
money to take care of the cities. So far as the state was concerned Great Uncle
Sam will take care of the villages.
Well, what we wanted to do was to try to work our way into the 20th century
with control of our own territory. We primarily wanted the land. We didn't want
to disturb any inherent rights to govern or powers that the communities may have
had and the tribes may have had. In fact, when the act was passed, we didn't... the
only thing we lost was the Allotment Act. Everything else stayed the same. You
know.
I mean they didn't eliminate the Indian Reorganization Act. They didn't
eliminate whatever tribal powers the tribal councils may have had. Since then,
they've, you know, provided monies for education. They provided monies for
health. They provided all kinds of federal laws that apply, you know, to the tribal
councils.
And so, to me, it was a real estate transaction. But we didn't have the power
to clarify things and so, if you don't have the power to get what you want in
negotiation, then you keep it fuzzy. Maybe you win it in court. And that's where
we're at.45°
2. INDIAN COUNTRY & LAND USE & OWNERSHIP
Land is very important for our tribe and no quick decisions are ever made
aboutit. Last summer the Tribal Government interviewed contractors who wanted
to get hired to improve our culvert system in Arctic Village. Because their
presence and activity would affect the tribal members and the land, we made sure
that they protected the environment and observed tribal rules respecting the ban on
drug and alcohol use. They were also not allowed to hunt game. They were
450. Willie Hensley, Co-chairman of the Alaska Federation of Natives,, in Indian Country Forum, supra note 155,
at 6.
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encouraged to follow our tribal member employment preference."
The other major issue we had to deal with (when Robert Frank was Chief)
was the land claims settlement. We had many meetings in both villages educating
ourselves about the settlement and what options we had. I traveled a lot in those
days, even to Fort Yukon and Katsikh, trying to reach all of our members to let
them know we had to decide about keeping our reservation land or choosing a
smaller amount of land and getting some of the money from the land claims
settlement. Some of the things people talked about at these meetings was how hard
our ancestors had worked to get the land in the first place and to protect it from
outsiders and how we had to keep protecting it for the future generations. It was
no surprise to me that the vote was overwhelming in favor of keeping all of our
reservation land instead of becoming Doyon shareholders and getting a part of the
settlement money.4 "2
3. INDIAN COUNTRY AND REGULATION OF HUNTING AND FISHING
If someone were to waste some part of the animal, the people would call a
meeting of the authorities. They would ask for the person that left the wasted
animal, talk to him and tell him not to do that again. If a person violates the rule
again, his gun is taken away. The third time it happens, the person is banned from
the village. If a person doesn't check his traps or fishnets, this is a waste and must
not be allowed. The animal has worked hard to survive and it's not right to leave
it stuck in a trap. We don't know how badly that animal might feel. It would also
be a waste to let a wolverine get an animal that we have trapped. There is not big
difference in wasting a big animal like a caribou or a small animal like a squirrel.
Each one gives us nourishment so the result should be the same if someone wasted
either of them. Jim Christian says that the Indian law is to take only what one
needs; that there is no difference in killing bugs as killing caribou when it's not
needed as some other animal might need those things.453
4. INDIAN COUNTRY AND ALCOHOL REGULATION
Two of the most important things ever done which I was involved with the
Tribal Government in the 1960's and 1970's were the protecting of tribal
ownership of the land and enforcing the ban on alcohol consumption and
importation throughout the reservation. We began actively working on banning
all alcohol inhe 1960's after many incidents of violence and other problems caused
by people bringing alcohol to our villages. In Venetie we had meetings of all the
451. Resp. Br., supra note 16, Appendix I at 68aa- 69aa. Testimony of Gideon James.
452. Resp. Br, supra note 16, Appendix I at 48aa. Testimony of Robert Frank.
453. Resp. Br, supra note 16, Appendix I at 32aa-33aa. Testimony of Moses Sam.
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people that went on for many hours. We selected Christian Tritt as our tribal
judge. Anyone that the Council believed had violated the alcohol and would have
to go before Christian Tritt, whose job it was to pass sentence on the person- how
much of a fine to pay or how much community service the person had to do. When
I was Chief I never did like to use the "blue ticket," which causes a person to be
banished from the reservation for a certain period of time. It was my belief that
we needed all the tribal members right there on the reservation, but others after my
time have used "blue tickets" and banished people who violate the alcohol ban. It
is my belief that the reason we are successful in getting rid of alcohol on the
reservation is that we had many, many meetings and talked a long time among
ourselves. The rule to ban all alcohol was decided by all the people and they
supported the Tribal Council and the local village councils in enforcing the ban.
When I was Chief I also talked to FAA and pilots and people who owned the plans
coming into Venetie and Arctic Village and tried to educate them about not
bringing in alcohol. One of the jobs of tribal and village council members was to
search all baggage of incoming planes. Any alcohol found was destroyed or sent
back to Fort Yukon. The ban is still in force to this day.454
5. INDIAN COUNTRY & POLICE POWERS & KEEPING THE PEACE
The Alaska State Troopers are primary state law enforcement for the majority
of the 226 villages in the state of Alaska, and we're not doing a very good job in
delivering service to those villages because of the manpower shortage. We use the
Village Public Safety Program to the best of our ability. We're training them...
We have villages such as Keypunch and Akiachak that are doing their own
policing because we're not giving them the service they want or need. Along the
same line, when they do need us and call us, we're there.
On one hand we're saying: We're going to get to you. And whether it's one or
two or three days later. And on the other hand we say: Well, we're not going to
be able to take care of your problem immediately, so on the other hand, they start
taking care of their problems, like Kipnuk (where people entering the village are
searched)... The somebody comes around and says: Well, we wanted you to take
care of your problem, but we didn't mean it this way. And so, they kind of throw
their hands up and say: On one hand, you're telling us you can't deliver the
services. You're saying we should help ourselves. And now, when we help
ourselves, you're saying time out.455
In my village, I was woke up one morning, as an example (of the absence of
state services in village Alaska) - and this is not a criticism on the troopers, it's
454. Resp. Br, supra note 16, Appendix I at 48aa. Testimony of Robert Frank.
455. Col.GlennGodfrey, AlaskaStateTroopers&Chairman, KoniagNativeCorporationinIndian CountryForum,
supra note 155, at 8-9, 11.
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just telling you the way it is. I woke up... a mother was calling me: "My son's
shooting up his house. He's got his kids. The VSPO is out of town. The troopers
said they can't make it for three days. I went over there and disarmed this guy and
got his kids out and settled him down. And the next day, the family was back
there. Everything was going good. Three days later, you know, peoples come in
and haul him off in cuffs. I mean, the guy was, you know, completely at peace...
I think the state services are way short, and the village tribal governments are there
and they're doing the job.456
6. INDIAN COUNTRY & TRIBAL COURTS
Where's the justice? Our tribal courts are needed out there. The state court
system, is begging us, asking us to help out.4 7
The Bethel D[istrict] A[ttorney] doesn't want to deal with small crimes here.
We [the Quinhagak village court] address them in 24 hours.458
[In the Athabaskan village of Minto there are no judges or juries. A panel of
four or fivejudges rules by consensus, often discussing things like extended family
relationships that wouldn't be relevant in state court.] They consult with one
another, or bang heads around, and look at the case.459
7. INDIAN COUNTRY & CHILD-REARING
When I was the IRA Tribal Government Chief I also had to deal with matters
involving children of our members. I remember one time a state social worker
went up to Arctic Village because someone had filed a complaint. I told the state
not to come into our villages unless they heard from the Tribal Government first.
After that, we never had any problems. In those days adoptions were done the "old
way"- that is, by agreement between families or between family members. That
has always been how we take care of our children.'
8. INDIAN CoUNTRY, ViLLAGE GOVERNMENT & COmmuNrry MEMBERSHIP
There has never been a need to write our laws down or write up descriptions
456. Will Mayo, President Tanana Chiefs Conference, in Indian Country Forum, supra note 155, at 10-11.
457. Id. at 11.
458. Anthony CaoleTribal Administrator,QuinhagakquotedinTomKizzia, WhoseLawand Order?, ANcHoRAGE
DAILY NEws, Special Section on Indian CountryJuly 3, 1997, at 18.
459. Charlie Titus, Jr., former judge, quoted in Tom Kizzia, Whose Law and Order, ANcHoRAGE DAILY NEWS,
Special Section on Indian Country, July 3, 1997, at 18.
460. Resp. Br, supra note 16, Appendix I at 49aa. Testimony of Robert Frank.
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of how we operate. But recently, more and more State government and federal
government programs are causing us to do things more formally. We received a
grant from the Administration for Native Americans (ANA) self-governance
project in the amount of $158,000 to interview our elders and write down
traditional knowledge, customs and advice about how to preserve our land and
tribe. We also plan to write down our traditional laws as part of our ANA project.
The goal is to ensure future protection for our tribe and its membership and to
make sure that our tribal government remains in control of all local matters.
461
An outsider who marries into a family does not become Gwich'in and cannot
be enrolled on the reservation list but the children can be enrolled. Gwich'in
means community of people who live in a particular place. A non-member is not
allowed to have business on our land. John Fredson has told us that this will not
work. The non-member brings down our strength and destroys the land...
Someone who lives here with is for 5, 10 or 20 years and takes care of things like
we do, becomes like us but still cannot do business on the land. A non-member
can rent space if he leaves something here but if a non-member operates a business
on tribal land, I will claim all his belongings and make them leave.462
9. INDiAN COUNTRY AND NAIVE WORLDVIEWS, SUBSISTENCE LIFEWAYS &
IDENTrrY
The elders have taught us to waste nothing of the animal. When we first
moved to Christian Village, I learned from Chief Christian to make sure that every
part of the animal was brought back to camp. Back then, I didn't understand why
we had to do all that. When I asked my mother about it, she said that once when
she was young, there had been some very hard times. Because of these bad times,
they were so grateful to get an animal that they would use every part of it. They
would clean it, treat it, and preserve it with respect as best as they knew how. The
most important part of their lives was preserving food for future survival. There
was a fish trap to catch fish, then the fish would be dried so it can go with the
people when they hunt sheep. A snare is set in the path of the sheep leading to
natural soft grounds. When a sheep is snared, the people surrounded it and killed
it with bow and arrows. After that is harvested, they cooked only a little for them
to eat; the rest was dried and taken back down into the valley to be stored for the
cold winter months. They might fish again when they returned from the sheep hunt
but only until the time when the caribou would migrate this way. Then, they
moved their caribou fences, set snares in the corrals and somehow would herd the
animals into the openings in the fences. This was the best way to get the caribou
because it would be too hard to get enough to survive the winter otherwise. When
they were lucky, they harvested lots of animals and everyone would share the meat
461. lId at68aa-69aa.
462. Id. at 34aa-35aa.
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equally, storing most of it for future survival. This food would last until the middle
of the winter and when it began to run out, they moved to another location to hunt
for food again. This is what we call the nomadic life and this is where we come
from.! 3
10. INDIAN COUNTRY & HUMAN RIGHTS & SELF-DETERMINATION
My question is: The right of indigenous people to govern themselves in their
own way and manner is, in my opinion, a basic human right. And I would like to
ask the panelists (state & Native leaders) if they believe that the right of the first
people to govern themselves in our own homelands is or is not a basic human right.
And I would really appreciate it if it wouldn't be prefaced with a "but" and just
came out straight with an answer.4
The Native people of America had these governments thousands of years
before... I mean, when Caesar was conquering Britain for pete's sake, and they
were, you know, worshipping rocks, I mean the Native nations of Alaska had
governments. And they've had them ever since... they had themwhen Christopher
Columbus was found on our beaches in the Lower 48, and they had it when Alaska
became a state in 1959. And they still have it because it's never been revoked or
taken away. And the fact is, that a basic human right is something that is beyond
and above the state of Alaska, its constitution, the United States of American, it's
constitution.4 5
463. Id. at 31aa-33aa.
464. Paul Swetzoff, Aleut Representative to the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council and alternate to the AFN Board of
Directors, in Indian Country Forum, supra note 155, at 12.
465. Will Mayo, President, Tanana Chiefs Council, in Indian Country Forum, supra note 155, at 13.
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